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Abstract 
      The early years of the Soviet Union provide a rich context in which to examine the animal 
question, as one in which we see a complex search for meaning and identity in the climate of war 
and revolution.  Three writers of the time—Boris Pilnyak, Andrei Platonov, and Evgeny 
Zamyatin—use animal imagery in ways that both illustrate and complicate ideological and 
ontological tensions.  They emphasize the complexity of animal imagery, and the many 
problematic layers of the “animal.”  Challenging traditional constructs of hierarchy and value, 
their works engage issues of identity, the problem of dehumanization, and the question of the 
intrinsic value of nonhuman beings. 
      In Chapter One, I explore the flexibility of animal imagery in constructs of human identity.  
In “Mother Earth” Pilnyak employs as his “hero” a misidentified fox cub to explore the 
estrangement and hostility between historically divided social groups.  In “North” Zamyatin uses 
animals to explore the opposition between the primitive and the civilized, disrupting the binary 
construct through simultaneity and liminality.   
      In Chapter Two, I show how Zamyatin and Platonov use the literalization of dehumanizing 
tropes to question essentialist notions of animality and notions of morality and progress.  In “The 
Dragon” Zamyatin challenges to notion of “humanness” by raising a third point of contrast to the 
animal/human binary: the inhuman.  Similarly, in “Garbage Wind” Platonov disrupts human 
superiority through regressive metamorphosis, and challenges the “humanity” of humans who 
use science to justify oppression.   
       In Chapter Three, I examine the question of value, and the difficulty of representing a 
nonhuman subject whose interiority is not fully accessible to us.  Pilnyak’s “A Complete Life” 
marginalizes the human by showing the “complete” lives of birds in the wild, free of human 
influence or meaning.  By contrast, in “The Cow” Platonov presents the life of a cow whose 
value, as an agricultural resource, is limited to the products of her body.  The tension created by 
vii 
 
these conflicting views provides a critical view of anthropocentrism, in terms of both the 
exploitation of living beings, and the devaluation of individual subjective lives by which such 
exploitation is justified.   
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Introduction 
 
I.  Drawing Lines. 
      A Civil War propaganda poster from 1919 presents an image of a white medieval knight on 
horseback charging from the sky, about to slay a red dragon (Figure 1).  The heading reads, “For 
United Russia,” and was designed to inspire the White Army to fight the “serpent ring” of 
Bolshevism that had “squeezed the heart of Russia.”   It is a strong image, deliberately 
associating the plight of the White Army with the iconic image of St. George.  While the poster’s 
symbolic meaning is unambiguous, the basic elements of the symbolism are not.  A similar 
revision of the St. George image was also made earlier, in 1918, this time depicting Trotsky on 
horseback about to plunge a spear into a serpent’s head (Figure 2).  The serpent wears a top hat 
and has the word “counter-revolution” written on his body.  Juxtaposing these two images, we 
see that the knight and the serpent are the basic variables which can represent either term in a 
binary pair relating to values of good and evil, right and wrong, etc.  While the political or 
ideological forces represented by the figures in the image may vary, the relationship between 
them is constant: the knight is always the good, while the dragon/serpent is always the evil.   
      Animal imagery is common in propaganda because of the ease with which such imagery can 
access reductive cultural associations in order to position one ideology or group against another, 
to either valorize a hero or vilify an enemy.  This ease stems from the tradition of seeing the 
animal according to a mode (or modes) of binary opposition, and then using this opposition to 
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inform or illustrate others.  Animal imagery provides a compressed and flexible vehicle for 
symbolizing notions of identity, meaning, and value. 
      While binary constructs are common across cultures and historical eras, during periods of 
intense social conflict, the tendency to define circumstances or people according to these 
constructs—old/new, right/wrong—is particularly strong.  The period surrounding the Bolshevik 
Revolution was wrought with tension as Russia, still suffering the effects of World War I, was 
thrown into further conflict, and lines were continually being drawn according to class and 
ideology, in an effort to define and assert notions of identity and meaning during a time of great 
transition.  Much of the literature of the period is both an exploration and a reflection of this 
tension, self-definition, and conflict.  It was a period in which writers were still very much in the 
modernist current of exploration and innovation, with its preoccupation with fragmentation, 
discontinuity, and impermanence; and their art is both an extension and expression of the 
significant social and cultural changes occurring at that time. 
      This dissertation is about the literary use of animals and animal imagery in selected stories of 
three important and influential Russian writers: Evgeny Zamyatin, Boris Pilnyak, and Andrei 
Platonov.  Their work, in general, is very much a product of, and directly engages, the 
experience of identity-construction as it occurred in the climate and aftermath of the Bolshevik 
Revolution.  The specific works to be considered here were chosen because of the way in which 
their use of animal imagery engages the complexity of the animal image.   They all address 
issues of identity, meaning, and value, but they do so in a way that questions these very concepts, 
and the beliefs associated with them, and they do so, in part, through a use of animal imagery 
that draws attention to itself.  They highlight the ambiguity of the animal image, the tension 
between the symbolic and the real, and how nonhuman animals are simultaneously figurative 
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symbols and living beings in a way that challenges or distorts our perception and understanding 
of either.  Reading these works with attention to the animal imagery we see that they engage 
difficult questions about the concept of the animal as a counterpoint to the human, about the 
animal as a mode of generating systems of meaning, the instability of such systems, and the way 
in which the ideas we hold about the animal directly influence both our concept of self, and our 
attitudes and treatment of those we view as “other.” 
 
II. The animal read in mind and body. 
      “The question of the animal” is very complex because the term “animal” contains multiple 
meanings which exist simultaneously and inform each other, often with very serious 
implications.  The term can refer to any animate being, including humans, or it can refer to all 
animate beings excluding them; it can refer to the biological, “natural” aspects of being, or it can 
refer to those lower, baser qualities positioned in opposition to those considered higher or 
refined.  Thus, in general, the term refers to two principal ideas: animals and animality.  Because 
of the multiplicity of meanings and because of the fact that “the animal” refers to both actual, 
living beings and the concepts we construct about such beings, when we speak of “the animal,” 
we are generally talking about what animals mean to us.  Thus, in addition to all the things for 
which we use nonhuman animals, such as food, clothing, labor, etc., an important, and not 
entirely separable, use is in the development of our self-concept.  We recognize that we are 
animals, but we have developed the idea that we have somehow transcended the animal, or that 
we have been afforded some special place in the terrestrial scheme of things.  But the key 
problem here, and the one which Critical Animal Studies seeks to address, is the 
anthropocentrism inherent in this way of seeing, and the consequence this has for other beings.  
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Nonhuman animals are subjects of their own lives in ways that are entirely separate from the 
value we grant them, either physically or conceptually.  Yet, our notions of animality and of 
animals, affects not only our relationship to our own animality, but also the very real lives of 
actual nonhuman beings, as species, groups, and, perhaps most importantly, individuals.  This 
question has been raised by a number of theorists working on this problem: how the attitudes and 
treatment of living animals are affected by our concept of “the animal.”  And it is a difficult 
question because of the extent to which all the aspects of this concept are connected and 
continually influence each other.  As Steve Baker describes it, “Our attitudes, our prejudices and 
indeed our sympathies are all filtered through or clogged up in this thick but transparent mesh (or 
mess) of history, culture, public opinion, received ideas.”1  
       In many ways, our concepts of human identity and value are the result of dualistic notions of 
animals and animality.  We define the human by drawing a border of difference between “them” 
and “us,” between the animal and the human.  But because humans are animals and other 
animals are both like us and not like us, this border of difference is flexible and vague.  A 
productive way to engage this problem is to look at the larger dualism as comprised of two fairly 
distinct strains of thought, one which draws a line between humans and other animals, and one 
which draws a line between humanity and animality.  The former is mainly a biological 
classification, while the latter is a moral position, yet the two are often mapped onto one another, 
continually affecting the understanding of both.    
       In his examination of theories of totemism, Claude Lévi-Strauss provides one approach to 
this system of mapping.  He argues that animals figure prominently as totems in primitive 
                                                 
1
 Steve Baker, Picturing the Beast: Animals, Identity, and Representation (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
2001), 10. 
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societies not because a particular animal has any real relationship or resemblance to a given clan 
or tribe, but because they have great potential as metaphor, that animals are chosen “not because 
they are ‘good to eat’ but because they are ‘good to think.’”2  Animals and nature provide a 
conceptual framework upon which analogic associations are imposed.  But this framework often 
has little to do with actual animals or an objective understanding of the natural world.  Rather, it 
is based on reductive concepts which we use to explain, justify, or criticize practices, qualities, or 
habits we see in ourselves.  
      Exploring the practice of associative projection, Lévi-Strauss explores some problems 
concerning notions of similarity and difference he sees in earlier studies of totemism.   He 
maintains that animal imagery has been a significant part of cultural identity throughout history, 
but he asserts that associations with certain animals are not based on resemblances between an 
animal and a human group, but are actually rooted in notions of difference.  He states that the 
important thing is “not the resemblances, but the differences, which resemble each other.” 3  
There are two realms of difference, he argues, one which distinguishes one animal species from 
another, and another realm which distinguishes different human social groups, either different 
tribes or different segments of one tribe, and that these two modes of difference are seen as 
analogous.    
      This associative projection is used to illustrate or validate hierarchical constructs of both 
nature and human society, informing the enduring constructs of a Scale of Nature or a Great 
Chain of Being.
4
  Sometimes the implications of these constructs are fairly neutral, while at other 
                                                 
2
 Lévi-Strauss, Totemism, Trans. Rodney Needham (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), 89. 
3
 Lévi-Strauss, 77. 
4
 For a detailed discussion of these hierarchical constructs, see Arthur Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study 
of the History of an Idea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964). 
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times we see the more negative aspects of this in the justification of exclusionary social 
practices, including forced stratification and exploitation based on race or class.  Such mapping 
can be seen in the language of taxonomic systems, especially pre-Darwinian systems, which 
arrange natural phenomena according to a hierarchically structure.  To illustrate this type of 
analogical identification, Keith Thomas discusses the social terminology of taxonomic systems, 
pointing out, as an example, that Carl Linnaeus classified vegetables into “tribes” and “nations” 
with the latter having “plebeians” (grasses), “patricians” (lilies), “servants” (mosses), “slaves” 
(flags), and “vagabonds” (fungi).5  He also discusses how this sort of terminology was used to 
arrange different species as well as to understand the behavior of individual species, such as the 
monarchical structure of beehives.  These projections are quite often developed and maintained 
despite natural complexity and conflicts between metaphor and reality.
6
   
       While the theories of Darwin and his successors have changed the way we understand the 
natural world, we continue to project one system of identification onto another, often with moral 
implications.  A particularly clear discussion of these implications is offered by the 
anthropologist Tim Ingold.  Where Lévi-Strauss sees two parallel lines of classification mapped 
onto one another, Ingold sees two lines basically intersecting, and he argues that the attempt to 
align the two is problematic because it relies upon a false identification.  He outlines two senses 
of humanity, one which sees the human as a species of animal (Homo sapiens) and one which 
sees the human as a condition opposed to the animal.  These two modes of thought are conflated 
to produce an anthropocentric view of human exclusivity, one which sees humans as unique not 
                                                                                                                                                             
  
5
 Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500-1800 (London: Penguin Books, 
1983), 66. 
6
 To underscore this, in his discussion of  the popularity of the beehive as a metaphor for monarchical rule, Thomas 
explains that  prior to the seventeenth century it was thought that the beehive was ruled by a male, a king bee.  The 
female sex of the large bee was eventually proven in the mid seventeenth century by a Dutch entomologist, but his 
findings were so controversial that they were published only decades later in the 1740s.  Thomas, 62. 
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in the sense that every species in unique, but one which sees humans possessing certain qualities 
in comparison to which all other animals are essentially the same.
7
  He argues that philosophers 
have sought the essence of humanity according to a mode of exclusion, asking not “what makes 
humans animals of a particular kind?” but rather, “what makes humans different in kind from 
animals?”  In shifting the emphasis this way, humanity “ceases to mean the sum total of human 
beings, members of the species Homo sapiens, and becomes the state or condition of being 
human, one radically opposed to the condition of animality.”8  Thus, the question of whether 
human nature resides in our humanity or in our animality elicits conflicting answers, because we 
are, according to this conception, “constitutionally divided creatures, one part immersed in the 
physical condition of animality, the other in the moral condition of humanity.”9 
      This moral condition is overlain with a hierarchical concept of value, which constructs a 
vertical line of development perpendicular to the plane of species and of physical life.  This 
concept asserts an ideal of human aspiration, one which is positioned in contradistinction to 
nature and animality as something to be transcended or overcome in the development of culture.  
The specific qualities of this ideal vary from one school of thought to another, from spiritual 
purity or moral temperance to the cultivation of intellect and refinement.  But whichever quality 
or qualities are celebrated, they are typically antithetical to the lower, “baser” qualities of 
animality, an opposition which creates a dualistic view of the totality of the human self.  As 
Barbara Noske explains it, “humanity’s ‘animalness’ is being restricted to its body, its real 
humanness lies in a vital addition to that body.”10  And since animals have been equated with our 
                                                 
7
 Tim Ingold, “Humanity and Animality” in Companion Encyclopedia of Anthropology, ed. Tim Ingold (London: 
Routledge, 1994), 15. 
8
 Ibid., 19. 
9
 Ibid., 21. 
10
 Barbara Noske, Beyond Boundaries, Humans and Animals (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1997), 82. 
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concept of animality, they are associated with the natural impulses which humans find fearsome 
or distasteful in themselves, a prop in the definition of human values; it was “a comment on 
human nature that the concept of ‘animality’ was devised.”11  These concepts serve moralizing 
and socializing purposes in two different and contradictory ways.  As Richard Tapper explains, 
“Sometimes certain animals are idealized and used as models of order and morality, in animal 
stories and myths.  The animals are treated as agents and social beings, with motives, values and 
morals; and differences between them and people are implicitly denied.  By contrast animals are 
sometimes represented as the Other, the Beast, the Brute, the model of disorder or the way things 
should not be done.  Animals are ideal for both of these purposes.”12 
      In creating this divide within the human, and in identifying the negative aspects of the human 
with animality, and animality with animals, we project upon nature and the other species of the 
world a moral hierarchy with often terrible consequences, both for other animals, and for humans 
who, according to various criteria, somehow fall short of an established ideal, who fail to fully 
manifest qualities thought to define the humanity of the human.  There have been several 
attempts to isolate specific features of this humanity in order to distinguish humans from all 
other species.  Some have emphasized physical characteristics, such as intestinal length or facial 
structure; others have emphasized the mental traits of rationality and language; while still others 
have sought the difference in the religious ideas of a conscience or, most categorically, a soul.
13
   
      The problem with seeking a trait which defines the characteristic excellence of humankind is 
twofold.  First, this type of thought is reductive and dismissive of the enormous diversity and 
complexity of animal life.  Mary Midgley devotes significant space to this problem in Beast and 
                                                 
11
 Thomas, 41. 
12
 Richard Tapper, “Animality, Humanity, Morality, Society,” in What is an Animal? ed. Tim Ingold, (London: 
Unwin Hyman, 1988), 51. 
13
 Keith Thomas offers a valuable summary of many of these defining qualities.  See Thomas, 31-33. 
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Man, arguing that this method of differentiation sets all other species fundamentally apart from 
the human, and that it is really not possible to find a mark that distinguishes humans from “the 
animals” without saying which animals.14  Second, the difference asserted between humans and 
other animals, according to whichever criteria or mark of distinction, is overlain with a 
hierarchical notion of value, positioning other animals as “lower” or less important.  In many 
ways, it is perfectly reasonable to assert the worth of one’s own species over others, as this is 
essentially a manifestation of kin preference, which occurs in many species, even extending that 
kin group to unknown members of the same species.  What we seem continually unwilling to 
accept, however, is that this is a subjective mode of valuation.  There is no cosmic principle to 
defend the position that humans are objectively, fundamentally more valuable than any other 
type of being.
15
   
      The imposition of moral value upon biological classification is at the heart of both Midgely’s 
and Ingold’s arguments.  Midgley focuses mainly on the celebration of intellect as the primary 
trait used in this mode of projection in Western thought, because it is one of the most enduring 
and echoes through classical, religious, and Humanist traditions.  She argues that we must be 
vigilant against conflating the moral and the biological, asserting that “The Platonic exaltation of 
the intellect above all our other faculties is a particular moral position and must be defended as 
such against others; it cannot ride into acceptance on the back of a crude method of taxonomy.”16  
Ingold extends this line of thought to address the moral theories of personhood, arguing that the 
conflation of biology and morality is a great paradox in Western thought.  It asserts equally that 
humans are animals and that animality is the very obverse of humanity; that a human being is an 
                                                 
14
 Mary Midgley, Beast and Man (London: Routledge, 1995), 204. 
15
 It could be argued that one species could be objectively more valuable in the context of a particular ecosystem, but 
given our profoundly negative environmental impact, this line of thought would certainly not work to defend human 
supremacy. 
16
 Midgley, 204. 
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individual of a species, being human is to exist as a person.  He states, “In the first sense 
humanity refers to a biological taxon (Homo sapiens), in the second it refers to a moral condition 
(personhood).  The fact that we use the same word ‘human’ for both reflects a deep-seated 
conviction that all and only those individuals belonging to the human species can be persons, or 
in other words that personhood is conditional upon membership of the taxon.”17   
      The identification of Homo sapiens with the moral construct of “humanity,” along with the 
hierarchical understanding of both of these concepts, are at the core of our devaluation of 
nonhuman life.  One the one hand, these notions inform our exploitative treatment of other 
animals; on the other they are used to justify it.  Since nonhuman animals are considered 
deficient in intellect, language, the capacity for abstract thought, the ability to enter into 
contracts, an immortal soul, or any other exclusionary criteria, they do not, in themselves, 
warrant ethical consideration.  Keith Thomas asserts that a powerful argument for the Cartesian 
position of animals as automata, was that it was the best possible rationalization for the way 
humans actually treated animals.  The alternative view had left room for human guilt by 
conceding that animals could and did suffer, and it aroused worries about the motives of a God 
who could allow animals to undergo suffering on such a scale. The view of an absolute 
ontological (and moral) divide  “absolved God of the charge of cruelty and humans of moral 
guilt [and] created an absolute break between man and the rest of nature, thus clearing the way 
very satisfactorily for the uninhibited exercise of human rule.”18  
 
 
                                                 
17
 Ingold, 23. 
18
 Thomas, 34-35. 
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III. Reading the animal in Russian dualism. 
      Dualistic notions regarding the animal often find expression in culture through the 
association of parallel dichotomies.  The opposition between animality and humanity is 
identified with those between instinct and reason, nature and culture, material and spiritual.  
Because dualistic concepts involving animals operate on many levels simultaneously, animals 
are very useful in representing oppositional concepts of human culture and society, and equally 
useful in questioning them.  Moreover, given the flexibility of the animal image and its 
fundamental association with nature, it can at once represent the gross or base level of existence 
which is to be overcome in the name of cultural or spiritual progress, and it can alternately 
represent a sort of Edenic purity and harmony threatened in the process of modernity and the 
increasing estrangement from nature.
19
 This idea gained some currency in the Romantic period 
and found expression in the Russian nationalist movements of the time. 
      In Russian culture there is a strong tendency toward dualistic concepts, a tendency which is 
the subject of a famous essay by Yuri Lotman, in which he outlines many of the important 
manifestations of this idea from the Middle Ages to the end of the eighteenth century.  In the 
essay, he advances two distinct but related ideas; the first has to do with ideological dualism, 
while the second concerns how this dualism informs a cyclical pattern of historical development. 
He argues that a specific feature of Russian culture “is its fundamental polarity which is 
expressed in the dual character of its structure [ . . . ] divided by a sharp line and without any 
neutral axiological zone.”20  This fundamental polarity is centered on the opposition between old 
                                                 
19
 See John Berger for a discussion of the development of nostalgia for the animal in the early Modern period. John 
Berger, Why Look at Animals? (New York: Penguin Books, 2009), 21-23. 
20
 Yuri Lotman, “The Role of Dual Models in the Dynamics of Russian Culture,” in The Semiotics of Russian 
Culture, ed. Ann Shukman (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1984), 4. 
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and new, an opposition which informs and absorbs other oppositions, such as Russia/the West, 
true faith/false faith, social top/social bottom, etc.
21
  As a consequence of this polarity’s being 
both extreme and hostile, and its having no neutral axiological zone, Russian culture can be 
divided into historical stages which replace each other dynamically, with each new period 
forming a decisive break with the preceding one.  Because each new stage arises in opposition to 
the one immediately preceding it, there tends to be a regeneration of archaic ideas and structures, 
a cycle of “negations of negation” which, in the larger picture, contributes to an overall 
homeostatic character.
22
 
      While the historical scope of his essay does not extend beyond the end of the eighteenth 
century, evidence of these binary models can be traced through the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, if not beyond.  In the nineteenth century, the fundamental old/new dichotomy, 
and its attendant opposition of Russia/the West, gained increased strength in the 
Slavophile/Westernizer debate in its various manifestations.  According to Lotman, in the second 
half of the eighteenth century there was another turn towards the celebration of the “old” and the 
“natural” as the primordial sources of national culture, unsullied by Western influences.23  This 
trend found expression in various circles and movements, such as the Wisdom Lovers and the 
early Slavophiles, who believed that Russia had developed along a trajectory separate from 
Western Europe and Roman influence, and consequently developed and maintained valuable 
traditions of spirituality and communalism (sobornost’) that distinguished it from the 
rationalization, materialism, and atomization of Western society.
24
  While the upper classes were 
influenced—and largely corrupted—by the West and westernizing reforms of Peter I, the 
                                                 
21
 Ibid., 5. 
22
 Ibid., 3,5. 
23
 Ibid., 26-7. 
24
 Andrzej Walicki, History of Russian Thought: From the Enlightenment to Marxism (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1979), 93-95. 
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common people (narod) had remained pure and were, in many respects, the repositories of these 
distinct and morally superior traditions and customs.
25
  Despite their being romantic and utopian, 
as Andrzej Walicki characterizes them, the ideas of the Slavophiles were influential to later 
political movements, such as Panslavism, some strains of Populism, and later, Eurasianism and 
Scythianism.  All of these feature nationalistic constructs of Russian (or Slavic) singularity and 
superiority characterizing one side of an East/West binary, and they are distinguished by cultural 
constructs that characterize the relative primitivism of the common people as a comparatively 
simple, authentic mode of life that is closer to God and a sort of “natural order,” in contrast to the 
Westernizers who tended to view them as emblematic of Russia’s backwardness and retarded 
development.   
      In the twentieth century, this cultural dualism found expression in Bolshevik ideology and its 
constructs of hostile antinomies.  In her examination of Soviet political posters, Victoria Bonnell 
argues that while the Bolsheviks drew intellectual support from Marx and Engels, including the 
dualism of class struggle, their binary models were equally influenced by “the bipolar orientation 
in traditional Russian culture.”26  They organized their social constructs around the diametric 
oppositions drawn between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the kulak and the poorer peasant, 
White versus Red, individual versus collective.  Furthermore, these contrasts were so polarized 
that, as in Lotman’s theory, there was not a neutral axiological zone; the Bolsheviks were 
intolerant of ambiguities, of social categories or individuals who occupied, socially or 
intellectually, an intermediate position.
27
  In light of both this tendency to draw definitive lines 
between opposing ideologies, groups, eras, etc., and in the inclination to think in parallel 
                                                 
25
 Ibid., 96-98. 
26
 Victoria Bonnell, Iconography of Power: Soviet Political Posters under Lenin and Stalin (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1999), 187. 
27
 Ibid., 188. 
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dichotomies, some writers of the period drew upon animal imagery to explore the implications of 
these oppositional constructs. 
 
IV. Chapter outline. 
      This work is comprised of three chapters each of which explores a specific aspect of the 
animal question.  I provide close readings of two principal texts in each chapter to examine not 
only the development of a particular theme, but the careful way these themes are treated through 
the language and structure of the texts.  I seek to show that the specific details in these texts 
reveal the authors’ awareness of the richness, complexity of animal imagery, as well as its 
implications.  Looking at these works through this particular critical lens both enriches our 
aesthetic appreciation of these texts, and shows how they engage, both thematically and 
formally, the problems of animal representation and the politics of human and animal identity. 
      In Chapter One I analyze Pilnyak’s “Mother Earth” and Zamyatin’s “North” to show the way 
in which the authors explore the flexibility of the animal image in constructs of human identity.  
Pilnyak uses animal imagery to explore the constructs of cultural dualism, specifically the idea of 
the estrangement and hostility between historically divided social groups.  He does this by 
establishing as the “hero” a fox cub who is mistaken for a wolf by those whose urban 
background has estranged them from nature and the authenticity of the common people.  
Similarly, Zamyatin also uses animal imagery to explore cultural dualism and dualist constructs 
of identity, specifically the opposition between the primitive and the civilized.  He constructs a 
center-periphery model, and then complicates it through narrative point of view, and by adding 
aspects of simultaneity and liminality, which disrupt simplistic binary constructs.  Moreover, the 
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animals in these texts are both symbolic and “real,” a detail which demonstrates the authors’ 
engagement with the complexity of the animal image, and which reminds the reader that animals 
are more than the concepts we create with and about them. 
     Chapter Two continues the theme of identity but in a much darker context as I explore the 
problem of dehumanization and the way in which the rhetoric and practice of dehumanization is 
connected to constructs of human supremacy.  I analyze the stories of Zamyatin (“The Dragon”) 
and Platonov (“Garbage Wind”) to show how these texts use the literalization of dehumanizing 
tropes to draw a connection between essentialist notions of animality and notions of morality and 
progress.  These texts are particularly compelling insofar as their use of animal imagery 
problematizes the conventional moral hierarchy.  Zamyatin questions the notion of “humanness” 
by raising a third point of contrast to the animal-human binary: the inhuman.  Similarly, Platonov 
disturbs the anthropocentric view of human superiority through the idea of regressive 
metamorphosis in a way that challenges the “humanity” of humans who use scientific rhetoric as 
a means of justifying oppression and violence.  I argue that these texts illustrate a connection 
between the devaluation of nonhuman life and the oppression of humans regarded as essentially 
inferior “subhumans.”  In doing so, they question the complex and problematic concept of 
“humanness.”  
      In Chapter Three I turn from more figurative treatments of animal imagery to texts which 
engage the problem of actual animals, the questions of nonhuman subjectivity and intrinsic 
value.  I examine Pilnyak’s “A Complete Life” and Platonov’s “The Cow” to show how these 
texts both attempt an approach to the nonhuman subject, and underscore the inherent difficulty of 
representing a subject whose interiority is not fully accessible to us.  These works approach the 
question of the animal subject in two very different contexts.  Pilnyak’s story marginalizes the 
16 
 
human by showing the “complete” lives of birds in the wild, free of human influence or meaning.  
Platonov, by contrast, presents the life of a cow whose value, as an agricultural resource, is 
limited to the products of her body.  The tension created by these conflicting views provides a 
critical view of anthropocentrism, in terms of both the exploitation of living beings, and the 
devaluation of individual subjective lives by which such exploitation is justified.   
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Figure 1: Poster, “Za edinuiu Rossiu,” 1919. 
 
Heading and caption, in English:  
FOR UNITED RUSSIA! 
"A thick serpent ring of Bolshevism has squeezed the heart of Russia. 
It seemed that the victim could not break free. 
But suddenly, in the light of the rising sun, came a horseman, freely taking the hard task 
of saving Russia. 
 His strong arm is lifted to strike, and the helpless serpent knows that the end is near, that 
he cannot escape and that justice shall be done."   
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Figure 2: Poster, “Lev Trotskii pobivaet kontrrevoliutsiiu,” 1918. 
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Chapter 1 
Opposition 
 
 
“The wolf stopped, momentarily puzzled, then tossed his 
head back and – moved away from me with the very same 
calm, majestic gallop: – there the wolf was free, 
elemental… To me the wolf is the beautiful romanticism of 
Russia, our Russian, blizzardly, dreadful romanticism.” 
          – Boris Pilnyak, Machines and Wolves  
 
      Pilnyak’s 1924 novel uses machines and wolves as metaphors for cultural conflict, as a way 
to explore the social and philosophical tension between civilization and nature, and between 
members of a historically divided populace.  An important feature of the novel, one that is 
characteristic of Pilnyak’s complexity, is that these metaphors have no fixed meaning or defined 
value.  Rather, like the “beautiful” (prekrasnaia) and “dreadful” (strashnaia) romanticism in 
Andrei’s characterization of the wolf, Pilnyak contrasts positive and negative connotations of 
each side of the opposition.  On the one hand, the wolf symbolizes strength, courage, 
independence, instinct, and intuition; on the other the wolf symbolizes darkness, stagnation, 
superstition, and brutality.
28
  As the wolf is used here as a symbol of the rural Russian people, its 
ambiguity of signification is characteristic not only of Pilnyak’s ambivalent feelings toward the 
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question of “the people,” but similar feelings of many writers, particularly the so-called “fellow 
travelers,” who felt themselves between two worlds, historically, socially, and culturally.29  A 
number of these writers explored a metaphorical connection between this tension of transition 
and liminality, and the ontological position in which humans place themselves in relation to the 
natural world, as humans conceive of themselves as both animals and above the animal, both a 
part of nature and apart from it.  In the work of both Pilnyak and Zamyatin, for instance, animal 
imagery is used to explore these complicated issues of identity.  In “Mother Earth,” Pilnyak uses 
the image of a wolf and fox to explore the problem of uniting socially and historically alienated 
groups.  In “North,” Zamyatin uses animal imagery to explore the tension of the traditional 
East/West, rural/urban dichotomies in connection with the question of authenticity and progress.   
       While there is a strong tendency to draw associative connections between humans and other 
animals, the image of the animal does not have a fixed semantic meaning.  Sometimes there are 
clear metaphoric or metonymic relationships, at other times the meaning or associative 
connection is vague or unknown.  One example of this variability is the use of animals as 
national symbols.  Some national animal symbols are based on metonymic associations, being 
either native to or prevalent in a given country, such as the Australian kangaroo or Indian 
Elephant, while others are more metaphorical and meant to convey ideas of courage, resilience, 
freedom, or any other qualities thought to characterize national or ethnic identity.  In one sense 
these images are fairly straightforward, with one animal representing one country or group and a 
different animal representing another, with additional distinctions developed to maintain 
exclusivity for those animals that tend to be popular and cross-cultural, such as eagles and lions.  
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However, as Steve Baker argues, while the images themselves may be straightforward, the 
meaning the image is meant to convey is neither consistent nor reliable.
30
  Baker presents a series 
of images of national animal symbols in cartoons, advertisements, and political posters, and 
analyzes them in connection with their context, intended meaning, and reception, to illustrate 
how these symbols are not only fluid but also easily misinterpreted.  He argues that a reason for 
this misinterpretation has to do with the “difficulty in representing timeless, heraldic forms,” 
with the way in which “iconographic codes” can be altered or destabilized through “codes of 
connotation.”31  Another reason is that such iconographic codes are themselves unstable.  The 
lion, for instance, in various cultures and periods has been used to symbolize courage, vigilance, 
endurance, magnanimity, but also pride, wrath, and ferocity.
32
  The question then arises as to 
why animal images would be used if their symbolic meanings are often vague or confusing.   
      One answer involves the area of inquiry in which Lévi-Strauss asserted that “animals are 
good to think” with.  He argues that animal imagery is used as a symbolic system to establish 
meaning about human life and society by reading relative differences among animals and 
drawing a connection to differences among members of a human society.  This practice of 
associative projection can be seen in many cultures and cultural expressions, from fables and 
religious myths, to theories of taxonomy and social politics.  As Keith Thomas explains, “it is an 
enduring tendency of human thought to project upon the natural world (and particularly the 
animal kingdom) categories and values derived from human society and then to serve them back 
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as a critique or reinforcement of the human order, justifying some particular social or political 
arrangement on the grounds that it is somehow more ‘natural’ than any alternative.”33   
      The rich potential of animal metaphors exists in this concept of the similarity of differences, 
as Levi-Strauss asserts, but it simultaneously exists in concepts which maintain a strict difference 
between humans and other animals.  If the first concept is more commonly used to define or 
justify certain, often hierarchical, social structures, the second is more commonly used in the 
realm of morality.  Rather than describing the ways in which humans and our inter- and 
intragroup relations and structures are similar to other animals and their inter- and intraspecies 
relations, the emphasis here becomes one of human distinctiveness, supremacy, and the elevation 
of “humanity.”  On a moral level, the proposed distinction between humans and animals has less 
to do with actual animals than it does with the animality of the human.  This is a mode of 
projection that sees animals as representative of the uncomfortable, frightening, or repellent 
aspects of being, all that is “carnal,” “lower,” “base.”  As the antithesis of what is valued as 
noble, civilized, or refined, our humanness is in many ways defined through the negation of 
animal features, through the repression or excision of our own animality.
34
  This line drawn to 
separate humans from other animals, and humanity from animality, has powerful and far-
reaching implications, informing a host of binary oppositions such as wild/tame, lower/higher, 
nature/culture, primitive/civilized, body/mind, flesh/spirit, most of which stem from traditional 
theological and metaphysical dualism.  Animals are very useful as symbols because they can be 
made, more or less easily, to represent one side of a moral or ontological opposition.  These 
oppositions influence not only our treatment of other animals, but also our treatment of each 
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other, since in our constructions of nature, as Mary Douglas phrases it, “the contrast between 
man and not-man provides an analogy for the contrast between the member of the human 
community and the outsider.”35   
      Animal imagery is used, then, not in spite of its inherent variability, but because of it.  
Animals are useful as symbols because they can simultaneously carry a number of different 
meanings and modes of contrast, and can themselves be seen as symbols of conflict.  The works 
to be discussed here explore this variability and complexity of the animal image as it relates to a 
binary model. 
 
I. A Fox in Wolf’s Clothing: Conflict and Estrangement in Pilnyak’s “Mother 
Earth” (1924).   
       Boris Pilnyak rose to great prominence in the years immediately following the Bolshevik 
Revolution, and is noted for being one of the first prose writers to deal directly with the subject 
of the Revolution and the Civil War, most famously in his novel The Naked Year.  Pilnyak 
makes frequent use of animal imagery in his work, to different but related ends.  Some works 
include animals in a more auxiliary role as merely beings of the natural world, as many of his 
stories are set in the provinces, where animals are a more integral part of daily life.  In others, 
animals are given a more prominent role as central figures in a range of representational modes.  
Some animal subjects are clearly allegorical, such as the characters of “A Dog’s Life” 
(“Sobach’ia zhizn’” 1919), where various animals are anthropomorphized and speak in human 
language.  Others are represented as animals as such, where the narrator attempts to provide a 
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vision of life from an animal’s point of view, in the spirit of the animal stories of Jack London.  
“A Complete Life” (“Tselaia zhizn’” 1915) and “Snow Wind” (“Pozemka” 1917), for instance, 
present life, death, and the struggle for survival in nature without overt anthropomorphism or 
allegorical didacticism. 
      While there is a range of uses of animals in Pilnyak’s work, they are all, with the possible 
exception of the allegorical “A Dog’s Life,” associated with the theme of nature, and more 
specifically, the contrast seen on several levels between nature and civilization.  This is a major 
current running through his work, and it informed his opinions and artistic treatment of the 
political, social, and cultural issues of his time.  From an early age, Pilnyak felt a close affinity 
with nature and rural life.  His parents were both from the lower Volga region, his mother from 
Saratov and his father from Ekaterinenshtadt, now Marks.
36
  They were active in the Populist 
movement, and believed that the zemstvo could improve the lives of the peasantry through 
education and material improvement.  To that end, they were employed by provincial zemstvo 
boards, his father as a veterinarian, and his mother as a schoolteacher.  The family relocated 
several times, and the young Pilnyak learned much about rural life and the social and economic 
disparity of the country, while his strongly apolitical father impressed upon him the need to 
combat the barbarism which was, in many respects, the consequence of the people’s hardship 
and destitution.
37
  From his somewhat nomadic childhood and from his apolitical father, Pilnyak 
developed a worldview in which he would not attach himself completely to any one idea, 
movement, milieu, or area.  Well-educated and well-read, he was comfortable among urban 
intellectuals, but did not feel, at the same time, detached from the common people.  As Peter 
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Jensen characterizes him, Pilnyak was “very much interested in the borderline between nature 
and civilization; but he did not feel that he belonged specifically to one side or the other, 
considering himself to be just as competent in the big city as in the wilderness.  His place was the 
border area between the two.”38  And while he tended, especially in his earlier work, to idealize 
somewhat the simplicity of rural life and its connectedness to nature and natural cycles, he was 
quite even handed about examining the positive and negative aspects of both nature and 
civilization.  As Gary Browning states, “Throughout his life, ideologies were peripheral to the 
all-encompassing issue that juxtaposed the positive and negative features of nature (spontaneity 
and freedom versus ignorance, poverty, and violence) to the equally positive and negative 
features of civilization (wealth and security versus regimentation and monotony).”39   
      While Pilnyak resisted organized affiliations, he was certainly not beyond political or 
ideological concerns.  He gravitated toward a Slavophile view of Russian exceptionalism in that 
he sought to understand Russia’s place in relation to the East/West dichotomy, and he believed 
that the Russian people had preserved a simplicity and spiritual integrity (though not necessarily 
in terms of religion) that was lacking in the intellectual and mechanized West.  These views led 
him toward a general support for the Bolshevik Revolution, which he viewed, at least initially, as 
a spontaneous popular uprising in the spirit of Pugachev and Stenka Razin.
40
  In The Naked Year, 
Pilnyak expresses these ideas through Gleb Ordynin.  In a conversation with a young 
ecclesiastic, Gleb states that in the West  
Everything is dead, purely mechanical, machinery, comfort! [ . . . ] Machine culture 
forgot about spiritual culture [ . . . ] The Russian State for the last two centuries, since 
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Peter, has wanted to adopt that culture.  Russia, Gogol’s through and through, was being 
stifled in that atmosphere.  And the Revolution has opposed Russia to Europe.  What is 
more—now, after the first days of Revolution, Russia, in her life and her ways and her 
towns has gone back to the seventeenth century.  Peter stood at the end of the eighteenth 
century.
 41
 
And he asks, which of the two will win, “machine Europe” or “sectarian, orthodox, spiritual 
Russia.”   
       While the conflation of the dichotomies old/new, East/West, nature/civilization are not 
exclusive to Pilnyak, it is a prevalent theme in his writing, and it underwent many changes as he 
continually revised and reworked his texts, incorporating early stories into later novels and 
novellas.  A characteristic feature of Pilnyak’s work is his use of repetition and refrain, both 
intra- and inter-textual, and these repeated characters, passages, and images become altered, 
complicated, and enriched in new and broader contexts.
42
  In terms of animal imagery, Pilnyak 
makes repeated and increasingly complex use of the wolf to symbolize both nature and the 
Russian people, and perhaps more specifically the primitive life of the rural peasantry.   
      In Pilnyak’s earlier stories, wolves are used less metaphorically; they do not come to be 
clearly representative of the Russian people until the works of the early 1920s.  Instead, the 
earlier depictions of wolves are of beings in the natural world without any overt contrast to 
civilization, at least within the text.  For instance, in “Snow Wind” (“Pozemka”), written in the 
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spring/summer of 1917, Pilnyak presents the life of a wolf pack at a critical point in a larger life 
cycle, when the leader has temporarily abandoned the pack to avenge the death of his mate.  
When he finally returns, he is killed by a younger, stronger wolf who will himself, the narrator 
suggests, eventually be replaced.  The human in the story, the farmer in whose trap the older 
wolf’s mate is caught and later killed, is chased and mauled to death by the vengeful older wolf.  
Yet, while there is a conflict between the human and the wolf in the story, this conflict is only 
part of the larger struggle for life and survival.  In this they are equal. 
      With this image, Pilnyak establishes the wolf as a symbol of nature and natural life, as a 
being governed by instinct and the will to survive, and he uses the wolf to symbolize similar 
qualities he feels exist in the Russian people.  These associations become more clear and overt in 
later texts, principally in “Wolves” (“Volki” – 1923), which features an important scene in which 
a young anarchist, Anna, visits a menagerie and has a conversation with a Communist commissar 
in front of a caged wolf.  She feels sorry for the wolf and draws a connection between him and 
the suppression of anarchists following the Revolution.  To Anna, the wolf is the master of the 
forest, he is Russia, romantic and beautiful, fierce and terrifying, “like the revolt of Stenka 
Razin.”  Conversely, in the cage he is a “conquered element.”  His brothers wander the forest, 
they howl, live, kill, give birth, die; his brothers are free; “they are Russian and rule the Russian 
fields, forests, and nights,” while he “suffers like a pendulum” in the cage.  In her and the 
narrator’s description, Pilnyak establishes a contrast between wolf and machine which becomes 
the largely irreconcilable conflict between nature and civilization: 
волк бегал по клетке; волк изучил клетку,—он кружился в ней, след в след, шаг в 
шаг, движение в движение, не как живое существо, но как машина, — исчезая в 
тень клетки и возвращаясь в свет; потом он остановился, опустил голову, взглянул 
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на людей понуро, устало, исподлобья и тихо завыл, зевнул;—волк был 
беспомощен, страшный русский зверь.43  
The wolf ran about the cage.  The wolf had studied the cage—he whirled around it, track 
by track, step by step, movement by movement, not like a living being, but like a 
machine—disappearing into the shadows of the cage and returning into the light, he 
stopped, lowered his head, looked at the people despondently, wearily, from under his 
brows and quietly began to howl, yawned.  The wolf was helpless, a frightening Russian 
beast. 
The image of the crippled, mechanized wolf in a cage is the symbol of the alliance between the 
Revolution and the machine, at the expense of naturalness and spontaneity.
44
  It symbolizes the 
conflict outlined by Gleb Ordynin between old and new Russia. 
      This conflict is more fully developed in Machines and Wolves (1924), of which the material 
from the story “Wolves” forms an important part.  While much of the material is the same, 
however, in the novel the connotations of the wolf take on greater complexity and ambiguity, 
and are more revealing of a shift in Pilnyak’s thought regarding progress.  Following the 
publication of “Wolves,” Pilnyak spent the greater part of four months in England during the 
spring/summer of 1923.  This trip made a strong impression on him and significantly influenced 
the novel he worked on at the time.  He saw the possible material and cultural advantages of 
industrialization and the consolidation of labor which, while not completely destroying his 
romantic ideals of authenticity, compelled him to look upon rural Russia as a place of stagnation 
and backwardness.
45
  He saw a need for the machine as perhaps the only way to elevate Russia 
and the Russian people from barbarous conditions and work towards the greater development of 
Russian culture. At the same time he was aware that the advance of the machine does not 
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necessarily alleviate suffering and ensure happiness.  The exploitation of labor will not 
necessarily release the muzhik from the vice of poverty and ignorance.
46
  Thus, in Machines and 
Wolves, we see a very complex and ambivalent picture of the tension between nature and 
civilization, wolf and machine.  At various points in the novel and through its various characters, 
Pilnyak illustrates the contrast between the wolf and the machine which includes the positive and 
negative values of each. On one hand the wolf is nature, simplicity, instinct, spontaneity, 
freedom, and independence.  On the other it is poverty, ignorance, brutality, predatoriness.  
Likewise, the machine is both the artificial, rationalized regulation that crushes life and freedom; 
and it is also material wealth, scientific and technological progress, security, and equality.
47
  
Both have their potential value, but if human life is violated, both civilization and nature are 
equally repulsive.   
      Pilnyak completed Machines and Wolves in June of 1924.  Later that year he finished another 
piece involving the wolf, the novella “Mother Earth” (“Mat’ syra-zemlia”), which has come to be 
considered one of his finest works.  By this point in the evolution of Pilnyak’s symbolism, the 
wolf had become a strong and recurring emblem of wild nature and the Russian peasantry.  
While the wolf continues to hold these associations in this story, there are a couple of crucial 
differences, the most important of which has to do with the specific features of the peasantry the 
wolf is made to represent.  As in Machines and Wolves, Pilnyak continues to explore some of the 
darker aspects of rural life, its primitive barbarity and lawlessness, and thus it is a further step 
away from his earlier romanticization of the rural peasantry and the idealization of raw nature.
48
  
Pilnyak continues to explore the underlying tension between East/West, rural/urban, 
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nature/civilization, but the focus of this tension is on a smaller scale, with an emphasis on a more 
particular, nuanced point.  Here he explores the irreconcilability of these opposites, the mutual 
alienation and hostility of opposing forces.  It is a portrait of estrangement, of the suspicion, 
hostility, and ignorance that came to characterize the chasm in Russian culture between the 
gentry and the peasantry, between educated society and the common people.  In the story, 
Pilnyak uses a wolf pup to symbolize this estrangement, to suggest that it stems from a deeply 
ingrained perception of difference impossible to overcome through structural or ideological 
changes in the larger society. 
      The story is set during the Civil War, in a remote area in the lower Volga region, to which a 
communist party forester, Anton Nekulev, has been sent to organize and oversee a campaign to 
stop the local peasants from ravaging the recently nationalized forest.  Nekulev is an educated 
and worldly man who grew up in a town in the Urals, but who later studied at a forestry institute 
in Germany, lived in Moscow, and became passionately involved in the communist cause.  He is 
proudly rational, and considers his life lived with “the precision of a game of chess.”  He is also 
naively optimistic about the possibility of uniting the city and the countryside.  As he ventures 
into the rural world of the peasants, however, his optimism and rationality are increasingly 
threatened.  He faces repeated and aggressive opposition from the peasants who consider him an 
interference in the taking of the forests which they consider now rightly theirs.
49
  To them he is 
little more than a replacement of the landowning prince whom the peasants gruesomely 
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murdered, a parallel reinforced by Nekulev’s assigned residence in the manor house which had 
been stormed and looted immediately after the Revolution.  In his isolation, Nekulev meets a 
young woman, Irina, who grew up in the area as the daughter of a local tanner, but who lived and 
studied in Petersburg, who joined the communist party before the Revolution, and who has now 
been sent to the area to revive the tannery.  Despite her rural background, her education and life 
in the city have alienated her from the common people.  In some ways she is a liminal character, 
between Nekulev and the peasants; she knows the area and the people, their problems and their 
customs, but she no longer shares their worldview.  But unlike Nekulev, she is not as repelled by 
the darker side of rural life, a difference which ultimately leads to their separation.  While he 
knows that she works as a tanner, when he witnesses her slaughtering a group of old horses, he is 
overcome with revulsion and runs away, never to see her again.  That night, he begins to write 
her a letter, apologizing and thanking her, but he never finishes the letter.  He has received news 
that the White army is approaching and the peasants are rioting.  His unease and fear has reached 
a point that teeters on madness, and he flees the manor house through a window.  That same 
night, Irina is brutally raped and impaled by Cossacks.  In the morning, Nekulev’s peasant 
assistant, Kuzya, finds her room overturned with traces of blood on the floor.  Assuming that 
Irina had been either killed or forcibly expelled, he takes what possessions he can carry, along 
with the pup, whom he later kills to make a hat out of his pelt. 
      Despite his stated importance to the story, the wolf pup occupies very little of the actual text, 
being featured in only five of the novella’s fifty pages.  However, the narrator states at the 
beginning that the wolf pup is the hero of the story: 
 ...Глaвный герой этого рaсскaзa о лесе и мужикaх (кроме лесничего Антонa 
Ивaновичa Некульевa, кроме кожевенницы Арины – Ирины Сергеевны 
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Арсеньевой, кроме летa, оврaгов, свистов и посвистов)—глaвный герой—волчонок, 
мaленький волчонок Никитa, кaк нaзвaлa его Иринa Сергеевнa Арсеньевa, этa 
женщинa, тaк нелепо погибшaя и мерившaя—этим волчонком—погибшим зa 
шкуру—столь многое.50   
The hero of this story of forest and peasants (apart from the forester Anton Ivanovich 
Nekulev, apart from the tanner Arina—Irina Sergeevna Arseneva—apart from summer, 
ravines, and whistles), the hero is a wolf pup, the little wolf pup Nikita, as he was named 
by Irina Sergeevna Arseneva—that woman who was to die so senselessly and to whom 
the wolf pup—who was to die for his pelt—stood for so much. 
After a short section in the prologue, the wolf pup is not mentioned again until the final pages, 
where it is then revealed, at the very end, that the wolf pup is actually a fox.  The reader is then 
left to question the relationship of the wolf/fox to the rest of the text.  Given his previous use of 
the wolf, Pilnyak’s readers would have some understanding of its emblematic significance, and 
given the fact that the bulk of the story is devoted to Nekulev’s conflicts with the local peasants, 
the reader will correctly assume a symbolic relationship between the wolf pup and the peasantry.  
Yet, the question remains as to what purpose the wolf/fox serves, what specific points or shades 
of meaning are gained by not only his inclusion, but the narrator’s insistence on his importance.  
Clues to understanding this lie in the details in the scenes involving the wolf pup, and in the 
story’s overall structure. 
      The novella is composed of five parts, with two main storylines: Nekulev’s problems with 
the peasants, and his relationship with Irina.  Symbolically connected to these are two subplots: 
Irina’s relationship with the wolf pup; and Kuzya’s tale of a man who conceives a devious plan 
to punish three priests who have made advances on his wife.  This man plans to embarrass the 
priests, but inadvertently kills them and covers it up by deceiving a drunken peasant into helping 
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him dispose of the bodies.  This tale is told in four installments throughout the course of the main 
narrative.  The question is how these storylines and subplots fit together to produce a coherent 
whole.    
      There are a few possible ways of answering this question.  Judith Mills, for instance, argues 
that of the two main storylines in the text, one is plotted (Nekulev – Irina) while the other is non-
plotted (Nekulev – peasants).51  While she makes some very insightful points, and her 
conclusions generally seem valid, particularly in her analysis of the thematic conflict between the 
rationality of Nekulev and the instinct-driven world of the peasants, contrasting these two 
storylines this way is a bit problematic, insofar as the Nekulev – Irina storyline only seems more 
“plotted” because there is less space devoted to it and it is therefore easier to piece together.  The 
fragmentation that seems to complicate the plot of the other storyline occurs here as well.  
Furthermore, both of these storylines do in fact follow a generally clear temporal and thematic 
arc, which, while it is complicated by fragmentation, interruption, and detailed subplots, is made 
more coherent through a closer examination of the text’s structure, and its use of repetition, 
parallelism, and framing. 
      Studying the arrangement of the story’s five sections, one notices a clear symmetrical 
structure.  The work begins with a somewhat lengthy prologue, about twelve pages long, which 
is neither titled nor identified as a prologue, in which the main characters and central problems 
are all introduced.  Following the prologue are three core chapters, each with a title and a 
unifying theme.  These are followed by a short epilogue, entitled “About the Wolf Pup.”  In his 
article on Pilnyak’s use of myth, Eduard Meksh points out that the wolf and the theme of 
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blindness provide a frame for the rest of the story, and states that these themes emerge as the 
contrast between the life and fate of the intelligentsia (Nekulev) and the natural society of the 
forest people.
52
  However, as this is somewhat tangential to the focus of his article, he does not 
develop this connection nor explain how it functions in the narrative. 
      The connection between the wolf pup and blindness (and the faculty of sight more generally) 
is not overt, but rather is introduced with a textual association at the beginning of the prologue.  
The story opens with a flash forward to a scene in which a peasant forest thief, Stepan Klimkov, 
is brought before Nekulev after he was discovered hanging inverted in a tree from which he was 
stripping bark during the night.  Apparently, Klimkov lost his footing, became entangled in the 
branches and, consequently, his eyes burst from the sustained rush of blood to his head.  He asks 
Nekulev for a guide since his eyes have “run out” (glaza-te vytekli).  Immediately following this 
flash forward, the narrator begins the introductory part of the prologue which begins with the 
introduction of the “hero” wolf pup in the passage quoted above.  The narrator explains that Irina 
bought the pup from a peasant boy who found him the only survivor of an abandoned litter, and 
that at the time he was still blind and unable to open his eyes.  The narrator places repeated 
emphasis on eyes throughout the text up to the final scenes where we see two striking parallels.  
First, when Irina’s death is described with imagery somewhat reminiscent of the opening scene 
with Klimkov, the narrator notes that her eyes had fallen out of their sockets (glaza vylezli iz 
orbit).
53
  The second occurs at the end of the text, when Kuzya is walking home through the dark 
forest after visiting Irina’s room and taking the fox cub.  The narrator states that Nekulev would 
have wondered how Kuzya could move through the darkness without having his eyes poked out 
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(ne vytknet sebe glaz), which repeats a sentiment (and verbal construction) stated near the 
beginning of the story, in the middle of the prologue, when Kuzya is first escorting Nekulev from 
the village to the manor house.   
      These sections concerning the wolf/fox and the theme of blindness, which occur in tandem at 
either end of the text, do provide a frame for the rest of the novella, and is likely what Meksh 
refers to in his article.  The question remains, however, as to what exactly these episodes are 
framing and what significance this has to the understanding of the work.  The answer is that both 
of these themes have to do with perception, which is obvious with respect to the faculty of sight, 
but less so with respect to the wolf/fox.  And this association with perception operates 
simultaneously on thematic and structural levels.    
      In terms of structure, these opening and closing sections involving blindness and the wolf/fox 
form a frame of the three internal chapters.  Chapter Two is the physical and thematic center of 
the work.  In some respects, it is one long digression, as very little action concerning the main 
storylines takes place within it, and so, in terms of plot, it is largely an interruption and thus 
likely the main cause of the work’s apparent fragmentary form.  However, despite its digressive 
form, Pilnyak emphasizes the chapter’s centrality in a few deliberate ways.  First, it is literally in 
the middle of the text.  Second, it is the only one of the three chapters that does not open with a 
piece of folk mythology.  Chapter One begins with a description of the myth of the wood devil 
(leshii –liad), and chapter three begins with the myth of Mother Earth (Mat’ syra-zemlia).  Third, 
chapter two is divided into two equal sections, which are distinguished from each other by a shift 
in point of view.  The use of contrasting point of view is the key significance of both the chapter 
and the story as a whole. 
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      The primary focus of chapter two concerns the lives and worldview of the peasants among 
whom Nekulev has been sent to live and work.  In the first section, the narrator gives an account 
of the lives of Kuzya and Yegor.  Yegor has built a new hut, but before he and his family can 
move in, they must undertake an elaborate, superstitious “crawling-in” ceremony strictly 
following the directions of another local peasant, “father” Ignat.  Ignat is a local soothsayer who 
rents an apiary, and whom the other peasants turn to as a wise man and folk healer.  Before 
Yegor’s move, Kuzya buys black-market grain and samogon from a local peasant who operates a 
distillery in a cave.  We see Yegor’s wife, Katyasha, decorate an icon case with beer labels 
because she cannot read.  And we see Yegor find Nekulev’s toiletries, and it is made clear that he 
has never seen a razor, toothbrush, or tooth powder.
54
  All of the details in this section serve to 
expand the reader’s understanding of the daily lives of the peasants with whom Nekyulev has 
come to live, and while the narrator conveys the information in a calm, straightforward tone, the 
details emphasize the peasants’ poverty and ignorance, their isolation, illiteracy, superstition, and 
fatalism, as well as a mode of life that is beyond whatever laws and conventions the larger 
society happens to promote at any given time.  The general sense is that their lives are 
characterized by a primitive constancy.  To them, leaders and laws come and go, but their lives 
are so remote, basic, and marginal that these changes occur in a different realm, and if they do 
affect them at all, it is generally as an inconvenience to which they adapt but which has very 
little impact on their lives in the broader picture.   
      Of particular importance in this section is the fact that the reader is given these details 
through omniscient narration, but mainly from Kuzya’s point of view.  The choice of omniscient 
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narration with multiple points of view allows for not only a fuller picture of the characters’ lives, 
but a better understanding of the degree of difference in worldview between Nekulev and the 
peasants, and the enormous difficulty in bridging the gap that separates them.  This gap is the 
main focus of this chapter.  In addition to shifting point of view, the narrator provides long 
passages through which the reader gains access to the views they hold of each other, the 
peasants’ impressions of Nekulev in the first section, and Nekulev’s impressions of the peasants 
in the second.  For instance, in one scene, the peasants have gathered around an evening bonfire.  
Kuzya is in the middle of his tale of the priests when they see Nekulev leave the manor house to 
climb the hill where he occasionally goes to be alone, as by this point he is becoming 
increasingly frustrated and disillusioned.  They exchange stories about him.  Kuzya’s wife, 
Maryasha, tells the others of “the barin’s” indulgent lifestyle, that he “lives like the masters” 
(gospodskaia zhizn’), eating foods both rich (cream, butter, eggs) and exotic (buckwheat), and 
that he insists on having his undergarments washed even though he has worn them only a week 
and they are “clean as can be,” and insists that she wash the clothes and dishes with soap, even 
though she informed him that they hold soap to be “unclean” (poganyi).  Yegor tells them how 
many of the women are convinced that he is a sorcerer, and that one night, out of curiosity, he 
followed Nekulev up the hill and was terrified by what he saw.  He describes how Nekulev 
would break up dry branches to start a fire, lie beside it and stare into the fire, and “his eyes are 
terrible to see, and those glasses on his nose glow like coals—and all the time he’s chewing a 
blade of grass . . . It’s real frightening!”55 And after lying and looking into the fire, or standing 
and staring out over the Volga, he walks home “just like nothing’s happened.”   
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      These details and depictions are given immediate contrast in the chapter’s following section, 
where we see the peasants from Nekulev’s point of view, in a letter describing his time among 
them.  He describes their lives, with many details coming from the preceding section, which 
sharpens the contrast in their respective points of view.  For instance, we learn that Yegor’s hut 
has been built with illegally cut forest wood which he is supposed to be protecting, and that this 
hut is furnished with furniture taken from the manor house after the prince’s murder.  We learn 
that Kuzya’s wife, Maryasha, who is twenty-three, has had five children, two of whom have 
died, and that she bore all of them herself, without help from anyone, including the local 
midwife, and that the three children she has are all filthy, naked, and malnourished.  He explains 
how Yegor’s bull calf became ill and they called in not the veterinarian from the nearby village, 
but the soothsayer, Ignat, who “removed (!) some kind of film (!) from its eyes” and the calf 
went blind.  He then sprinkled salt in them and instructed Katyasha to rub ground snakeskin in 
them for treatment.  Their lives, he states, are all “savagery and horror” and that his relationship 
with them is one of mutual bewilderment:  
Я для них:—барин и больше ничего,—я не пашу, мою белье с мылом, делаю 
непонятные им вещи, читаю, живу в барском доме, стало быть,—барин; заставлю я 
ходить их на четвереньках—пойдут, заставлю вылизать пол—вылижут, и сделают 
это на 50% из-за рабственного страха, а на 50—из-за того, что:—может, барину это 
и всерьез надо, ибо многое из того, что делаю я, что делаем мы, им кажется столь 
же нелепым, как и лизание полов.56 
For them I’m just the Barin and nothing else: I don’t plow, I wash my clothes with soap, 
do things incomprehensible to them; I read, live in the manor house, and so—I’m the 
Barin; if I were to order them to crawl on all fours—they’d do it; if I ordered them to lick 
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the floor clean—they’d do it; and they’d do it 50 percent out of servile fear and 50 
percent because—who knows?—maybe the Barin really needs it done, because much of 
what I’m doing—what we’re doing—seems as absurd to them as licking floors. 
Just as the peasants’ views of Nekulev reveal their incomprehension of him, his letter reveals a 
similar degree of incomprehension, and underscores the idea that their way of life is so deeply 
entrenched that bridging the gap that separates them would likely be impossible.  In juxtaposing 
these contrasting points of view, and in emphasizing this contrast through the structural 
arrangement of the text, Pilnyak underscores the story’s key theme of alienation. 
      Pilnyak further emphasizes this alienation through the wolf pup.  As mentioned above, the 
passages involving the wolf pup are placed at the beginning and end of the text, forming the 
outermost frame of the novella’s center—the contrasting views presented in chapter two.  In 
addition to this structural framing, the wolf scenes reinforce this opposition in other ways, one of 
which is the suspicion and hostility with which the pup meets Irina’s maternal affections.  The 
narrator explains that when left alone the pup leads “a very contented life, absorbed in his own 
concerns,” running about the room, lying around, chasing flies.  But when she enters the room, 
he immediately retreats to his corner and stares at her carefully and suspiciously.  There is a clear 
parallel drawn between the wolf pup’s suspicious hostility and the attitudes and behavior 
exhibited by many of the peasants toward Nekulev.  He tries to treat them with benevolence and 
understanding, assuring them that he is on their side, but his attempts to find a common ground 
with them are consistently frustrated.   
      In addition to these behavioral and situation similarities, Pilnyak also draws this parallel 
linguistically, through the use of recurring terms: 
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Волчонок забился в угол, сидел на задних лапах, поджал под себя пушистый свой 
хвост, и черные его глаза стерегли каждое движение рук и глаз Ирины.  И когда 
глаза их встретились, глаза волчонка, немигающие, стали особенно чужими, 
враждебными навсегда.  Ирина нашла волчонка еще слепым, она кормила его из 
соски, она нянчилась с ним, как с ребенком, она часами сидела над ним, 
перешептывая ему все нежные слова, какие знала от матери, волчонок рос у нее на 
руках, стал лакать с блюдца, стал самостоятельно есть,—но навсегда волчонок 
чувствовал себя врагом Ирины.  Приручить его возможности не было; и чем 
больше волчонок рос, тем враждебнее и чужее был он с Ириной.57 
The wolf pup hid and crouched in the corner, his fluffy tail curled under him, and his 
black eyes followed every movement of Irina’s hands and eyes.  And when their eyes 
met, the pup’s unblinking eyes became especially alien and eternally hostile.  Irina found 
the pup when he was still blind; she fed him with a rubber nipple; she nursed him like a 
baby; she sat over him for hours, whispering to him all the tender words she learned from 
her mother; the wolf pup grew in her care, learning to lap from a saucer, to eat on his 
own—but he felt that he would always be Irina’s enemy.  There was no possibility of 
taming him; and the bigger the wolf pup grew, the more hostile and alien to Irina he 
became. 
In this passage the narrator repeats the words “vrazhdebnyi” (hostile) and “chuzhoi” (other, 
alien), words which are also used in other scenes involving the wolf pup, as well as in the 
beginning of chapter two when the narrator describes Nekulev’s feelings about the manor house 
being alien and hostile to the surrounding area, to the forests and the steppe, and the parallel he 
draws between the murdered prince and his own insecure position among the peasantry.  Of the 
four scenes involving the wolf pup, the word “chuzhoi” is used in all but the last, the final scene 
of the story in which Kuzya finds the pup alone in Irina’s room.   
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      The svoi / chuzhoi (one’s own/other) dichotomy is important in Russian culture based on 
ancient identifications of kinship or clan, as a means of signifying who is and who is not part of 
one’s group.  As Yuri Lotman describes it, the svoi / chuzhoi distinction is vital to the 
construction of the boundary, the primary mechanism of semiotic individuation, which forms the 
“outer limit of a first person form.”58  Pilnyak’s repeated use of the word “chuzhoi,” a term that 
is loaded with connotations of otherness, is a subtle but powerful way to impart to the reader the 
degree of alienation experienced by Irina and Nekulev, both from the wolf, and by symbolic 
extension, the peasants whose world resists them.   
      The absence of the word “chuzhoi” in the final scene further emphasizes this opposition.  
With Irina and Nekulev the wolf pup is invariably hostile, whereas in the scene with Kuzya we 
don’t see this hostility.  He notices the wolf pup, looks at him closely, sees that he is not a wolf 
but a fox, and calmly picks him up by the scruff, wraps him up, and takes him home.  The 
contrast here to previous scenes suggests to the reader a more natural association between the 
animal and Kuzya.  It is not to suggest a bond or affection – the narrator states that during 
Winter, Kuzya kills him for his pelt – but that the wolf/fox and Kuzya, in the realm of the text, 
are on one side of a divide which runs through the story.  The narrator underscores this division 
through Kuzya’s story to the others about the misidentification of the fox.  He tells them that a 
wolf’s tail is like a cudgel, but the fox has a black tuft on the end and his ears are black, but “how 
would the masters (gospoda) know about that?” 
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     The misidentification of the fox is significant in a couple of ways.  On one level, that the 
animal is a fox is symbolic, given its cultural associations of craftiness, trickery, and deceit.
59
  In 
the novella these associations are manifested in the numerous details of theft and deceit 
pervading the text.  In addition to the illegal seizure of forest resources which forms the basis of 
the plot, and the rampant bootlegging of grain and samagon, Nekulev becomes aware of the fact 
that his peasant aides are deceiving him by overcharging for the foodstuffs they procure from the 
German settlements across the Volga.  When he finds out about this, Nekulev is upset over their 
apparent lack of honor, and he reproaches Maryasha and Katyasha, who tell him that they did it 
“for fun, on purpose like” (My ponaroshku zato, narochno my, to est’).  Their nonchalance 
underscores the idea that such behavior is simply a matter of course, as does Kuzya’s tale about 
the deception of the three priests, their accidental deaths, and the peasant’s stratagem to cover up 
the deaths by tricking another peasant into helping him.  As it is, his tale features layers of deceit, 
but with Kuzya’s jovial tone, his rendition is one which celebrates such deception.  Jerome 
Rinkus argues that Kuzya’s tale emphasizes an ironic contrast between the values of the peasants 
and those of the intelligentsia, and that the fox is an allegorical comment on the ease with which 
man may be deceived or deceive himself.
60
 
      This idea of self-deception is another way the misidentification of the fox is important.  Irina 
views the wolf pup as a sort of surrogate child.  We know that before her relationship with 
Nekulev, she was a virgin, and devoted her time to her education and political activity.  Her 
attempt to care for and raise the pup is a way for her to at once reconnect with her rural youth for 
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which she is somewhat nostalgic, as well as to provide an outlet for the instinct of motherhood.
61
  
But the intervening distance has estranged her from the place of her youth, and the wild animal 
rejects her attempts at domestication.  Similarly, Nekulev initially feels that the problem with the 
peasants can be resolved through reason and order.  Just as he imagines it will be easy to restore 
the manor house by replacing windows and doorknobs, installing a new floor, etc., it will be just 
as easy to bring the peasants around to his (and the party’s) way of viewing the local natural 
resources, and creating a rational sense of order.  Additionally, his vision of Irina is also tinged 
with self-deception, insofar as he willfully ignores the reality of her work, and dismisses the 
smell of blood and tanbark that surrounds her.  When he finally comes to face the violent reality 
of what she does, his self-deception is exposed and his idealistic constructs dismantled.  
      In the novella, through repetition and framing, Pilnyak compresses several ideas into the 
image of the wolf/fox.  As established in his earlier work, the wolf is emblematic of positive and 
negative qualities he associated with the peasantry.  Likewise, in “Mother Earth,” we see the 
qualities of instinct, resilience, independence, as well as ignorance, brutality, and anarchic 
predatoriness.  Here, though, he further complicates the image by superimposing upon the image 
of the wolf that of the fox and its cultural associations of treachery and deceit.  This compression 
gives the reader a more complicated image with which Pilnyak symbolizes the mutual alienation 
of the two general groups, and the tension of conflicting identities and worldviews between the 
urban intelligentsia and the uneducated rural peasantry.  Additionally, for our understanding of 
Pilnyak’s evolving thought, this complicated imagery underscores not only his shift from his 
earlier “primitivism” and idealization of “the people,” but also his increasing pessimism toward 
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the idea and possibility of meaningful progress, and his growing ambivalence toward the Soviet 
project.
62
 
 
II. A Space Between: The Bear and Deer in Zamyatin’s “North” (1918). 
      Whereas Pilnyak uses animal imagery to explore the idea of an irreconcilable duality, 
Evgeny Zamyatin problematizes the dual model by introducing the concept of a relative 
continuum.  Zamyatin makes frequent use of animal imagery in his fiction and critical essays.  In 
some instances, he uses animals to symbolize the realm of nature in general; in others, he uses 
animals more in the sense of animality, as symbolic of the “lower” aspects of the human, 
characterized by the barbarous and appetitive, which threaten the realization of “higher,” nobler 
modes of being toward which humans allegedly strive.  The two symbolic uses of animal 
imagery are not exclusive to Zamyatin, informed as they are by traditional dualistic conceptions 
of life and humanity, and the rigid line drawn between humans and other animals.  More specific 
to Zamyatin is the way in which these are connected to differing notions of the primitive, how 
they relate to each other, and how they are characteristic of the sense of tension which echoes 
throughout his work and thought.   
      Present in history, art, philosophy, religion, and science, Zamyatin explores this tension as it 
is expressed in the conflict between the individual and the collective, the natural and the 
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artificial, the primitive and the civilized, and in the philosophical (social, scientific, cosmic) 
dichotomy of energy and entropy.  In his essays, this tension guides his ideas of social 
revolution, artistic forms and movements, and dialectical models.  In his fiction, it manifests 
itself in themes of opposition, formal experiment and innovation, and in his use of satire and 
irony as a means of resisting philistinism and challenging the status quo.  While we can trace this 
tension throughout his work, including the stories, tales, and fables of his early period, it isn’t 
until the “middle period” that we see these ideas taking a more definite shape, being explicitly 
articulated in his essays and in his longest and most famous work, the dystopian novel We.
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      A significant point of tension in Zamyatin’s work is the contrast between the artificial and 
the natural or authentic, a contrast which he often explores through the use of setting.  Many 
scholars have noted a shift in setting during the middle period, with more works being set in the 
city, such as the three stories set in Revolutionary Petersburg (“The Dragon,” “The Cave,” and 
“Mamai”) and the urban future depicted in We.  It is important to remember, however, that while 
there is a greater use of urban setting during this period, the majority of his works, even those 
from this period, feature provincial settings.  Like Gogol, whose Petersburg stories are among his 
most famous, Zamyatin’s provincial stories far outnumber the urban, and come to provide, 
during the middle period, an important thematic contrast.  While rural settings remain a strong 
constant in his fiction, there is an important shift in emphasis and meaning.  In much of his early 
work, especially in the two famous tales, Uezdnoe, and Na kulichkakh, the emphasis is on the 
banality and backwardness of provincial life as degrading or corrupting influences.  In the 
middle period, there is a shift toward viewing the rural, if only symbolically, as antithetical to the 
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mechanization and automatization of urban life as a hyper-rational force that threatens 
individuality and authenticity, and results in a state of entropy and philistinism.  Such a threat is 
central to We, for example, in the opposition of the One State to the Mephi rebellion, and the 
ambivalence and inner conflict this opposition produces in the protagonist, D-503.  
      This shift in emphasis and significance has less to do with setting as it does with evolving 
ideas of the primitive and progress, which take shape in the middle period, at least in part as a 
reaction to the Revolution and its aftermath.  Zamyatin was attracted to revolutionary ideas early 
on, becoming involved with the Bolshevik party during his first years in Petersburg, studying 
engineering at the Polytechnic Institute.  His involvement stemmed more from the pull of 
contrast and rebellion than from a strong interest in politics, as he writes that being a Bolshevik 
at that time “meant following the line of greatest resistance.”64  By the time he finished at the 
Institute, following periods of arrest, imprisonment, and exile, much of the allure of Bolshevism 
had waned and he left the party.
65
  Though he moved away from political forms of rebellion, 
from meetings and demonstrations, his revolutionary passion remained, but he channeled it into 
his academic and artistic pursuits.  A more meaningful break with Bolshevism would come later, 
in 1917, after his return from England.  Like many writers and artists of the time, he was excited 
by the social changes promised by the Revolution, but became disillusioned and highly critical of 
the forms of barbarism and oppression Bolshevik policies were taking.  He was dissatisfied with 
the way revolution had become not a force of dialectical change and social development, but a 
slogan of a state whose policies threatened individual thought and freedom.  Revolution is a 
means of progress, but progress, in Zamyatin’s view, is not a state or condition; rather, like 
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evolution, it is a force of perpetual motion and change, an idea made quite explicit in a 1923 
article in which he wrote that “Revolution is everywhere, in everything.  It is infinite.  There is 
no final revolution, no final number.  The social revolution is only one of an infinite number of 
numbers; the law of revolution is not a social law, but an immeasurably greater one.  It is a 
cosmic, universal law.”66 Very similar ideas are expressed by I-330 in We.  In that novel, D-503 
describes the One State as a place of perfect order, built on reason and mathematical precision.  
The citizens are depersonalized cogs in a carefully-built and smoothly-running machine.  Nature, 
the irrational, and emotion have been forcibly excised.  In the spirit of Ivan Karamazov’s Grand 
Inquisitor, freedom has been sacrificed for the sake of happiness.  It is a state of civilized order 
which is drawn in contrast to the wild, natural world beyond the Green Wall. 
      To explore the problematic notions of progress, Zamyatin uses concepts of nature and the 
primitive as antithetical counterweights to stasis and entropy which he increasingly associated 
with the civilized world.  Thus, in the middle period, as he clarifies his views of revolution as a 
cosmic force, we see a development and a change in the representations of the primitive.  There 
is a quite a shift, for instance, from the animalized characters of his early tales, such as Uezdnoe 
(1911-12), to the similarly primitive fur-bearing people beyond the Green Wall.  While both are 
primitive and “uncivilized,” they exemplify different modes of these ideas.  These distinctions 
can be more clearly seen when comparing some of the provincial tales.   For instance, the 
protagonists of Uezdnoe and “North,” Baryba and Marei respectively, are both portrayed as 
provincial, hulking giants.  There is, though, a crucial difference between them.  While both are 
portrayed using animal imagery—a wolf in Baryba’s case, and a bear in Marei’s—there is a 
difference in characterization and emphasis.  Baryba is lumbering, barbaric, and selfishly 
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appetitive, while Marei is more a gentle giant with comparatively noble, altruistic tendencies.  
Baryba is a brute, whereas Marei is referred to several times as “bogatyr,” recalling folkloric 
associations to heroic figures like Ilya Muromets and mythical notions of authentic 
“Russianness,” in a way similar to Leskov’s Ivan Severyanich Flyagin from The Enchanted 
Wanderer.  In several instances, especially those works which serve as antitheses to philistine 
civilization, the primitive comes to represent a connection to nature, however tenuous and 
nostalgic, and a form of a lost or threatened authenticity. 
      Associating the primitive and rural with the authentic is a strong thematic feature in 
Zamyatin’s “northern cycle,” three stories set in the far north of European Russia, in the area 
surrounding the White Sea.  These three works—“Africa,” “North,” and “The Yawl”—were 
written individually over a span of twelve years, from 1916 to 1928, but have often been 
considered together due to similarities in setting and theme.  Each story features a male 
protagonist whose idealistic dream of a better life is obsessively focused on a material object or, 
in the case of “Africa,” a distant place, rejecting the present for the sake of an imagined future 
happiness.  Each protagonist suffers a tragic fate as a consequence of his pursuit.  These stories 
are not a criticism of aspiration and idealism per se; rather they are, as Shane argues, a rejection 
of the notion that the attainment of a material goal will automatically lead to a perfect life; that 
while Zamyatin espoused true progress as endless movement forward, humans are still mortals 
who should live fully, and that an important part of life exists in manifestations of love rooted in 
strong physical desire.
67
  He advocates an authenticity which often exists apart from, and in spite 
of, social or political conventions and constructions.  This is part of the significance of the setting 
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of these works, as Zamyatin subscribed to the opinion that the distant north was a repository of 
authentic “Russianness.”68   
      While these three works taken together share a number of common elements, this discussion 
will focus on “North” for a few reasons.  First, it was written in 1918 during the middle period, 
and thus is in many respects an immediate reaction to the Revolution and conflicting ideas of 
social and technological progress.  Second, the novella includes a greater use of animal imagery.  
Third, this animal imagery is thematically and formally connected to questions of identity, 
progress, and authenticity.  In “North” Zamyatin uses animal imagery to challenge conventional 
dualistic notions of identity, such as center and periphery, civilization and the primitive, West 
and East, culture and nature.  
      The story is set in a remote fishing village and its surrounding forest in the far north near the 
White Sea.
69
  The story focuses on three characters: Kortoma, a wealthier merchant and 
entrepreneur; Marei, a local fisherman who, while physically imposing, is dreamy and 
withdrawn; and Pelka, a young Sami woman who comes to the village one spring as part of her 
community’s migration route and ends up staying and marrying Marei.  After hearing about the 
technological progress occurring in the city, Marei becomes obsessed with constructing a giant 
lantern which he envisions will illuminate, both literally and figuratively, the entire village.  In 
the course of his work on this, Pelka is seduced by Kortoma, a conquest which, along with the 
crushing failure of Marei’s project, results in a sort of spiritual death of the couple, and the story 
ends with a fatal confrontation with a bear.  They are hunting, but bring only one rifle loaded 
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with shot.  Consequently, they are unable to kill the bear, so in an attempt to survive, they play 
dead.  The bear then covers them with moss and crushes them to death.   
      Zamyatin uses animal imagery to signify or illustrate qualities of the story’s characters.  In 
some instances this is done in a general way, such as the use of animal imagery, specifically fish 
and migratory birds, to characterize the Sami people.  In others, it is used more specifically to 
define traits of individual characters, such as Marei’s nephew, Stepka, who is referred to as zuëk 
(plover) and compared to a puppy, and the shop assistant, Ivan Skitksy, who is compared to a 
mouse.  Marei is likened to a bear, and Pelka is associated with a deer. 
       An important aspect of these comparisons is that they become sustained associations in a 
way that illustrates Viktor Shklovsky’s statement that Zamyatin’s characters are accompanied by 
“a fixed characteristic which is something like a detailed epithet.”70  In the initial presentation of 
a given character, Zamyatin will often draw a similarity between the character and an object or a 
specific animal, and that associated image will be repeated throughout the text often to the point 
where, like Gogol’s extended similes, they border on the grotesque.  This repeated imagery 
becomes interchangeable with the character in the reader’s mind, so that if a character is 
associated with a certain color, for instance, further mention of that color will subtly recall the 
character, even if that character is not mentioned in a given passage.  In “North,” this is 
particularly apparent and important in connection with the story’s three principal characters, 
especially with Kortoma and Pelka, who form the two sides of a civilization/nature binary.  The 
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reader is first struck by this repetition in the initial presentation of Kortoma, whose associated 
image is a samovar.  While this association is not based on a similarity to an animal, as are the 
associations of Marei and Pelka, this early passage serves to establish a formal pattern which, 
because it is so overt and sustained, affects the way in which the reader views the other central 
characters.  Chapter Two opens: 
      На столе в конторе – самовар: скуластый, руки в боки—кирпичом натерт— 
сияет. В сияющем самоварном брюхе—по-своему, самоварному, приплюснуто, 
перевернуто—отражен весь мир. И на своем самоварном языке—самовар, 
несомненно, мыслит: 
     "Мир—мой. Мир—во мне. И что бы без меня стал делать мир?" 
      Самовар милостиво ухмыляется миру... 
      Перед самоваром—Кортома. Кортома в самоваре—как в зеркале: 
приплюснутый, широкоскулый, медно-добродушный. Самовар в Кортоме—как в 
зеркале: рыластый, веселый, бьет день и ночь белым ключом, попыхивает белым 
дымком.71 
      On the table in the office there is a samovar: high-cheeked, arms akimbo, rubbed to 
high polish with a brick.  The shiny belly of the samovar reflects the whole world—in its 
own way: stretched, flattened, upside down.  In its own samovar language, the samovar 
undoubtedly thinks: “The world is mine.  The world is in me.  And what would the world 
do without me?” 
      The samovar grins graciously at the world… 
      Kortoma sits before the samovar.  Kortoma is in the samovar, as in a mirror: 
flattened, with side cheekbones, good-natured.  The samovar is in Kortoma, as in a 
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mirror: broad-jowled, merry, bubbling away day and night, sending out puffs of white 
smoke.  
In this extended association, the narrator introduces several key details and phrases that recur 
throughout in reference to Kortoma.  Some of these are physical details, such as the copper of the 
personified samovar being used to refer to his shiny cheekbones and to his “coppery good 
nature” (medno-dobrodushno), and the puffs of white smoke we see emitted from both the 
samovar and Kortoma’s pipe.  Other details are psychological or behavioral, such as the adverb 
“graciously” (milostivo) which, in addition to later repetition, here already echoes a statement in 
the first chapter, in the way Kortoma “graciously reigns” over the shop and “graciously banters 
with the women” (milostivo koroliuet Kortoma, milostivo shutit s zhënkami).  These earlier lines, 
and the psychological insight provided in this passage, provide a portrait of Kortoma’s self-
importance, his pride in having a central and supreme position in the village: “The world is mine.  
The world is in me.  And what would the world do without me.”  By strongly affixing these 
characteristics to the image of the samovar early in the story, and thus establishing a formula in 
which the physical qualities of the samovar are interchangeable with the psychological qualities 
of Kortoma, the narrator can trust the reader’s memory to recall these characteristics by 
referencing the samovar without explicitly mentioning them.  For instance, during Kortoma’s 
pursuit of Pelka, she rejects him the second time he visits the hut, when Marei is out.  Following 
the rejection, the narrator states: “The samovar world was shattered” (samovarnyi mir 
rasskochilsia).  Later, Kortoma is in his office and the samovar is “boiling, spurting steam” 
(kipit, obdaet parom samovar) suggesting his anger.  And when Pelka arrives at Kortoma’s party 
wearing the dress he acquired for her in Norway, his prideful conquest is illustrated through 
these same associative connections: “The wide-cheeked copper began to gleam; it chomped and 
flattened the world: mine!” (Zasiiala shirokoskulaia med’, chavknula, spliusnula mir: moi!).  By 
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this point, very late in the story, the connection is so entrenched that the narrator can convey 
meaning with a sentence in which only “copper”—not Kortoma nor the samovar—is the active 
grammatical subject.    
      In addition to establishing a formal pattern of association, the Kortoma-samovar parallel 
creates a metaphoric opposition which illustrates the urban/rural, civilization/nature dichotomy 
forming the thematic center of the text.  Kortoma and his wife, Kortomikha, are the only 
characters not associated with animal imagery, but exclusively with man-made objects – the 
samovar for Kortoma, and an empty glove for his wife – whereas the villagers all have some sort 
of animal imagery associated with them.  And the nomadic Sami people are referred to not only 
through animal imagery, but collective animal imagery specifically.  For instance, when they 
come to Kortoma’s shop that first spring they are described as dark and quick, like young fish 
(rybnaia molod’) in shallow water.  Later, that autumn, as they are preparing to leave town, their 
departure is described in connection with bird migration: 
Запели синички, хрусталем зазвенели синички. Лебеди, гуси носятся косяками, 
разминают крылья: скоро в дальний путь. Помаленьку укладываются лопари: не 
нынче—завтра двинутся на свой погост, к югу.72 
The titmice started singing, tinkling like crystal.  Swans and geese were flying in flock 
formation, stretching their wings, preparing for the distant journey. The Lapps were 
gradually packing up.  Very soon they would start moving south, to their ancestral burial 
grounds. 
While the Sami are not overtly compared to migratory animals here, in Zamyatin’s careful prose, 
the succession of active grammatical subjects here (titmice, swans, geese, Lapps) forms a 
structural connection to the associative images, one which emphasizes their nomadic nature.  
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Furthermore, their association with collective animal imagery underscores a lack of individuation 
which suggests a greater degree of otherness.   What Zamyatin seems to be doing here is 
establishing a conventional center/periphery model and placing his characters on some point 
along a graded continuum.  As the city is typically associated with the idea of a cultural center, 
Kortoma occupies this position given that he is the only character with any experience in the 
city.  The Sami, by contrast, are figuratively the furthest away from the center, further even than 
the villagers, because the Sami’s lack of permanent settlement endows them with a greater 
degree of primitiveness.  Zamyatin makes a similar distinction regarding this in We, when D-503 
states that “the whole of human history, as far as we know, is the story of transition from a 
nomadic mode of life toward an increasingly settled one.”73 
      In her reading of the story as a critique of technocratic consciousness, Susan Layton 
identifies a key contrast in the story of the abstract world of the city and the more natural world 
of the provincial village and its surrounding area. In her view, the city world is represented by 
Kortoma, who speaks of St. Petersburg as a realm of civilization and progress, whereas the world 
of nature is represented by Marei.
74
  While this reading is essentially valid, I would modify it 
somewhat with the assertion that it is Pelka, rather than Marei, who more explicitly represents 
nature.  As a Sami woman, she is more primitive and natural according to a center/periphery 
model, and she is the character most heavily associated with natural and animal imagery.  With 
Pelka, Zamyatin introduces a third point of contrast, one which complicates the more 
straightforward binary opposition that Layton proposes.  Rather than representing nature, Marei 
occupies an intermediary position between two perceived extremes, and thus represents the site 
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of tension between opposing forces.  Over the course of the story, he is drawn in both directions, 
but charmed by the notion of progress as a light in the darkness, he chooses culture over nature, a 
choice which ultimately proves fatal. 
      This fatality is connected to the theme of self-destruction, which Zamyatin develops through 
the use of associative imagery with both Marei and Pelka.  As in the recurrence of Kortoma’s 
samovar, Pelka is repeatedly associated with both the color red and deer, which in the course of 
the narrative themselves become linked.  The first of these associations is the color red, 
specifically the word “ryzhii” used to distinguish the red-haired Pelka from the other brunette 
Sami women, as we see when the Sami first come to Kortoma’s shop: “only one red head flashes 
like a hare among the black” (tol’ko zaichikom mel’kaet ryzhaia golova sredi chernykh).75  This 
word is repeated dozens of times, and while many of these instances refer specifically to her hair, 
many feature the word when context might prefer “krasnyi” or “rumianyi.”  One of these occurs 
in a phrase introduced in the episode in which “ryzhii” is first used, when Marei briefly notices 
her watching him from the opposite bank of the river: “And far off among the pines on the other 
bank flashes a red spot, like the sun on pine trunks” (I daleko mezhdy sosen na tom beregu 
mel’kaet ryzhee— kak na sosnovykh stvolakh ot solntsa—piatno).76  This phrase is repeated 
multiple times with slight variation—always drawing a connection between red, the sun, and the 
pines—up to the final scene in which Marei, fearing the bear’s approach, thinks: “the sun—the 
red spot—to live…”77  Colors have symbolic significance in many of Zamyatin’s works, and red 
is most often associated with blood,  life, and energy.  In We, for instance, this connection is 
maintained in D-503’s thought of a “crimson (bagrovoe) sea of fire” hidden beneath the surface 
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of the earth, in the dark red (temno-krasnye) wall of the ancient house, the blood of the Mephi, 
and in the repeated mention of I-330’s red (krasnye) lips.78  Similarly, in “North,” the color red 
and the pine trees become repeated signifiers of Pelka’s association with nature: “She calls out to 
all the forest creatures.  Her green-red sister pines run after her in an obedient herd” 
(Pereklikaetsia so vsiakoi lesnoi tvar’iu, pokornym stadom begut za nei zeleno-ryzhie sestry-
sosny).
79
  
      While Pelka is associated with life and nature, she is also associated with death and 
destruction.  One way this association is achieved is through the use of sound reiteration, 
specifically the consonant sounds /r/ and /zh/ as Zamyatin carefully juxtaposes the words 
“ryzhii” (red) and “ruzh’e” (gun/rifle).  There are three key scenes in which this is done, all of 
which have to do with violence or death.  The first instance is in the personal encounter with 
Marei, mentioned above, when he is watching for the thief who has been cutting the fishing 
lines.  Marei hears the person in the woods at night and chases after him, finally catching him 
and throwing him to the ground, only to discover the girl: 
та самая, рыжая... Вот так Ванька... 
    —Ты... ты зачем же это... крючки-то?—стоит Марей, ноги расставил, ружье на 
земле. 
   А рыжая—лицом в мох . . .80   [Bold type added for emphasis] 
 
the girl, the redhead . . . Some Vanka! . . . 
      “You . . but why . . . why the hooks?”  Marei stood, his legs wide apart, his gun on 
the ground. 
      And the redhead, with her face in the moss . . .  
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The next instance occurs during their next confrontation in the beginning of autumn when the 
Sami are all preparing to leave.  She confronts him in the woods and shoots at him: 
Голова—рыжее пятно, губы—кровь, ружейный ствол на руке. И ни слова, ничего: 
увидала—и на Марея бегом. Волну мчит на камень: ударится и—одни дребезги. Но 
ни зацепиться, ни удержаться, ни крикнуть: мчит волну. 
   "Эй, ружье-то свое..."—хотел крикнуть Марей... Но уж рыжая подняла, 
приложилась—бух!81 
Her head—a red spot, her lips—blood, a rifle in her hand.  And not a word, nothing.  She 
caught sight of Marei and ran straight at him.  A wave rushes toward the rock: it strikes 
and shatters to bits.  Yet there is no catching it, no holding it back, no crying out: the 
wave rushes. 
      “Hey, your gun . . .” Marei wanted to shout . . . But the redhead had already raised it, 
aimed – boom! 
She misses, and he tackles her to the ground and the scene ends, suggestively, with their first 
sexual union, after which she professes her love and devotion and decides to leave her people 
and stay with him.  The above two instances feature a violent confrontation with Marei.  In the 
third instance, the situation is more directly self-destructive: 
   Пелька ходила по избе веселая, напевая изменчатую, переливчатую лопскую 
песенку. Сняла со стены ружье, на минутку замолкла: или не надо—или повесить 
ружье на место? 
   Нет. Пошла с ружьем: 
   —Там я следы видала, может—и промыслю что... 
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   Развивается, свивается, колышется синий сполох. В синей пещере на дне—чуть 
виден тонконогий рыжий олень. Шею ему обхватили горячие руки, горячие губы 
целуют, целуют—кругом всю заиндевевшую морду. 
   И Бог весть, как это случилось—должно быть, курок зацепился за рукав—ружье 
нечаянно выстрелило прямо в оленя, олень упал.82 
      Pelka went about the hut gaily, humming a warbling, fluid Lapp song.  She took the 
rifle from the wall, fell silent for a moment: maybe she ought not . . . maybe she ought to 
put the gun back in its place? 
      No.  She went out with the rifle. 
      “I’ve seen some tracks, maybe I’ll shoot something. . .” 
      The blue northern lights sway, folding and unfolding.  In the blue cave at the bottom 
of the ice the slender-legged red deer is barely visible.  Hot arms embrace his neck, hot 
lips are kissing, kissing his hoary muzzle. 
      And God knows how it happened, the trigger must have caught in her sleeve, but the 
rifle inadvertently fired straight at the deer.  The deer fell. 
  
      By this point in the story, the signifiers “ryzhii” and “olen’” (deer) have become so firmly 
associated with Pelka that her killing the deer is highly suggestive of her own destruction.  Her 
association with deer is first introduced from Marei’s point of view, the second time he sees her, 
the morning following Midsummer Night (Ivan Kupala).  He sees her across the river driving a 
young bay deer.
83
  The next instance illustrates his subconscious association of the deer and 
Pelka, which occurs during his watch of the thief, discussed above, when he falls asleep and 
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dreams of a bay deer who comes to him and pleads: “Don’t ruin me, Marei, I am from 
Petersburg.”  The association with the red deer specifically is introduced following their first 
sexual encounter.  Marei calls her “my forest deer” and “my golden deer,” and when she agrees 
to stay with him, she asks that her pet deer remain with her: “But let my deer come with us.  He 
was little, red . . . And I was little . . .” (I tol’ko pust’ s name—moi olen’.  On byl malen’kii— 
ryzhii . . . Ia byla malen’kaia).  Her decision to leave the Sami is difficult and has important 
implications, and we see her ambivalence in the representations of the deer.  For instance, the 
following spring we see that part of her is drawn to leave, to move on as her people always have, 
while another part is drawn to her life with Marei:   
 У избы смирно стоял, привязан рыжий олень. Пелька обняла, прислонилась к 
теплой оленьей морде. 
    —Хорошо, миленький, а? Стоять надоело? 
   Отвязала—пустился олень стрелой. Очертил круг, вскочил на взлобок, стал, 
тонконогий, задумался: бежать ли туда, где синеет низкий северный лес, или 
вернуться к избе за мхом?84 
 
Near the hut, the red deer stood quietly on his tether.  Pelka embraced him, pressing her 
face to the warm muzzle. 
      “Happy, darling? Tired of standing still?” 
      She untied him, and the deer darted off like an arrow, made a wide circle, leaped on a 
knoll, and stood, thin-legged, thinking: should he run out there, to the low northern 
woods blue in the distance, or come back to the hut for moss? 
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In light of these connections, the final scene with the deer, quoted above, when she inadvertently 
shoots him and she and Marei subsequently eat his flesh, is thematically significant.  It occurs 
right before she succumbs to Kortoma’s coercion, suggesting her spiritual death both in her 
betrayal of Marei and in her moving still further from her origins, from the natural, rural 
periphery symbolized by the Sami, to the artificial, urban center symbolized by Kortoma. 
      As mentioned above, Zamyatin complicates a conventional dual model by situating Marei 
between two extremes, and with the inclusion of additional places.  Rather than just the city 
(Petersburg) and the country (the northern village) we have also the temporary settlements of the 
Sami people, and the vague “West” which Kortoma characterizes as the height and goal of 
civilization.  With this inclusion, these spatial contrasts become associated with a center-
periphery model, with distinct points along a continuum—from Western Europe to Petersburg to 
the village to the most peripheral, Lapland.  And Zamyatin uses animal imagery proportionately 
to signify this gradation, as more of this imagery is used for those furthest from the conventional 
center. 
      Zamytain also uses point of view to complicate the notion of a stable center.  Marei is the 
main figure of the story, and the narration follows his experience and perception. The reader’s 
view of the world is localized to the village, while presenting other places—the West, 
Petersburg, Lapland—as vague and foreign.  This is particularly true of Petersburg, which is 
referred to throughout as a place of culture, a site of western enlightenment, yet remains a sort of 
mythical place to which the people in the village have no access.  Only Kortoma has been there, 
and even he presents it in a way that underscores his lack of any real connection to it.  For 
instance, on Midsummer night, he tells Marei of Petersburg: “We must live according to the 
Western European nations, we must see educated cities.  Take, let’s say, Petersburg . . .”  Marei 
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is astonished by what Kortoma tells him, and he asks how many streets there are in Petersburg, 
to which Kortoma replies that there are “around forty, or maybe even fifty . . .”  Marei is 
astonished: 
      Бог знает, есть ли в самом деле такой город, чтобы пятьдесят улиц и всё дома, 
дома, люди. И как же там не заблудятся в улицах? Ведь это не лес, в лесу всякое 
дерево, и мох на коре, и мочажины, и камни—все разное, только глаза разуй, а 
там—как же, в городе-то?85 
      God knows whether there is really such a city—with fifty streets, and houses all over, 
and people.  How come they don’t get lost in those streets?  After all, it isn’t like a forest, 
with all kinds of trees, and moss on the bark, and junipers, and rocks—and everything 
different; all you have to do is keep your eyes open.  But there in the city? 
Marei’s reaction exaggerates the difference in his perception which, because of the narrative 
point of view, is fixed in the space of the village and forest.  The effect is a sort of decentralizing 
of an assumed center by confusing the perception of where and what the center actually is.  For 
Marei, Petersburg is just as peripheral as the far north of the Sami people. 
      Marei’s intermediary position is further suggested by the metaphorical association with the 
bear.  Bears have long been thought of as sort of liminal beings: in their perceived anatomical 
and behavioral similarities to humans, they are thought to occupy a unique position between 
animal and human; and because of their annual hibernation, in folk mythology they are thought 
to traverse the threshold between life and death.
86
  Similar to the bear’s apparent resurrection, in 
childhood Marei had been resuscitated after drowning; and like the bear’s unique position 
between human and animal, Marei occupies a liminal space between civilization and nature.  
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Marei is between extremes—between an urban, technological future and a primitive, nomadic 
past.   
      There are two points in the text in which the narrator draws a parallel between Marei and the 
bear.  The first instance follows his first real encounter with Pelka, when he discovers that it was 
she, rather than “some Vanka,” who had cut the fishing lines.  The second occurs during Marei’s 
defeat, when the giant lantern he builds explodes.  The two episodes are structurally significant 
insofar as they form two temporal points which frame the relationship between Marei and Pelka, 
the first immediately preceding their first sexual union, and the second following Kortoma’s 
conquest of Pelka and the couple’s subsequent death.  Furthermore, each of these explicit 
associations occurs right before an episode depicting a bear hunt during the animals’ mating 
season, one of the story’s associative connections between sex and death.  Pelka’s sexual 
encounter with Marei initiates her separation from the Sami people, while her tryst with Kortoma 
leads to her alienation from Marei and her spiritual death.  As Pelka’s shooting the deer is 
symbolic of her self-destruction, so too is the bear’s killing the couple at the end of the story 
symbolic of Marei’s fatal decision to abandon what was valuable and authentic in his life for an 
illusory idea of progress.  While there is embedded criticism here, Marei is portrayed as a 
positive character throughout, and in his fatal promethean quest is to illuminate his society, but 
he fails in his approach by succumbing to a perceived cultural ideal.  As Alex Shane argues, 
Marei realizes his mistake and understands what is truly important—life and love—only 
moments before his death.
87
   
      Some scholars argue that this story illustrates Zamyatin’s pessimism concerning the actual 
course of the Revolution and its faith in technological progress, and that it presents a romantic 
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view of natural, instinctive life which is corrupted by civilization.
88
  There is certainly a 
prominent shift from the works of Zamyatin’s early period, such as Uezdnoe (1912) and Na 
kulichkakh (1914), which demonstrate a more anti-provincial attitude.  In the middle period, of 
which “North” forms an important part, it is not so much that he is celebrating the rural as much 
as criticizing the urban by contrast.  Like the earlier tales, the provincials in “North,” with the 
exception of Marei, are also depicted as somewhat backwards—simple, barbarous, and 
superstitious—but the story does feature a strong reverence for the natural.  In “North” nature 
both is and is not romanticized.  On the one hand we see nature as idyllic—mostly from Marei’s 
point of view—though he rejects the past (primitive) for the sake of an imagined future.  On the 
other, we see the violence of nature in the impulsive destructiveness of Pelka and the bear who, 
in the final scene, underscores nature’s violence and indifference.  In Zamyatin’s work we find 
competing views of the oppositional relationships civilized/primitive and human/animal.  
Looking at some of his early work, particularly Uezdnoe, we see the primitive and animal 
connoting negative ideas—the primitive as dark and backwards, and the animal as base, carnal, 
appetitive, violent.  In his later work, such as We, concepts of the primitive and the animal are 
endowed with positive connotations, as natural, authentic, organic, etc.  What is particularly 
interesting about “North” is that both of these conceptions exist simultaneously.  The primitive is 
both backwards and authentic, nature is both idyllic and violent.  This simultaneity creates a 
compelling disruption of binary systems of thought, a disruption which prompts the reader to 
seek a way to either synthesize or transcend these oppositions 
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      While advances in modern thought, at least since Darwin, have destabilized the traditional 
ontological divide, the persistent notion of a human/animal boundary is still evident in our 
contemporary worldview, practices, and language.  The image of the animal is deeply encoded 
with dualistic ideas, informing and informed by our concepts of both nature and civilization, both 
reality and the ideal.  Animals are powerful in figurative constructs not only because they can be 
employed in a variety of different meanings, but also because each image can host a number of 
such meanings simultaneously.  While they are, in a sense, automatically suited for dualistic and 
hierarchical concepts, given the range and competing modes of similarity and difference, they 
are just as valuable in questioning these concepts.  In the works discussed above, Pilnyak and 
Zamyatin use the inherent dualism of the animal image in ways that both illustrate and 
complicate binary strategies of identity which, while not exclusive to Russian culture, are 
particularly strong and loaded with specific historical and social significance.  The way in which 
animals are used in these two texts suggests the authors’ awareness of the singular complexity of 
the animal image as a site of several related, intersecting, and conflicting ideas.  Animals occupy 
an important space in these texts because they are related to and effective in capturing their 
central themes of division and conflict.    
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Chapter 2 
Dehumanization 
 
 
“In order to kill them, it was necessary to declare that 
kulaks are not human beings.  Just as the Germans said that 
Yids are not human beings.  That’s what Lenin and Stalin 
said too: The kulaks are not human beings.”      
                                 -Vasily Grossman, Everything Flows.  
 
      In Grossman’s final novel, Everything Flows, the protagonist’s landlady and lover, Anna 
Sergeevna, gives an account of her memory of and involvement in the Terror Famine of the early 
1930s.  She explains that at the time anti-kulak rhetoric was everywhere—in meetings, radio 
broadcasts, films, books, Stalin’s speeches—and she refers specifically to the way in which 
kulaks were characterized as subhuman in order to ignite “the fury of the masses” against them.   
Though a particularly strong example, it is not unique; in many texts dealing with national, 
ethnic, or political conflict, one can find instances in which the “others” are referred to as vilified 
animal beings, such as vermin, parasites, insects, rats, dogs, pigs, etc.  Such dehumanizing 
rhetoric is common because it can be effective in rationalizing or excusing atrocities, and to 
assuage or prevent any guilt associated with harming other humans, who would normally be 
included in a wider moral community, the border of which has long been drawn around the 
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species homo sapiens.  By associating a human or group of humans with non-human beings, they 
are effectively removed from the sphere of moral concern and can thus justifiably be treated as 
“animals.”  The other side of this practice, however, and one that is not adequately questioned, is 
that it both derives from and strengthens the ontological and moral boundary that humans have 
erected between themselves and every other species.  It is a practice of violence that is based on 
practices of greater violence.   
      As discussed in the previous chapter, the post-Revolutionary period was marked by 
oppositional strategies of identity-making along a number of lines, not only national and ethnic, 
as were quite strong in previous eras, but increasingly along lines of culture, class, and ideology.  
The Civil War occurring in the wake of the Revolution, the aggressive campaigns of 
collectivization and dekulakization a decade later, and the waves of purges culminating in the 
Great Terror, were periods of incredible devastation, fear, and uncertainty.  In the literature of or 
about these two decades, several texts highlight the use of dehumanizing animal rhetoric in their 
illustrations of extreme social and political tension.  Some of these texts go a step further by not 
only drawing attention to such rhetoric, but by exploring and questioning the beliefs which 
underlie it.  Since this kind of dehumanization is based on notions of human supremacy, 
questioning these underlying beliefs and their reductive cultural associations is a way not only to 
see the practice of dehumanization from a different, perhaps broader perspective, but also to 
explore an effective means of resisting it. 
      The texts discussed in the previous chapter use animal imagery to explore dualistic constructs 
of identity.  The texts to be discussed here use animal imagery in a way that furthers this 
exploration by focusing on a significantly darker aspect of identity and identity-making.  They 
illustrate the social and psychological processes of dehumanization, and they do so in a way that 
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problematizes received conceptions of an animal-human binary, particularly its axiological and 
moral implications.  Zamyatin’s “The Dragon” (“Drakon”) and Platonov’s “Garbage Wind” 
(“Musornyi veter”) diverge in their temporal and geographical settings—the former set in post-
Revolutionary Petersburg, and latter in Nazi Germany—but they are similar insofar as they both 
not only criticize the moral assumptions of what it means to be human, but do so through the 
literalization of dehumanizing tropes.  In doing so, both stories play with ideas of form and 
essence as a way to question notions of morality and progress.  Zamyatin’s story juxtaposes two 
different modes of animalistic dehumanization, the subhuman animal and the superhuman 
monster, which serves to problematize the conventional moral hierarchy associated with an 
animal-human binary by introducing a third point of contrast, the inhuman, in a way that 
questions the concept of “humanness.”  Platonov is similarly provocative in his approach to this 
concept.  He uses the imagery of regressive metamorphosis in a way that challenges the notion of 
an ontological hierarchy for the specific purpose of criticizing materialism and scientism, and the 
use of scientific rhetoric as a means of justifying violence and oppression. 
      Animalistic dehumanization is based upon the deeply entrenched boundary separating 
humans from other animals, upon the reductive contrast between humanity and animality.  These 
ideas are based upon two fundamental ideas: the notion of a taxonomical hierarchy such as the 
Great Chain of Being, and the notion of essence.  While these are two distinct ideas, they are 
closely interrelated, owing to human tendencies to essentialize, categorize, and rank.  Both of 
these ideas, in the West, have roots in ancient Judaic and Greek philosophy, and together inform 
dualist views regarding animals and animality which developed through Medieval Scholasticism 
to the Enlightenment, most strongly in Descartes, and inform the anthropocentric underpinnings 
of Humanism.  And while advances in science may have seriously challenged these ideas, they 
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continue to inform our conception of humanity in relation to the rest of the natural world.   
Language in both scientific and popular discourse reveals the continuing influence of traditional 
modes of thought.  When we speak of “higher” and “lower” animals, when we refer to 
organisms, groups, or behavior as “primitive,” “brutal,” or “bestial,” we are comparing other 
species or human outgroups to our own and placing them in a conceptual position relative, and 
generally inferior, to the one we envision for ourselves.
89
   
      In recent years there has been a growth of interest in the subject of dehumanization, 
particularly in the field of social psychology.  The research being conducted in this area is 
interesting insofar as it sheds light on some of the lesser known aspects of a fairly well-known 
phenomenon.  We have seen instances of dehumanization throughout history; in periods or 
instances of intergroup conflict there is a tendency to objectify and denigrate the opposition 
through the use of animal rhetoric.  And we understand that this practice may be a strategy, 
conscious or unconscious, to cope with hatred or violence that would be morally problematic.
90
  
What we do not fully understand is how these practices occur, why they seem to be so universal 
across cultures, and how they are connected to our more overarching worldview.  These studies 
have begun to answer some of these finer questions, revealing that dehumanization is more 
widespread than is commonly believed, and that it is closely connected to essentialist ways of 
thinking.
91
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      In its most basic definition, metaphysical essentialism holds essence to be that which 
constitutes and distinguishes a thing, the most fundamental feature that is shared by only and all 
members of a specific type of entity.
 92
  Essence is thought to be an unobservable property which 
causes a thing to be the type of thing it is, and which remains constant despite observable 
changes in appearance, such as the growth of a biological organism or the change in the form of 
a chemical substance.
93
  In classical thought, human essence was defined by rationality 
(Aristotle); in the Judeo-Christian tradition it is defined by the possession of an immortal soul.  
These two fundamental notions became merged in Medieval Scholasticism up through the 
Enlightenment in Descartes’s firm position that animals lack both reason and a soul.94  These 
ideas of a distinct human essence had a profound and lasting effect on theories concerning the 
natural world.  As Marc Ereshevsky points out, “Prior to the acceptance of evolutionary theory, 
essentialism was the standard mode of classification in biological taxonomy.  Such biologists as 
John Ray, Maupertius, Bonnet, Linnaeus, Buffon, and Lamarck believed that the proper way to 
sort species taxa is by their species-specific essences.”95 While evolutionary theory has 
undermined biological essentialism, as well as the notion of a Great Chain of Being, essentialism 
continues to inform our concepts of species and taxonomical divisions.
96
   
      Furthermore, while problematic, biological essentialism informs popular concepts of race, 
gender, and ethnicity.  Essentialism seems to motivate and underlie various modes of 
stereotyping, as it is commonly felt, though often unconsciously, that social and racial 
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differences are inherently determined and fixed.
97
  This tendency to essentialize, especially to 
conceive of a fundamentally different essence based on outward, observable differences, gives 
strategies of dehumanization such power.  Perceiving another person as inherently different 
allows for a process of mapping one mode of difference (race, gender, class, etc.) onto another 
(species), and consequently allows human outgroups to be regarded as somehow less than 
human.  For instance, the development of physical anthropology in the late 18
th
 and early 19
th
 
centuries was largely defined by racial and ethnic classification based on physical measurements, 
such as arm length, skull shape, etc.  Scientists such as Arthur Gobineau, Samuel Morton, Paul 
Broca, and Georges Cuvier were part of a trend in anthropology which held that objective racial 
differences could be determined on the grounds of either physical or behavioral similarities in 
other animals.
98
  The use of anthropometry to provide physical evidence of a number of value-
laden differences continued throughout the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, informing racial and 
ethnic discourse, criminology, and the practice of eugenics. 
      An underlying impetus in of all this is to find a distinguishing mark of humankind, the 
essence of humanness, to define ourselves relative to other beings.  The use of science to locate 
and specify this distinction is the more modern means of approaching this goal, but it is just 
another way of asking the same question.  Mary Midgley argues that the use of science to 
support a notion of ontological dualism is problematic insofar as it confuses two distinct modes 
of thought.   The question “what is the characteristic excellence of Man” is a question of 
morality, not one of biological classification. 
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      The problem remains, however, that we seem to be generally inclined to seek these 
differentia.  In the research on dehumanization, psychological studies have attempted to locate 
these differentia, not in an area of physical reality, but in the cultural perception of groups and 
individuals.  Nick Haslam has compiled the data from several studies to arrive at a schematic 
model which separates two distinct groups of traits, Human Nature (HN) and Uniquely Human 
(UH).  HN traits are shared in varying degrees among both human and non-human animals, and 
include warmth, emotional responsiveness, agency, individuality, and depth.  UH traits, by 
contrast, are thought to be uniquely possessed by humans, and include civility, refinement, 
rationality, and moral sensibility.  In connection with these two groups, he posits two different 
modes of dehumanization: mechanistic and animalistic.  When someone is considered to lack 
HN traits, they are thought of as machines or robots.  When someone is seen to lack UH traits, 
they are thought of as animals or savages.
99
  While these two groups of traits, particularly those 
positing traits that are “uniquely human,” may be just another attempt to fortify the animal-
human boundary, these studies are important because they reveal that these differentia, while 
arguably objectively suspect, are quite real in human perceptions of self/other, and the views of 
animals and animality.  When we talk about animals we are almost always talking about human 
concepts of “animal.”   
      The human-animal problem has always existed in two different but inextricably related 
forms: the problem of humanity’s relationship with other animals, and that of humanity’s 
relationship with itself as a type of animal.  Just as humans position themselves above other 
animals, the concept of humanity is positioned above the concept of animality.  There are many 
theories as to why humans are so anxious to differentiate humans from other animals, and 
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humanity from animality.  For the purpose of the present discussion, it is enough to understand 
how these concepts inform one another, and the consequences these distinctions have on human 
relations.  Of course anthropocentrism leads to violence against other species, but it is also 
connected with dehumanization and human intergroup violence.  In instances of extreme 
violence—war, genocide—this pattern in fairly clear, as evident in historical accounts, 
propaganda, literature, etc.  However, studies suggest that the process of essentializing and 
denying humanness to perceived outgroups is not isolated to these instances of extreme conflict, 
but is more common than generally perceived, and most often unconscious.
100
  Furthermore, 
there is evidence to suggest that people who hold humans to be inherently more valuable than 
members of other species tend to be less tolerant of human racial, cultural, and ethnic 
outgroups.
101
   For instance, another study included “dehumanization interventions” in which 
strategies that reduced the human-animal divide exerted a positive effect in studies of human 
outgroup tolerance.  The researchers conclude that since there is a direct correlation between 
notions of inherent human supremacy and practices of dehumanization and intolerance, a 
concentrated challenge to these notions may positively impact not only human-animal relations, 
but intergroup human relations as well.
102
  Thus being aware of these patterns of dehumanization 
in culture, and examining the way in which they are connected to animal-human relations, may 
be an important way of challenging them.  The literary works being considered here do just this.  
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I. Monsters in Men: The Inhuman in Zamyatin’s “The Dragon” (1918). 
      With his philosophy grounded in the humanist tradition, Evgeny Zamyatin’s employment of 
animal imagery is predominately figurative and generally connected with his notions of human 
development and progress, and with his views on revolution and social or cultural heresy.  
Generally speaking, he uses animal imagery in a way that is consistent with classic dualist 
conceptions of an animal/human binary, and more specifically, an animal nature/human nature 
binary, with both “natures” comprising a human being with a perceived continual struggle for 
supremacy between the “lower” and “higher.”  While the animal imagery in his work is generally 
conventional, he often uses this imagery in such a complex way that it invites a critical 
engagement with these conventions.  He will often juxtapose or combine imagery in a way that 
complicates binary models of lower/higher, animal/human. 
      Zamyatin’s philosophical and critical writings repeatedly articulate his notion of perpetual 
revolution, which he defines as a force that urges humanity toward ever higher and nobler 
aspirations of liberty and progress, in a pattern based on a dialectical model.
103
  His revolutionary 
idealism is restless insofar as it must not have too proximate a goal; it must never be allowed to 
fully manifest as this would degrade the ideal and result in stasis and entropy: “victory is defeat, 
because victory is inevitably followed by dogma and philistinism.”104  As a counterpoise to his 
enlightened revolutionary process, in his fiction Zamyatin presents satirical portraits of people 
who personify entropy and/or who are characterized by backwardness and slavishness, either to 
their own baser drives, or to social tradition or political dogma.  One way he does this is through 
the use of what Christopher Collins refers to as “downward-directed metaphors,” such as those 
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Zamyatin uses to compare people to non-human animals and inanimate objects.
105
  Zamyatin 
used this technique multiple times, for instance, in his early provincial tales, such as Uezdnoe 
and Na kulichkakh.   
      In these tales, an animal metaphor serves as a compact device consistent with his mode of 
impressionism to convey both physical features and character traits which resonate throughout a 
given work as a sort of leitmotif.
106
   In Uezdnoe, for instance, Timosha is repeatedly likened to a 
sparrow, both in manner and appearance, and the narrator uses animal imagery throughout, most 
commonly that of wolves and dogs, to underscore Baryba’s animality and “primitive” nature.  As 
Davydova argues, this reveals his animalized nature and suggests a lack of soul or conscience.
107
  
More generally, these metaphors help to highlight Zamyatin’s satirical treatment of the theme of 
the primitive backwardness of provincial life.
108
   
      Zamyatin’s animal metaphors are derived from traditional hierarchical conceptions of human 
superiority, conceptions which follow a largely unbroken current from classical models from 
Aristotle and the Bible up through the Modern period, including conservative interpretations of 
Darwin.  For Zamyatin, however, the importance of such distinctions exists entirely within the 
realm of the human, as he focuses on the struggle between humanity and animality, not as 
different species, but as ascending levels of one species.  The focus of his satire in his pre-
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Revolutionary work was mainly provincial primitivism and backwardness.  Following the 
Revolution, there emerged a new threat to individualism and humanist ideals, one which forced 
him to redefine his revolutionary ethos to distinguish what he viewed as a cosmic force of 
continual evolution from the violence, moral chaos, and devaluation of life which he saw in the 
wake of the Bolshevik Revolution.
109
    
      Zamayatin’s earlier idealistic hopes for the Revolution were by this time (1918-1919) being 
challenged by the destruction and hardship pervading the country.  Now the Revolution was seen 
not as a liberating force but a force of depersonalization, dehumanization, and destruction.  
Zamyatin warns of the corrosion of values (specifically the value of human life) in his essays, 
most pointedly in the essay “Zavtra” (1919).  There he argues that Russia had shifted from the 
era of the suppression of the masses to one of “the suppression of the individual in the name of 
the masses,” and that “man is dying.  The proud homo erectus is getting down on all fours, is 
sprouting tusks and fur; the beast in man is triumphant . . . the value of human life is falling 
steeply . . . It is time to cry out: man is man’s brother.”110  This degradation and dehumanization 
is explored in the three Petrograd stories, “The Dragon,” “Mamai,” and “The Cave” 
(“Peshchera”).   With respect to the use of animal imagery, “The Dragon” is the most 
compelling, but as there is some thematic continuity among all three, it is helpful to briefly 
discuss the other two. 
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      “The Cave” and “Mamai” are often discussed together owing largely to similarity in 
theme.
111
  Both take place in Petrograd and both feature intellectuals who are driven to desperate 
and morally compromising acts due to extreme conditions.  Furthermore, both use highly 
metaphoric imagery to establish the severity of the setting.  In “Mamai,” post-Revolutionary 
Petersburg is metaphorically presented as a dark sea with apartment houses as isolated ships 
weathering the storms of nightly searches.  The protagonist, Petr Petrovich Mamai, a gentle man 
with a strong aversion to violence, is forced to guard the house from those conducting illegal 
searches.  He has saved a sum of money with which he plans to buy a rare edition of a certain 
book, and hides this money under a loose floorboard by the front door.  He later finds that this 
money has been eaten by a mouse, and the gentle man who is earlier described as one who 
refuses to kill a fly is overcome by vengeance and finds and viciously impales the mouse.  In 
“The Cave,” the city has become an ice age of glaciers and mammoths in which the people live 
in caves in the “black nocturnal cliffs” which “somehow resemble houses.”  The story follows a 
couple, Martin Martinych and his wife Masha, as they struggle to keep warm with no wood for 
the stove which has become a “greedy cave god.”  It is Masha’s name day and in an effort to 
keep her warm, Martin loses a moral struggle and steals a few logs from a neighbor.  As their 
room warms a bit, they reminisce and manage to secure a moment of happiness before the cold 
returns and Martin confesses to her what he has done.  Masha takes the one serving of poison 
they have between them, and the story ends with Martin walking outside, having lost everything.   
      Like Mamai, the protagonist of “The Cave” is a modest intellectual “little man” struggling to 
maintain his dignity amid difficult times.  These men—the book collector Mamai and the music 
                                                 
111
 The two stories were written in 1920.  Though initially published separately—“Mamai” in Dom iskusstv in 1921, 
and “Peshchera” in Zapiski mechtatelei in 1922—in many subsequent published collections, including the 1929 
four-volume Soviet edition of Zamyatin’s collected works, these stories were printed together and consecutively. 
77 
 
lover Martin Martinych—are victims of the severity and brutality of the period.  Richards defines 
them as “Hegelian tragic heroes, crushed by the dialectic of history.  Products of the pre-
revolutionary era, they are educated, refined, gentle and highly moral—qualities which are 
pathetically out of place in the new world.”112  However, as Davydova points out, they are not 
victimized in the same way as the intelligent from “The Dragon.”  They are not physically killed 
outright.  Their victimization is more internal, as they are forced to cross a moral line within 
themselves.
113
  In “The Cave” this is seen in the moral struggle as Martin contemplates stealing 
the wood, and when he confesses to Masha: “We do not have a single piece of wood in the study.  
And I went to Obertyshev, and there, between the doors . . . I stole, you understand.  And 
Selikhov [the house manager] said . . . I must take it back at once – but I burnt everything, 
everything!  I don’t mean the wood – what’s wood! – you understand me?”114  
       While both of these stories center on moral degradation, in “The Cave” Zamyatin more 
overtly employs animal imagery to elucidate his point.  As the story’s characters are likened to 
primitive cave dwellers, the desperate conditions in which they must attempt to secure basic 
needs (here, warm shelter) have relegated to superfluity any “higher” aspects of human culture.  
For instance, as Martin and Masha huddle around the stove, able to briefly warm themselves 
sufficiently, the narrator highlights what is lost in the severity of their struggle: “For a single 
hour it was spring in the cave; for one hour the animal hides, claws, fangs were discarded, and 
green shoots—thoughts—struggled up through the ice-crusted cortex of the brain.”115  While the 
loss described in the story is a consequence of the hardship of the Civil War period and loosely 
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based on an actual event,
116
 given Zamyatin’s unwavering defense of artistic and intellectual 
culture, this loss underscores his criticism of philistinism and Bolshevik brutality, but it also 
suggests a tension the extremity of which impels both sides to devolve into such brutality.  This 
tension is the central focus of the very short but artistically dense “The Dragon.” 
       Written in 1918, the story, like “The Cave,” is set in a Petersburg winter.  It depicts the brief 
interaction on a tram between a couple of Red Army soldiers, one of whom relates a story of 
how he, with his bayonette, dispatched to “the Heavenly Kingdom” an unspecified man with an 
“intellectual mug.”  Immediately thereafter, he sees a small frozen sparrow lying on the floor.  
He crouches down, his pistol drops, and he proceeds to cup the sparrow in his hands and warm it 
with his breath, until the bird revives and flies off into the “unknown.”  The soldier picks up his 
pistol and resumes his post as the tram rushes along.   
       The story is generally read as criticism of the chaos and violence of the Revolution.
117
  Here, 
however, the devaluation and dehumanization described in the essay “Zavtra” takes a more 
aggressive form than in the other two stories discussed above.  In “The Dragon” this spiritual 
degradation from man to beast is symbolized by the transformation of a common soldier into a 
dragon, by the transformation of men into monsters, and the erosion of values is characterized by 
the nonchalance of the soldier’s killing the man.  His saving the bird has been viewed in two 
ways: on the one hand, it can be regarded as a sort of reversal of a conventional value hierarchy 
(a human is killed in cold blood while a tiny bird is saved); on the other hand, the soldier’s 
saving the bird can be viewed as a different mode of contrast, one emphasizing the contrast of 
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different actions rather than a contrast of objects of those actions, that is, saving a life versus 
taking a life.  The moral conclusion would then be, as Alex Shane suggests, a plea for brotherly 
love.
118
  While this is a valid reading of the story, it is nevertheless worthwhile to take a closer 
look at the complex elements of the piece, particularly its use of animal imagery, in order to 
better understand the nuances of Zamyatin’s plea. 
      The theme of chaos and disorientation pervades the story, first introduced in the story’s 
setting as described in the first few lines.  The setting is at once stark and vague, depicted with a 
set of carefully chosen images and words that repeat with minor variations and mutations 
throughout the text, with combinations that convey a strong impression yet are themselves 
strange and disorienting: 
Люто замороженный, Петербург горел и бредил. Было ясно: невидимые за 
туманной занавесью, поскрипывая, пошаркивая, на цыпочках бредут вон желтые и 
красные колонны, шпили и седые решетки. Горячечное, небывалое, ледяное солнце 
в тумане—слева, справа, вверху, внизу—голубь над загоревшимся домом.119  
Gripped with bitter cold, Petersburg burned and raved.  It was clear: invisible behind a 
curtain of fog, red and yellow columns, spires, and hoary gates, trudge along on tiptoe, 
creaking and shuffling.  A fevered, impossible, frozen sun in the fog—to the left, to the 
right, above, below—a dove over a house on fire.  
These opening lines introduce some of the story’s important themes and devices.  The use of 
contradictory language and certain specific terms captures the sense of chaos, and more 
specifically, the theme of delirium that is central to the story.  For instance, the city is both 
frozen and burning; the scenery is both clear and invisible; the sun is icy and fevered, and 
shining in all directions.  Furthermore, since the reader does not know until the following 
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paragraph that the scenery is described from the point of view of a moving tram, the inanimate 
objects listed are seen as motile, described with the verb bresti (to trudge along), which in the 
third person form used in the text (bredut) has a stem which echoes the root of the verb bredit’ 
(to be delirious) a root which is repeated several times in the story as the “delirium world” 
(bredovyi mir) from which the dragon men originate.
120
  
      This sense of delirium is furthered by the use of space in the text.  There are seven “worlds” 
mentioned in the story: the delirium / foggy delirium world (bredovyi / bredovyi, tumannyi mir); 
the earthly world (zemnoi mir); the leaping, rushing world (soskochivshii nesushchiisia mir); the 
human world (chelovechii mir); the human/humane world (chelovecheskii mir); the heavenly 
kingdom (Tsarstvie Nebesnoe); and the vague “unknown” (neizvestnoe).  There is constant 
movement between these worlds: the dragon-men rise up (vynyrivali) from the delirium fog 
world into the earthly world; the intellectual is dispatched to the heavenly kingdom; the tram and 
the bird both go off into the unknown.  And while there is some movement up and down, most of 
the movement is horizontal, following the tracks, as the tram itself traverses these worlds.
121
  
This last detail adds a surreal quality to the movement through these worlds, since while the 
tram’s movement along the tracks is physical, the worlds themselves are more spiritual or 
metaphysical, such as the Heavenly Kingdom, the strange underworld from which the dragon-
men emerge, and the dragon’s eyes which are described as “two chinks from the delirium world 
to the human.”  All of these worlds seem to be parallel and simultaneous, traversable but not 
harmonious.  This is suggested by the inability of communication between worlds: the dragon 
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men belch fog, which in the delirium world are heard as words, but in the earthly world are only 
little white puffs of smoke; when the dragon speaks to the sparrow, they are words only in the 
earthly world, but are unheard in the delirium world.  The dragon-soldier is a sort of liminal 
figure, existing at the intersection of these multiple worlds—he comes up from a world of fog 
and delirium, exists “here” in the earthly world (which is described as also pervaded by fog and 
delirium); he is a dragon whose eyes give access to a ‘human world”; he is from a sort of 
underworld, yet at the same time is a “guide to the Heavenly Kingdom” capable of both killing 
and reviving. 
      The dragon-soldier’s liminality is important in connection with the story’s theme of 
dehumanization.   The multiple layers with which Zamyatin crafts this character not only engage 
this subject, but complicate a traditional understanding of it by blurring the line between 
dehumanizer and dehumanized as well as the line between human and animal. 
      In strategies of dehumanization, the attempt is made to dissociate the person under scrutiny 
or attack from the attacker, and to degrade or demean them as much as possible, and thus 
dissociate them from the sphere of moral concern.  Since nonhuman animals have long been 
situated on the other side of a moral boundary, animal imagery or rhetoric is often used as a tool 
for dehumanization, to stigmatize the object of oppression or violence.  This type of behavior is 
illustrated in “The Dragon” by the dragon’s language when recounting the murder.  He states: 
“So I’m taking him along: an intellectual mug – disgusting just to look at.  And it talks, the scum.  
Would you believe, it talks!” (Vedy ego: morda inteligentnaia—prosto gliadet’ protivno.  I 
eshche razgovarivaet, sterv’ a? Razgovarivaet!).122  The terms the dragon uses to demean his 
victim are very typical of dehumanizing practices.  First, in describing the intellectual’s face he 
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uses the word “morda,” which means “snout” or “muzzle,” thus attributing a nonhuman feature 
to his victim. Second, he calls him “sterv’,” a form of the word “sterva” which has a common 
pejorative meaning, when used for a man, “scum” or “bastard,” and when used for a woman, 
“slut.”  The traditional definition according to Dal’, however, is that of a dead animal or 
“carrion.”  The victim is characterized as subhuman and thus any moral compunction for taking 
the man’s life is avoided.   
       An interesting feature of the dragon-soldier is that while he engages in dehumanizing 
strategies, he is himself dehumanized and depersonalized.
123
  He is dehumanized insofar as he is 
referred to as a dragon, a mythical monster.  Cultural representations of monsters, often depicted 
as variations of animal-human hybrids, have been employed throughout human history as a way 
to vilify and personify any dangerous and terrifying threats.  David Livingstone Smith discusses 
this tendency at some length, arguing that it is a distancing mechanism to cope with atrocities 
committed by humans.
124
  To refer to individuals like Stalin or Hitler as “monsters” is a practice 
of essentially dehumanizing the dehumanizers to arrive at a more comfortable conclusion that 
“they” are different from “us”; that what they do or have done so undermines a shared human 
moral code that they must be fundamentally inhuman.  It is a common practice, he argues, that is 
“a symptom of the disease for which it purports to be the diagnosis.”125  This is not to minimize 
or excuse the atrocities committed by these men, nor those committed on a much smaller scale.  
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Rather, it is to make an important point that dehumanization is a common cultural practice, and 
one that is not restricted to particularly “evil” individuals.  Furthermore, it reveals the 
psychological complexity behind strategies of coping with the darker aspects of human culture, 
and to relegate these darker aspects or tendencies to other realms, most often to those of the 
nonhuman.  The terrible irony, of course, is that the extent and variety of human cruelty has no 
parallel in the rest of the animal kingdom.
126
   
      In addition to the soldier’s being dehumanized, he is also depersonalized.  This is 
underscored by the narrator’s emphasis on his uniform; on his cap, boots, and army greatcoat 
(shinel’).  Military uniforms are often used as symbols of conformity or depersonalization.  As a 
self-styled cultural heretic, Zamyatin was very critical of what he considered a herd-like 
philistinism, as well as habits or strategies of social depersonalization.  While he 
uncompromisingly espoused revolutionary fervor in art and culture, after the Revolution and the 
Bolshevik seizure of power, we see a shift in tone as he attempts to qualify notions of revolution.  
Rather than a dialectical force of change, he believed that revolution was being used as a means 
to power and subjugation.
127
  Like many artists of the time, he was shocked and disheartened by 
the increasing, and often violent, loss of personal and artistic freedom.  In “Zavtra” he writes: 
“Wars, imperialist and civil, have turned man into material for warfare, into a number, a 
cipher.”128  Similarly in “Skify li?” criticizing what he saw as the philistinism of the Revolution, 
he writes: “Shave all heads down to the skin; dress everybody in the regulation uniform; convert 
all heretical lands to your own faith by artillery fire.”129   These sentiments reverberate in his 
artistic prose.  In “The Dragon” this suppression of the individual is exemplified by the 
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uniformed soldier who kills the man with the “intellectual mug” (morda inteligentnaia), 
presumably a counter-revolutionary. 
      Zamyatin uses this symbolism, but he goes a step further, taking the depersonalizing effect of 
the uniform to an extreme.  It is not simply his individual personhood that is minimized, his 
physical body is as well.  At first this seems to be perhaps an issue of the size of the uniform: 
“The cap slid down on his nose and of course would have swallowed the dragon’s head were it 
not for his ears; the cap came to rest on his protruding ears.  The greatcoat dangled to the floor, 
the sleeves hung down, the tips of the boots were turned up—empty.”  Further on, however, after 
the brief conversation in which the soldier recounts the murder, the emptiness of the uniform is 
exaggerated:  “The hole in the fog [the soldier’s mouth] closed up: there was only the empty cap, 
empty boots, empty greatcoat.”  The man in the uniform is literally reduced to nothing.  Aside 
from this imagery, the narrator underscores the soldier’s reduction grammatically.  It is not his 
cap or his coat, but rather the cap or the coat.
130
  And when he squats down to pick up the bird, it 
is not the soldier that does this, rather the empty greatcoat is the grammatical subject of the 
sentence: “Pustaia shinel’ prisela k polu.”  
      The principal reason for the symbolism of the empty uniform seems to be a means of 
criticizing the Bolshevik rejection of the individual’s value as well as, more generally, the 
depersonalizing effects of power and authority.  Additionally, one could argue that it provides an 
explanation for violence against others, insofar as it suggests a causal chain: when one is 
depersonalized or dehumanized, it is easier to impose those states on others.  In this way, 
Zamyatin’s dragon-soldier is a particularly pregnant image.  Depersonalized and dehumanized, 
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he is himself an agent of violent dehumanization.  His individuality is lost in his “empty” 
uniform, symbolizing his being lost in his social role and the ideology that fosters it.  At the same 
time he is depicted as a dragon, a mythical non-human being, rising up from an underworld.  To 
understand how these two notions, of depersonalization and dehumanization, are encapsulated in 
the image of the dragon-soldier, we must revisit the ideas of form and essence.   
      Following a strain of thought from Aristotle to Locke to contemporary philosophers, Smith 
argues that “humans are natural-born essentializers, that we spontaneously divide the world into 
natural kinds to which we attribute hidden essences.”131  In doing so we suppose that there is a 
natural kind to which we belong—a human kind—and it is an aspect of our basic psychological 
makeup to think that the term human (or its equivalent) is properly applied only to bearers of a 
human essence . . . when we dehumanize people we think of them as counterfeit human beings—
creatures that look like humans, but who are not endowed with a human essence.”132  In 
strategies of dehumanization, verbal or visual imagery of non-human animals is often used to 
make more apparent a believed subhuman essence hiding in human form.   
      In Zamyatin we see a play with form and essence.  What is important to note, however, is 
that as a humanist, Zamyatin emphasizes in many of his characters a positive human essence that 
is threatened from outside, that degrades itself or is degraded by external hardship, oppression, 
and violence.  In “The Dragon” there are three nested layers to the dragon-soldier’s being.  He is 
at once an empty uniform, and a dragon (his paws (lapy) emerge from the coat’s empty sleeves).  
And when the dragon slides his cap back exposing his eyes, these are described as chinks into the 
human world; the uniform contains a dragon which seems to contain a human essence.   
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      This last detail is of particular importance.  Prior to being engaged with the frozen sparrow, 
the dragon’s cap covers his eyes.  Symbolically, he is blinded by the uniform and the ideology 
informing his role.  When he slides back his cap, his eyes reveal the hidden humanity that is 
distinct from the worlds previously described.  This distinction is suggested by the fact that the 
words spoken to the sparrow are unheard in the delirium world.  Another distinction from the 
preceding moments occurs when, as he blows on the bird “with all his strength,” his pistol drops 
to the floor.  His weapon and his role as soldier are temporarily abandoned and his positive 
humanity is revealed.  The dragon, which before is seen as an agent of death, is here breathing 
life into the bird, as breath is a symbol of spiritual essence and life.  While a dragon’s breath is 
mythically associated with fire and destruction, here we see a reversal.  It is in this instance that 
the dragon is in a sense momentarily transformed from dragon to man, in a moment that is 
described as a critical point in space and time: “at the moment ordained by destiny, at a point 
ordained in space, the sparrow jerked, jerked again – and fluttered off the dragon’s red paw into 
the unknown.”  In this way, the instance is given a sort of cosmic significance, at an intersection 
which echoes both the dragon-soldier’s liminality as well as the permeability of worlds discussed 
above.  After the bird flies away, we see the dragon smile (his maw (past’) opens to his ears) and 
the cap then slides back over “the chinks into the human world” and he picks up his pistol and 
resumes his role as “guide to the Heavenly Kingdom,” as the tram screeches and rushes “into the 
unknown, out the human world.” 
      The sparrow scene is crucial to our understanding of the story.  It occurs at a moment in 
which the dragon-soldier steps out of his role and is overtaken by a spontaneous moment of 
compassion that disrupts the mode of movement characterizing the story.  That is, as a “moment 
ordained by destiny, in a point ordained in space,” it is a static point in space and time 
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contrasting the tram’s movement through the worlds.  In his monograph, Richards discusses 
Zamyatin’s polemic against entropy as he saw it, and its manifestation as religious, scientific, 
social and political dogmatism.  Characterizing Zamyatin’s earlier philosophy of revolution he 
writes, “A man is most truly filled with the spirit of Revolution, and hence most truly alive and 
free, when he acts or thinks spontaneously, inspired by his total unique personality, unrestrained 
by the demands of reason, uncoerced by imposed values or beliefs.”133   After seeing the 
destruction and violence of the Revolution and the Civil War that followed, realizing the 
physical and psychological consequences of armed revolution, Zamyatin qualified this view but 
did not change it.  Rather, he now felt that “the real revolution is psychological, in men’s hearts, 
and that ideals imposed by force are corrupted in the process.”134  The dragon’s moment of 
compassion reveals a hidden urge that counterpoises the casual violence of the recounted murder, 
which is textually established through the repetition of the word “sterv’” which the dragon uses 
for both the murdered man and the sparrow.  The repetition of this term also helps to emphasize 
the point that the same person is committing both acts and, while one does not excuse the other, 
the dragon-soldier is a figure that resists simple vilification; he cannot be easily and neatly 
dismissed as a “monster.”  The monster is human. 
      The story’s underlying notion of human goodness underscores Zamyatin’s humanism and his 
very critical view of the degradation and violence of that time.  In “The Dragon” he initially 
presents an image of man at his worst, as image of one degraded by violence who in turn extends 
that violence by degrading others.  What is interesting, though, is that Zamyatin complicates this 
presentation, and seems to be drawing a distinction between agent and instrument.  The agency 
of the dragon is ambiguous.  The details about the uniform underscore this.  When assuming his 
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role as Red Army soldier, blinded by the ideology of his mission, he is an instrument of death.  
When spontaneously and momentarily free of that ideology and his social role, symbolized by 
the exposed eyes and the dropped pistol, he is an agent of resurrection.  The conflict here is one 
between human and inhuman, with the inhuman symbolized by the depersonalizing uniform and 
the ideology it represents, rather than the nonhuman form the human has taken as a result of that 
ideology in action.  This is evidenced by the fact that as he is trying to save the bird, he is still 
referred to as “the dragon” blowing into his “red paws.”  The dragon is essentially human, but is 
only humane when free of his social role.  The ambiguity of these distinctions is further 
emphasized in the last line of the story: “The tram gnashed and screeched and rushed into the 
unknown, out of the human world.”  In this final instance, the narrator uses the phrase 
“chelovecheskii mir” rather than “chelovechii” as he had previously.  “Chelovecheskii” can mean 
either “human” or “humane,” depending on context.  In such a carefully constructed text, the 
ambiguity is most likely deliberate.  If the tram is symbolic of the Revolution, Zamyatin warns 
that its motion and direction are dubious, and threaten to undermine the better qualities of 
humankind.  
 
II. Cleansing the Organism: The Subhuman in Platonov’s “Garbage Wind” (1934). 
      The question of humanness is also addressed in the context of dehumanization in Andrei 
Platonov’s short story, “Garbage Wind” (“Musornyi veter”).  A central philosophical problem in 
Platonov’s work is ontological dualism, and the tension or conflict which characterizes strict and 
apparently irreconcilable binary oppositions such as universal and particular, abstract and 
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concrete, essence and existence, mind and matter, spirit and body.
135
  In many of his works we 
can trace an ongoing struggle with divergent existential paths each attempting to resolve this 
conflict and tension and ultimately overcome dualism: either a final reconciliation of 
consciousness and matter, or a complete emancipation of the former from the latter.  These 
philosophical ideas informed his social outlook insofar as he placed great hope in the potential 
for science and technology to transform society.  This is evident in some of his earlier work, 
particularly his essays, in which he posits that materialization, the path from abstract to concrete, 
will be the final outcome of the historical process, a sort of reconciliation with matter.
136
  This 
was one of the reasons he had also placed great hope in the Revolution, and what he believed 
would bring progress and liberation.  Yet as the Soviet project unfolded, through the Civil War, 
collectivization, and the increasingly severe suppression of any debate and dissent, Platonov 
grew more and more disillusioned and cynical.   
      In “Garbage Wind,” we see a disillusioned Platonov presenting a gruesome and mordant 
critique of the 20
th
 century totalitarian state in which all life is reduced to matter and function, to 
be consumed as material resources in the realization of a utopian project.  It is a state moving 
toward complete homogeneity into which everything is to be integrated toward a single direction, 
and all superfluous and contrary elements are to be forcibly excised.  The more balanced 
ontological tension we see in his other works here gives way to the pull of materialism at its most 
oppressive and decadent.   While there is some ambiguity and nuance to the text, the underlying 
message is quite clear, and hopeless.  The diagnosis and prognosis are equally grim. 
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      The central point of the story is sacrifice of the individual to the homogeneous collective 
state.  This sacrifice is achieved through assimilation, suppression of independent thought, and 
the practice of social and racial hygiene by which deviant or dangerous elements are expunged 
from the collective “organism” of society.  Platonov examines these ideas and practices in the 
story through the related themes of metamorphosis and dehumanization.  Throughout the 
narrative we see multiple images of, and references to, “regressive” zoomorphic transformations, 
of humans developing into nonhuman animals, as well as the metamorphosis, though more subtle 
and less literal, of humans into machines or mechanized parts of a larger machine.  In connection 
with these metamorphoses, Platonov offers a criticism of the practices and consequences of the 
two main types of dehumanization: mechanistic and animalistic.  While the former of these two 
is certainly important, it is the latter that is more prevalent in the story, and the one which is 
connected to the theme of physical and moral degradation, as well as to the use of biology and 
taxonomical hierarchy to support practices of eugenics and genocide.  In “Garbage Wind,” 
Platonov uses the theme of regressive metamorphosis to symbolize the degrading effect of social 
crises and political oppression, and to challenge the notions of ontological hierarchy and 
progressive evolution which underlie practices of pseudospeciation and dehumanization. 
      The story is set in Germany in the summer of 1933, the year Hitler came to power as 
chancellor of the Nazi party, and the first Nazi concentration camp was founded at Dachau.  The 
protagonist, Albert Lichtenberg, is an astrophysicist who is repulsed by corporeality and who 
rejects the materialist reduction of life to matter and function in service to, or as resource for, the 
state.  On the afternoon of July 16, he follows a group of National Socialists to a site in the city 
center where a metal statue of Hitler’s upper body is being erected.  He gives an impromptu 
speech about power, society, and despotism, at the end of which he denounces Hitler and strikes 
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the statue with his cane.  Consequently, he is attacked by some party supporters and severely 
maimed, and later taken to a rubbish pit and discarded, but manages to survive for some time 
eating scraps of kitchen refuse.  Later, he is arrested and taken to a concentration camp where he 
is sentenced to execution but manages to escape and ends up in a deserted village, where he finds 
the last inhabited house in which a starving old woman tends to her two dead children, whom she 
imagines are still alive.  In an attempt to save her, Lichtenberg prepares a soup into which he 
puts several pieces of flesh from his own leg.  He goes outside and dies, and his body is found by 
his wife who comes searching for him with a police officer, but his body is not recognized by his 
wife.  Rather it is seen as the corpse of an “unknown animal” which had been mutilated and 
dressed in scraps of human clothing.   The old woman dies, and the meat left on the stove is 
eaten by the investigating officer. 
       Several readings point out that while the story is set in Nazi Germany, there are a number of 
clues which suggest that it is also a veiled denunciation of Stalinist Russia.  Mikhail Geller, for 
instance, focuses on a number of parallels in the story between Platonov’s depiction of Nazi 
Germany and Soviet Russia under Stalin.
137
   One such parallel, he argues, is the emphasis on 
science and technology, which while important for Germany, was even more important for the 
continued industrialization of the Soviet Union, especially given the temporal setting of 1933, 
the beginning of the second Five-Year Plan.  He points out that Lichtenberg is one of the last in a 
long line of scientists in Platonov’s work, and represents the author’s detachment from his earlier 
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hopeful beliefs regarding the liberating effect of science and technology.  Lichtenberg’s rejection 
of the utopian state is a rejection of what he characterizes as the materialist dream of the 
nineteenth century, the century that gave birth to Hitler who was “the first to understand that 
what must be built on the back of the machine, on the poor, sullen hump of precise Science, is 
not freedom but unyielding despotism!”138  In rejecting the despotism of science, Lichtenberg is 
rendered unnecessary and is rejected by the state.  His attempt to retain a sense of freedom and 
thoughtfulness is represented in the final scene in which he attempts to save the starving woman 
by feeding her his own body.  Yet, as Geller points out, this attempt is undermined by the 
woman’s death and the officer’s consumption of Lichtenberg’s flesh.139 
      The rejection of materialism and positivism is established in the opening pages with the 
narrator’s intensely physical descriptions of people and events, and with Lichtenburg’s revulsion 
toward such physicality.  At the beginning of the story, after Lichtenberg strikes his wife with his 
cane, he goes outside and the reader is presented with a series of physical descriptions of 
typically spiritual or intangible phenomena.  For instance, the first image we see when 
Lichtenberg goes outside is a Catholic church which stands “like suffering organized into stone,” 
and the narrator describes the people leaving the church in despiritualizing terms.  We see old 
women in whom “once-seething passions now oozed like pus”; a group of girls are seen with 
tears in their eyes, yet these tears are filled not with “adoration of Christ, but with moisture from 
love glands”; and a priest who is “excited, damp, and red—an ambassador of God in the guise of 
a man’s urinary appendage.”140  A crowd sings songs “from the depths of their guts” in a “tenor 
of quivering intestines.”  Similarly, in the first scene the narrator states that Lichtenberg’s despair 
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“lay with bony hardness,” while in this scene his thoughts grow furious and stand up in his head 
“like stubble, forcing their way through the bone.”141  These opening scenes with their extremely 
corporeal imagery, present a world in which dualist mind-body conflict is overcome not through 
some idealistic synthesis, but through a degrading reduction of all life to the physical.  It is a 
world that is perhaps Platonov’s grim vision of materialism carried to its fullest extreme.  
      The narrator’s emphasis on the physical establishes the theme of mind/body dualism which 
pervades to the text.  Analyzing Platonov’s treatment of this dualism in the story, Konstantin 
Barsht focuses on the scene of Lichtenberg in the rubbish heap in which he engages in a 
philosophical argument with Descartes.  While Lichtenberg’s initial denunciation is against 
nineteenth century positivism, here he traces the problem back to the Cartesian formula, “I think 
therefore I am,” which he views as the basis for the senselessness and irresponsibility of the 
modern age.  Barsht argues that Platonov proposes to correct Descartes by reversing the formula, 
stating that existence precedes thought.  One can act and exist without being conscious of one’s 
life.
142
  Yet, what is most important for Platonov is the interdependence and mutual influence of 
the energy of the universe and the energy of human thought.  According to Platonov, the 
ontological necessity of man to the Universe and his real existence is determined by the level of 
intensity of his thought and the level of his responsibility to the universe, and his thought 
becomes the last hope of man to extricate himself from the “rubbish of history.”143 
      Similar to Barsht, Thomas Seifrid sees the independence of thought at the center of 
Lichtenberg’s rebellion.  Seifrid argues that what is important is not whether the story is a 
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denunciation of fascism or Stalinism, as is the story’s grim “anticipation of the punishment 
awaiting anyone who raises a hand against absolute power.”144  While the story is particularly 
gruesome, Lichtenberg’s rebellion is typical of a Platonovian hero insofar as his rebellion is as 
much against the ontological regime in which individuals are reduced to resource and 
mechanism as it is against “the political one that mirrors and intensifies it.”145  However, the 
intensity of the materialism and Lichtenberg’s rejection of it is particularly strong, and may have 
much to do with Platonov’s own growing concerns over both the situation in the Soviet Union, 
and the silencing of his voice.  This is suggested by Lichtenberg’s surprise that they did not 
remove his tongue, as thought is “the most dangerous thing,” more dangerous than the 
“submissive reactionary” (smirnyi reaktsioner) of the sexual organ.146 
      As Lichtenberg is silenced, he loses not only his individuality but also his human status.  He 
is beaten, detained, slated for execution, while being dehumanized to the point where he is 
officially placed in a different taxonomic category, as a subhuman animal.  This is a point raised 
by those critics who have looked at this story in connection with the animal-human question.  
For instance, Oksana Timofeeva argues that animals in Platonov are often used to represent his 
tragic dialectic of nature and his disappointed hopes in the socio-political project of the October 
Revolution.  Platonov’s animals become a localization of life energy which is often tragically 
subject to exploitation and entropy.  Regarding the short story “Garbage Wind,” she argues that 
Platonov is describing a situation in which the messianic force of a political movement has 
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undermined social progress, and thus humanity is degraded, and the astrophysicist is no longer 
able to remain human in the Fascist society.
147
       
      The idea of devolution is extended in Hans Günther’s article concerning animals in Platonov 
more generally.  He argues that a common thread running through much of Platonov’s work is 
the idea of progressive metamorphosis.  Often propelled by social and scientific effort, the theme 
of progressive metamorphosis in Platonov is an idealistic view of evolution by means of which, 
concurrent with a more general course of progress, the utopian vision of harmonious relations 
between humans and other animals will eventually be realized.
148
  Platonov’s later works tend to 
be less optimistic.  Günther briefly focuses on “Garbage Wind” to discuss an inversion of this 
current of regressive metamorphosis, in which a defective society, and Lichtenberg’s rejection of 
and by it, leads to degraded mutation, and zoomorphic transformation.
149
 
     These readings situate the story in the body of Platonov’s work more generally, particularly in 
connection with his pervasive, and often ambiguous, preoccupation with ontology.  The problem 
of dualism has been adequately discussed by scholars, as has, though to a lesser extent, the 
animalization of humans as a consequence of deprivation and oppression.  What has not been 
discussed, however, is the connection between animality and practices of dehumanization.  It is 
thus worthwhile to take a closer look at a number of the story’s details to see how Platonov 
engages these ideas, as well as his treatment of scientism as a means of dehumanizing 
exploitation and violence and the way in which he explores these issues through complex images 
of animality. 
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      While Platonov is generally apprehensive about placing nonhuman animals along a 
hierarchical scheme or continuum in a static position subordinate to humans, the presentation of 
animality in this story is, as Günther states, one of regression or devolution.  From the opening 
scene onwards, Lichtenberg is presented as a man repulsed by corporeality, who sees everything 
around him reduced to gross matter, and people devolving into animals as a result of oppression 
and deprivation.  The first instance of this is the portrayal of Lichtenberg’s wife, Zelda, an 
Afghan “who had faded from hunger, though once she had been a dear and magnificent being.” 
Now she had “become an animal: the down on her cheeks had turned to a coat of hair.”  Her leg 
is covered by rampant sores of “an unclean animal; she did not even lick them, she was worse 
than a monkey.”150 Later, Lichtenberg is in a similar state after several days in the garbage pit, 
where as a result of his mutilation “a dark infection, similar to lupus, had spread over all of his 
body, while a thick coat of hair had sprouted on top of it . . . Bushes of hair had also grown on 
the places where his ears had been torn off.”151  Similar descriptions of Lichtenberg occur in the 
office of the concentration camp and in the village after his death.   
      Platonov had previously used hair to symbolize animality and regressive metamorphosis in 
Kotlovan, where we see both Nastya’s mother and the peasant Yelisei growing pelts as an 
atavistic consequence of their lives of hardship and deprivation, conditions so desperate that they 
must be so consumed by physical need that they have no time for “higher mental functions.”  In 
both of these works, Platonov is using animality to symbolize the dehumanizing effect of 
oppression, and exposing the philosophical and psychological notions on which such an effect is 
based.  In these instances, Platonov is highlighting a long-established dualist convention which 
positions humanity qualitatively above animality in associating humanity with notions of reason 
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and spirituality and animality with notions of instinct and physicality.  In “Garbage Wind” such a 
dualist contrast is maintained by Lichtenberg’s opposition to corporeality and materialism while 
asserting that despite the surrounding conditions he will remain human.  This pledge is first 
mentioned in the opening scene in Lichtenberg’s revulsion toward his wife:  
Теперь она зверь, сволочь безумного сознания, а он до гроба, навсегда останется 
человеком, физиком космических пространств, и пусть голод томит его желудок до 
самого сердца — он не пойдет выше горла, и жизнь его спрячется в пещеру 
головы.152 
Now she was a beast, scum of crazed consciousness, whereas he would always, until the 
grave, remain a human being, a physicist of the cosmic spaces, and even if hunger were 
to torment his stomach right up to his heart, it would not reach higher than his throat, and 
his life would hide away in the cave of his head. 
Here we see an opposition drawn between animal and human as well as the classic opposition 
between body and mind, but expressed in particularly gross, physical terms.  These oppositions 
are developed and problematized as the story proceeds, with arguably more severe implications 
than those in Kotlovan.   
      While physicality and animality are two different things, they are often conflated, and 
Platonov himself closely intertwines these concepts for various reasons and effects.  One is of 
course the problem of dualism; another is the problem of dehumanization.  When Lichtenberg is 
arrested and taken to the concentration camp, he is not questioned but only examined as he 
“could hardly be a human being,” and is determined to be “a possible new species of social 
animal, developing a layer of hair.”153  Similarly, at the end of the story as Lichtenberg lay dead, 
he is unrecognizable to his wife; she sees only “unknown animal [ . . . ] it might even have been 
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a primitive man who had grown a coat of hair, but most likely it was a large monkey someone 
had mutilated and then, as a joke, dressed up in scraps of human clothing.”  The policeman 
confirms her speculation that it was either a monkey or some other “unscientific animal for 
which Germany had no use” (kakoe-nibud’ nenuzhnoe dlia Germanii, nenauchnoe zhivotnoe).154  
      In these scenes, Platonov is literalizing the metaphors used in practices of animalistic 
dehumanization.  Platonov featured this practice as it happened in the language and imagery used 
to demean and justify violence against the kulaks in Kotlovan; in “Garbage Wind,” however, this 
practice and its consequences are more deeply explored.  Depicting humans as being animalized 
in the context of oppression or deprivation is one thing, to describe them as a physically 
animalized “other,” a specimen of a bestial outgroup, is another.  Perceiving members of an 
outgroup as less human than one’s own group forms the basis of animalistic dehumanization and 
its possible consequences of war and genocide.  This type of thinking is common among human 
groups, particularly in situations of intergroup conflict.
155
  Yet modes and patterns of 
dehumanization are difficult to understand and assess due to the relationship between the 
figurative and the literal, and the relationship this in turn has to notions of form and essence.  As 
David Livingstone Smith argues, the language of dehumanization may be metaphorical, but it is 
not just metaphorical; the language is only an indication of something occurring in deeper levels 
of perception.
156
  In “Garbage Wind,” when Lichtenberg literally begins to take on a nonhuman 
(or subhuman) form, he is manifesting a perceived subhuman essence, making physical and overt 
what is normally considered hidden, and thus destroying any ambiguity and uncertainty that 
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might normally be involved in recognizing the subhuman.  This type of insidious subhumanity 
would be made quite explicit in a later warning to members of the German SS that the subhuman 
is a dreadful creature that imitates man, that “not every being with a human face is human.”157 
      This literalization of metaphor has further significance in relation to the other aspects of 
physicality and materialism expressed in these passages.  This has to do with the use of science 
or pseudoscience to support theories of racial or cultural supremacy, and to justify practices of 
extreme discrimination.  In the scenes mentioned above, Platonov points to the important and 
interrelated ideas and practices of cultural pseudospeciation, and racial and cultural hygiene.  
Pseudospeciation is a practice of conflating the concept of species with other categorized groups, 
most often race.  As Erik Erikson originally defined it, “the term denotes that while man is 
obviously one species, he appears and continues on the scene split up into groups (from tribes to 
nations, from castes to classes, from religions to ideologies . . . ) which provide their members 
with a firm sense of unique and superior human identity.”158  While the term was first used in 
1966 it bears a strong relation both to modern theories of dehumanization and to 19
th
 and early 
20
th
 century appropriations of biology and physical anthropology for the purpose of supporting 
modes of discrimination, from criminal anthropology and social Darwinism, to the extreme 
applications of such theories in eugenics, racial hygiene, and genocide.   
      When the party officers define Lichtenberg as a “new species of social animal,” and as an 
“unscientific animal for which Germany had no use,” they are literally dehumanizing him by 
placing him in a different taxonomic category.  And since according to the pervasive notions of 
human supremacy nonhuman animals are always lower life forms, Lichtenberg is placed in a 
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position that is categorically inferior to humans, and can thus be treated accordingly with little 
moral compunction.  This is what is done when outgroups are labeled as subhuman, as rats, pigs, 
apes, etc.  Here, though, Platonov is drawing attention to this practice both through Lichtenberg’s 
literal, physical metamorphosis, as well as the attempt to distinguish his subhumanity through 
physical, “scientific” means. 
      One such scientific (or, more accurately, pseudoscientific) method is anthropometry, 
particularly craniometry and phrenology, to which Platonov alludes in the scene in the camp 
office.  During the examination, the officer reports that “judging by superficial characteristics of 
the head,” Lichtenberg is “a moron” (debil).  Platonov is actually alluding to two different 
practices here, both of which refer to the specific temporal context of the story, and two groups 
singled out for persecution in 1933: communists and the disabled.  The story features a number 
of connections to communists, such as the dedication to Comrade Zachow, a German communist 
who had been a witness at the Leipzig trial, and the imprisoned communists Lichtenberg meets 
in the camp, most importantly Hedwiga Wotmann, who receives her death sentence along with 
Lichtenberg.  Mikhail Geller discusses Platonov’s inclusion of communists in the story, but does 
so mostly in an analysis of the significance of Hedwiga Wotmann’s character, and the possibility 
that Platonov had included a vision of communists as positive heroes suffering under German 
oppression in the hope that it would increase the likelihood of the story’s publication.159     
       While these are certainly valid points, there are other important factors to consider.  First, 
communists became a key target of the Nazi party early in 1933, after the burning of the 
Reichstag building in February, for which communists were blamed and punished.  Second, in 
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March, the Dachau concentration camp was established, and in its first months of operation was 
used to inter mostly communists and other political opponents.
160
  Finally, Platonov’s inclusion 
of craniometry refers to specific practices that were used to examine communists in the camp.  
While communists were a problem because of their political convictions, Nazi ideologues 
developed the practice of viewing such convictions in semi-biological terms.  According to Nazi 
propaganda, communists could be recognized by their “deformed head shapes and the twisted 
features of their faces.”161 
      The second specific point of temporal context is the persecution of the mentally disabled.  On 
July 14, 1933 (Platonov’s story begins on July 16), Germany passed the Law for the Prevention 
of Genetically Diseased Offspring, a law instituting the compulsory sterilization of anyone 
suffering from certain genetic disorders, the first official step in a larger program of Nazi 
eugenics.
162
  Platonov’s criticism of eugenics is suggested by Lichtenberg’s being labeled a 
“debil,” the earlier detail of his genitals being crushed, and the language used during his 
sentencing.  Lichtenberg is sentenced to be shot: 
вследствие несоответствия развития своего тела и ума теории германского расизма 
и уровню государственного умозрения: в целях жесткого оздоровления народного 
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организма от субъектов, впавших в состояние животности, в целях профилактики 
от заражения расы беспородными существами.163 
on account of the failure of his body and mind to develop in accordance with the theories 
of German racism and the level of State speculation, and with the aim of rigorously 
cleansing the organism of the people of individuals who had fallen into the condition of 
an animal, so protecting the race from infection by mongrels. 
Not typically used for humans, the term “besporodnyi” here underscores the discriminatory 
mentality commonly associated with eugenics, as well as its origins in the selective breeding of 
plants and nonhuman animals combined with the social application of evolutionary theory, a way 
to further dehumanize the individuals subjected to these practices.
164
   
       While Platonov’s criticism here may in part be his echoing contemporary Soviet opposition 
to eugenics,
165
 he seems to include this as part of a more overarching criticism of practices that 
use science to legitimate discrimination, as well as practices involved in a larger pattern of 
biological reductionism.  One form of such reductionism occurs in this same scene in the use of 
the metaphor equating society to an organism.  When Lichtenberg is sentenced to be executed for 
the purpose of “cleansing the organism of the people,” Platonov is engaging another trope of 19th 
century positivism and social Darwinism which later came to be used in the theoretical 
justification of eugenics and “race hygiene.”  Biological terms such as “germ,” “infection,” 
“disease” are common in racist rhetoric and were used repeatedly in Nazi propaganda.  Platonov 
refers to this type of language in the sentencing scene quoted above, and again earlier when the 
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narrator states that unlike Jewish women, German women “did not consciously suffer from 
syphilis,” (sifolisom soznatel’no ne boleli), and that “they did not give off any bad smells thanks 
to the perfect racial composition of their bodies” (blagodaria sovershennomu rasovomu 
ustroistvu tela).
166
 
      The organism metaphor became popular in the 19
th
 century initially through the writing of 
Auguste Comte, who sought a way to advance a positivist theory of holism.  The trope then 
became more literal with Herbert Spencer, who provided detailed extensions of the metaphor 
saturated with biological language: society was not like an organism, it was an organism.
167
 
However, while Spencer did warn that while individuals comprise the units of a larger organism 
which is greater than the sum of its parts, the collective does not have a corporate consciousness 
as do individual organisms, and therefore individual welfare should not be subordinated to the 
collective good.
168
  A similar warning would be voiced by the populist Nikolai Mikhailovsky in 
his own critical use of the biological metaphor to articulate his ideas of social development.  For 
Mikhailovsky, the individual and society develop inversely and the heterogeneous individual is 
at constant risk of being homogenized in the larger collective, turning individuals into 
specialized organs in a larger organic whole, and what should be defended and developed is the 
whole, “integral” individual (tselostnaia lichnost’) in a cooperative society with little division of 
labor.
169
  A more monistic view of the social organism was developed by Alexander Bogdanov, 
one of Platonov’s principle influences.170 At a philosophical distance from other Marxists, 
particularly Plekhanov and Lenin, both of whom were averse to the organism metaphor and the 
application of evolutionary theory to social progress, Bogdanov developed an idealized vision of 
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the fusion of the individual and the whole in which individuals would become like “cells in the 
system of the tissues of an organism.”171  But this fusion would not be a subordination of the 
individual to the collective, but rather a much more utopian merger involving a unity beyond 
concepts of part and whole, mind and matter.
172
   
      This vision of unity is very much in the spirit of Platonov’s own monistic ideal, and is likely 
one of the reasons for the bitterness throughout this story.  Of course, it is difficult to reconcile 
the individual’s integration into a harmonious whole with Platonov’s repeated concerns for the 
value of the individual, a value that would be more in keeping with Mikhailovsky’s vision of 
individual wholeness.  Whether a reconciliation of these ideas is possible, what is important for 
our understanding of the story is Platonov’s position against homogeneity in a totalitarian 
society.  After Lichtenberg is assaulted following his denunciation of Hitler, the narrator states 
that he is resigned to his severe physical injuries since “he had long ago recognized that the time 
of the warm, loved, whole (tsel’noe) human body had passed: it was necessary for each person to 
become a mutilated cripple.”173  In the story we see both a criticism of the collective society as 
an enemy of the individual, and a criticism of the use of holistic tropes, particularly scientific 
tropes, to legitimate oppression and violence.  What concerns him is not so much the idea of 
seeing society as an integrated and evolving organism, but the promotion of an ideology as the 
goal of that evolution, and reducing individuals to mere units in a larger structure, units which 
can be expunged if they compromise the integrity or health of that structure.  In this way, 
biological metaphors for society provide a particularly severe form of dehumanizing the objects 
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of persecution, objects which can be seen not only as subhuman, but as dangerous pathogens or 
parasites which should be destroyed.  
      In addition to using dehumanization as a means of criticizing the use of biological metaphors 
and science to legitimate oppression, Platonov subverts the axiological construct of a human-
animal hierarchy.  As a victim of violence and oppression, Lichtenberg is “degraded” to the level 
of the subhuman, as he becomes, at the end of the story, an “unknown animal” for which the 
state had no use.  It is in this condition, however, that he literally sacrifices himself to feed a 
starving woman with the muscle tissue from his own leg.  With this act, Lichtenberg not only 
asserts his individual will, but also a particularly strong degree of compassion, a quality of moral 
sensibility often considered lacking in “lower” life forms.  It is not the subhuman Lichtenberg 
that behaves with savagery, but the uniformed vessels of the rational state.  In a way somewhat 
similar to Zamyatin’s dragon-soldier, Lichtenberg is at his most humane when he is least 
recognizable as human. 
 
      The stories of Zamyatin and Platonov considered here offer complex insight into the human-
animal dynamic, particularly as it concerns inter-human conflict and practices of dehumanization 
and a few ways these practices are informed by or otherwise connected to an ideology which 
positions the human above the animal.  They present a vision, at least partially, of the 
conventional human-animal hierarchy, and how this hierarchical construct can influence violent 
practices.  Yet, while they may be grim in their representation of darker sides of these 
ontological constructs, they both complicate these constructs insofar as both problematize the 
conventional notion of the human.  Zamyatin’s dragon-soldier is most “human” when he 
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spontaneously and momentarily rejects the social order which he is charged to uphold.  Likewise, 
Platonov’s scientist is most “human” as an animalized “degenerate” who sacrifices his flesh to a 
victim of the mechanized, homogeneous state.  By using the themes of zoomorphism and 
dehumanization in a way that confuses notions of humanity and animality, these texts not only 
expose the anthropocentric underpinnings of dehumanization, but question the deeply 
complicated idea of humanness. 
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Chapter 3 
Subjectivity and Value 
 
 
The woman is smiling, gentle, whitefaced.  An old 
monkey stares at her from the cage with cold 
attention.… 
The woman takes a piece of bread out of her pocket 
and holds it out to the monkey. 
Getting up with difficulty, the animal approaches 
her without moving his eyes from the moldy piece 
of bread. 
“People are sitting around starving,” mutters a 
nearby soldier. 
“What can a beast do?  A beast can’t talk!” 
 
                 Isaac Babel, “A Beast Can’t Talk,” 1918. 
 
 
      Isaac Babel wrote a series of short stories and vignettes to report on events and circumstances 
in Petersburg during the months surrounding the October Revolution.  One of these is a piece 
about starving animals in the city zoo.  Due to resource shortages, three members of a 
commission visit the zoo to evaluate the animals in order to decide which specimens would be 
kept and fed and which would be shot; and from a visitor’s vantage point, the narrator gives a 
brief glimpse of the conditions of a series of animals as one would encounter them, moving from 
cage to cage.  Like most of Babel’s Petersburg reports, the story presents a bad situation amid a 
bad situation, and like most of his work it engages deep and difficult questions.  This story, in 
particular, raises a couple of important problems connected to our relationship with nonhuman 
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animals: the question of value, specifically the value we place upon the lives of other beings; and 
another which often informs the first—the question of the nonhuman subject.  The story begins 
with a paragraph consisting of two short sentences, each with a different grammatical subject, a 
woman and a monkey, placed at either end of the paragraph.  The only verb is in the second 
sentence.  The woman is before a display cage from which a monkey looks out, watching her 
attentively.  This gaze contains both a mystery and a challenge: the mystery of a consciousness 
beyond the human, and a challenge to the value we reserve for our own. 
      In the previous chapters I examined literary texts which explore the use of animal imagery as 
a means of defining human identity, through a system of associative symbols used to assert 
varying notions of value and meaning.  In the context of dehumanization, for instance, humans 
are often denigrated through the symbolic association with an animal being that is regarded as 
having little or no value from a human point of view.  In studying these associations, though, we 
encounter a separate but related question: how do this symbolism and this point of view relate to 
and affect our understanding of and attitudes toward actual animals?  Our notions about animals 
directly influence our relations with them: we eat, wear, and experiment on them, we breed, 
collect, and display them, as in Babel’s example, largely because we feel morally justified in 
doing so based on a shared belief in our greater intrinsic value.  In this chapter we turn from 
animals as symbols to animals as living subjects, to examine various problems and effects of 
representing nonhuman life in a literary text.         
      Pilnyak’s “A Complete Life” is a story which effectively marginalizes the human by offering 
a glimpse of wildlife in an environment with an underscored lack of a human presence, told 
through a narrator who struggles with the challenges of representing the nonhuman subject.  
Platonov’s “The Cow” engages similar problems, but in a different context and with a 
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domesticated rather than a wild animal.  While also addressing questions of accessibility and 
value, the implications in Platonov’s story are arguably more grave and immediate insofar as the 
events take place in an environment in which humans are all too present.  In “A Complete Life,” 
Pilnyak disrupts anthropocentrism by questioning the value of humanity’s place in the world, the 
value of human reason, and the limitations of human understanding and experience.  Platonov 
extends this challenge by providing a portrait of some of the unfortunate consequences of an 
anthropocentric worldview, and by using narrative perspective to give the reader a view from the 
other side.  In these works, Pilnyak and Platonov have constructed complex narratives that 
approach a nonhuman animal as a unique subject while simultaneously drawing attention to the 
problems of representing that subject.  They explore the questions of similarity and difference, 
the difficulty of understanding nonhuman interiority, the comparative value of nonhuman life, 
and they problematize the anthropocentric view of nature and animals, as well as the narrative in 
which these are represented. 
      In attempting to represent an animal subject in a way that captures the animal’s experience, a 
writer is confronted with the question of whether access into that experience is even possible.  
Exploring the subjective nature of experience, Thomas Nagel argues that each species has both a 
distinct and unknowable mode of experience.  To illustrate this, he uses the example of a bat 
because its unique faculty of echolocation is radically different from the way humans perceive 
the world.
174
  He states that if we try to imagine what it is like to be a bat, we are restricted by the 
resources of our own mind.  We can understand how echolocation works, but even if we could 
simulate this, we would only be humans experiencing a simulation, because we cannot know 
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what it is like for a bat to be a bat.
175
  Though we cannot experience or describe an animal’s 
unique subjectivity, he concludes, we should not dismiss their experience as meaningless or less 
rich than our own.
176
 
     Representations of animals, of animal interiority, will thus always be approximations, at 
varying distances from the actual subject.  Drawing on the distinction that “non-human 
experience cannot be reproduced but only represented,” John Simons explores the sort of 
gradations of animal subjectivity in literature in connection with the topic of anthropomorphism, 
from the highly anthropomorphic fable to works which attempt to reproduce an animal’s life.177  
He argues that while actual reproduction is impossible, the closer a work comes to reproduction, 
the greater its tendency toward challenging the boundary between human and nonhuman.
178
  This 
challenge is complex insofar as it concerns both the established ontological boundary between 
humans and other animals, and the concept of anthropomorphism as a means of maintaining that 
boundary. 
      Tom Tyler outlines three general uses of “anthropomorphism”: the literal use which 
attributes human form to a nonhuman being; the ascription of distinctively human activities or 
behaviors to an animal, such as seen in children’s stories; and a third which attributes 
intentionality, purpose, or volition to a being thought to lack them, a charge often leveled at 
animal behaviorists who grant mental phenomena to animals without scientifically establishing 
the existence of such phenomena.
179
  In her study of the representation of animals in behavioral 
works, Eileen Crist examines the use of language which, in an effort to maintain a standard of 
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objectivity, tends toward the technical and mechanistic in a way that denies animal 
subjectivity.
180
  To avoid having one’s research labeled anthropomorphic, a writer will avoid 
terms which grant the animal meaningful experience or agency.  One can, for instance, use 
“bond,” “pleasure,” and “pain,” but not “friendship,” “happiness,” and “misery” as these allude 
to states of being beyond mere sensual experience.
181
 Emphasis is consistently placed on the 
reflexive, functional or adaptive value of behaviors, rather than inviting interpretations of 
thought or agency.
182
  
      Tyler argues that the resistance to anthropomorphism is defensible in the sense that it can 
help to avoid the hazard of demeaning either the human or nonhuman by failing to appreciate the 
unique traits of either.  However, as a rule, the charge of anthropomorphism is almost invariably 
anthropocentric insofar as, firstly, it fails to question certain assumptions about the human, and 
secondly, it precludes the possibility of discovering or appreciating animal-human continuity.
183
  
The charge of anthropomorphism, more than anything, reveals the presuppositions and biases of 
the critics, the “a priori conviction that the difference between animals and humans is so 
fundamental as to prohibit a shared language of representation in the depiction of action.”184 
      When encountering anthropomorphism in fables or children’s stories, we tend not to see it as 
a challenge to human exclusivity.  Real rabbits, for instance, don’t wear vests and attend tea 
parties.  But when an animal is represented as an animal in appearance and behavior, yet through 
narration that interprets his or her feelings, thoughts, or motivations, a conclusion often reached 
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is that the narrator is projecting uniquely human faculties onto the animal.  Such projection is to 
a degree perhaps unavoidable because of the limited access to an animal’s experience.  But more 
importantly, these conclusions reveal a discomfort in or resistance to accepting animals as 
agents, as meaningful subjects.  The texts to be discussed here explore some of the aspects and 
implications of this discomfort. 
 
I.  No Man’s Land: The Limits of the Human in Pilnyak’s “A Complete Life” (1915). 
      As discussed in the first chapter, Boris Pilnyak’s employment of animal imagery tends 
toward the symbolic, as a way of representing one side of a number of binary conflicts 
circulating through his work: nature vs. civilization, rural vs. urban, primitive vs. modern, 
instinct vs. intellect.  While some works assert a greater value of one side over the other, he is, in 
general, quite fair in examining the positive and negative aspects of both, interested as he was in 
the borderline between the two, in the tension and interplay of different modes or realms.
185
  His 
exploration of this tension became more complicated in the years following the Revolution, a 
feature which appears frequently in the novel Machines and Wolves, in which the central binary 
operates on multiple levels simultaneously, and their positive and negative qualities are more 
difficult to distinguish or disentangle.  In his earlier work, the contrast is relatively simpler, 
purer, more straightforward, with a greater value placed on nature and the natural as something 
to be preserved. 
      Because of his overall tendency toward the symbolic, exploring the role of animal imagery in 
these earlier works can be difficult.  Some of this imagery functions more apparently as symbols 
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or allegory, while other uses are more ambiguous, seemingly more an attempt to represent 
animals as beings as such.  The story “A Dog’s Life” (1919), for instance, is unmistakably 
allegorical; the animals are highly anthropomorphized, speaking in human language and 
behaving according to distinctions of social class.  “Snow Wind” (“Pozemka,” 1917), by 
contrast, presents a pack of wolves struggling for survival in their natural setting, with a narrative 
interpretation of their experience or motivation, but comparatively little of what would be 
considered anthropomorphic.  However, this story and the one to be discussed here, “A 
Complete Life,” often draw allegorical readings from scholars.  One reason for this, perhaps, is 
that because of Pilnyak’s frequent metaphorical or symbolic use of animals, one is inclined to see 
all of his animals in this mode.  Another possible reason, though, is that these stories, especially 
“A Complete Life,” approach the representation of an animal subject, which presents a challenge 
to the reader’s ability to see beyond the mode of projection.  In this story, the narrative carefully 
hovers at the interface of similarity and difference, in such a way that it simultaneously offers a 
narrative of a nonhuman subject, and confronts the tendency to read such a narrative either 
anthropomorphically or allegorically, and in doing so, it offers a critique of the anthropocentrism 
that promotes such a reading. 
      “A Complete Life” is a short story about the lives of a pair of large, predatory birds, 
apparently eagle owls.  The dominant theme of the story is nature, specifically a wild animal’s 
natural life cycle which is itself composed of smaller periodic cycles.  The narrative follows the 
pair as they unite one spring, begin their annual propagation the following spring, tend their 
offspring until they depart in the autumn, and the cycle begins again.  They live together for 
thirteen years, sharing a nest suspended over a ravine, until the female leaves the male for a 
younger, stronger mate, and the old male dies, his body devoured by wolves who dwell at the 
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bottom of the ravine.  Within the presentation of their larger life cycle, the narrator underscores 
the theme of instinct, and the fulfillment of natural instinctual drives through which nature is 
perpetuated.  At the end, the male dies contented, feeling that the purpose of his life—
reproduction—had been realized. 
      The story is one of Pilnyak’s earliest, written in 1915, and while it was included in many of 
his collections, it is not considered as important as his post-Revolutionary work, and has 
therefore not received a lot of critical attention.
186
  In a general sense, it is seen as an objective, 
dispassionate portrait of nature and natural life processes.  Where readings differ is in the degree 
to which a distinctly human meaning can be gleaned from or projected onto this portrait.  
Voronsky, for instance, views the depiction of the birds and concludes that human life is the 
same—its essence is wild, primitive, ruled by instinct.187  Similarly, Peter Jensen, sees human 
features in the birds which reveal the story to be a “universal parable.”188  Gary Browning, sees it 
as an “allegory of man’s condition” in the precarious nature of life.189  Galina Lobanova gives a 
detailed reading of the story, but she, too, views the story allegorically.  In her view the birds live 
a complete life, but their lives do not have sufficient meaning from a human point of view, so to 
understand the significance of the story one must look beyond the birds to the symbolic meaning 
they contain as psychological types.
190
  She argues that the narrator describes the birds so 
vividly, while shifting the emphasis of his descriptions and interpretations, that the birds 
alternately elicit sympathy and revulsion from the reader.  The more “human” they become, 
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when their emotions approach the human, the reader is repelled by their carnality.
191
  She 
concludes that the story demands the reader seek those qualities which distinguish humans from 
other animals.
192
   
      Other readings are less inclined to attribute specifically human meaning to the story.  
Vladimir Kriuchkov, for instance, argues against allegorical readings, stating that the connection 
between the birds and humanity is much “thinner and deeper.”193  He reads the story as one of 
the first manifestations of the theme of the natural cycle, the endless repetition of birth and death, 
which defined Pilnyak’s philosophical views of life and history.  Kriuchkov sees the story as an 
exploration of “wholeness” (tselostnost’) with “fully-fledged” (polnotsennye) animal characters 
which should not necessarily be read allegorically.  The birds experience the drama and 
achievements of a life distinct from the human.  He notes that despite Pilnyak’s sympathy 
towards the birds, one senses the author’s detachment or dismissal (otstranenie).194  The 
“complete life” is in the fullness of its manifestation of life processes and cycles which would be 
applicable to humans insofar as they too are subject to the cycle of birth and death. 
      Both of these readings are helpful in revealing important facets or implications of the story, 
Kriuchkov’s in his emphasis on the fact that human meaning is irrelevant to the birds’ lives, and 
Lobanova’s in her discussion of narrative shifts which complicate the reader’s experience of the 
story.  Of additional interest, though, is the variation in the degree to which the story can, or 
should, be read allegorically.  Taking a closer look at some of the story’s details will reveal some 
of the causes of this variability. 
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      The story is composed of ten sections, most of these presenting a vision of the birds’ lives in 
a particular season.  While the theme of cyclicity is central to the text, the narrative focuses on 
the male bird as the main figure, and the composition presents his life in an arc, the thematic and 
structural climax of which occurs in section five, which concerns the birth of his offspring.  
Understanding section five as the center, the rest of the narrative forms a frame for two key 
elements, one which concerns the matter of the text—the lives of the birds and the fulfillment of 
their natural, instinctual purpose (propagation)—and one which concerns the narrator’s (and the 
reader’s) experience of these lives and processes.  This second element has not yet received 
sufficient critical attention regarding the way Pilnyak’s narrative raises questions concerning the 
problem of subjectivity, and the value we place on the subject’s experience of his or her own life. 
      There are a few likely reasons for this lack of critical attention.  First, representation of a 
non-human subject, at least one which is not highly anthropomorphized, is inherently difficult 
insofar as there are limits to our ability to truly access a non-human life and to describe its 
sensations and consciousness.  Second, since such representations are created by humans for 
humans, even when such subjectivity is approached, readings tend toward anthropomorphic or 
allegorical conclusions.  Third, and of particular importance for this analysis, is the fact that 
Pilnyak’s text is complex in its use of language and structure, so that some of the important 
points regarding the potential to read the text as a critical challenge to both anthropomorphism 
and anthropocentrism can be easily overlooked.  The two elements mentioned above, the story 
and the narrative complexity through which it is presented, are essentially superimposed on one 
another, so that the first element, being dominant, eclipses the second, more subtle element, 
embedded in the text throughout, but becoming more palpable at the climax in sections four 
through six.   
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       The first section functions as a sort of prelude, in which the narrator introduces the setting 
and the two birds.  The first word of the story is “ovrag” (ravine), which establishes the 
preeminence of nature and underscores the fact that, while the birds are the story’s principal 
figures, they are both a part of and subject to the natural world they inhabit.  This is further 
emphasized by the narrator’s introduction of them as simply “samets” and “samka” (male and 
female), rather than as individuated beings or even members of a particular species.  They serve 
as a sort of “everyanimal,” a point of reference for the narrator and reader to focus on as the 
author attempts to explore the experience of life and nature from a nonhuman perspective.
 195
 
      This close connection with nature is also established through linguistic association.  When 
the birds are first introduced, we are given a description of their appearance and their nest.  In 
this section, the narrator repeats a variation of the word “tiazhelyi” (burdensome/heavy) six times 
in just over a page of printed text.  He uses the word to describe the “heavy, gray, low-hanging 
sky” above the ravine; the “big, heavy” bodies of the birds; the “rough, heavy gracefulness” of 
the female’s neck; and the male’s “heavy eyes” and “heavily hanging wings.”  Looking closely, 
one notices that this modifier is used for both the surrounding environment (the sky, the smell of 
pines) and the birds, which helps to reinforce an identification of the birds with nature, and also 
establishes a system of association which the narrator uses in his exploration of instinct and 
subjectivity, which he begins in the subsequent section.   
      The second section introduces the cyclical theme as it takes place in the spring, specifically 
the first spring in which the birds meet and the male competes in courtship of the female; this 
begins the narrator’s exploration into subjectivity.  The male’s desire for a mate is characterized 
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as both a burden and a power which commands his actions, first introduced with the noun tiagota 
(burden/weight), which stands out to the reader as it comes immediately after the repetition of 
the adjectival and adverbial forms (tiazhelyi, tiazhelo).  The introduction of this burden marks a 
turning point in the male bird’s life: 
      Эта весна, солнце, бестолковый ветер и лесные шумы вложили в тело самца 
весеннюю, земную тяготу.  Раньше он летал или сидел, ухал или молчал, летел 
быстро или медленно, потому что кругом и внутри него были причины. [. . .]  
      Теперь было не так.   
      Уже не ощущения голода и самосохранения заставляли его летать, сидеть, 
кричать или молчать.  Им владело лежащее вне его и его ощущений.196 
      This spring, the sun, the gentle wind and forest sounds filled the body of the male 
with a vernal, earthly burden.  Before, he would fly or perch, call or be silent, fly quickly 
or slowly, because there were causes both around and within him. [ . . . ] 
     Now it was no longer so. 
     It was not a sense of hunger or self preservation that induced him to fly or perch, call 
or be silent.  He was under the power of something outside of him and his sensations. 
Impelled by this “burden,” he leaves his roost “as if in a fog, not knowing why” (kak v tumane, 
ne vedaia zachem), scanning the ground and finally landing near a group of birds with the female 
among them, again “not knowing why” (ne znaia pochemu).  In these passages the narrator 
presents the drive to reproduce as an unavoidable force, and he does so in a way that attempts to 
capture the male’s bird’s experience of this force.  Here it is a “burden,” while elsewhere it is 
described as a “beautiful” or “sweet torment” (prekrasnaia, sladkaia muka) or, a bit later on, as a 
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“tormenting, enchanting alarm” (tomiashchaia, zacharovyvaiushchaia trevoga) which the forest 
animals feel just before spring.   
      This burden, torment, and alarm refer to instinct, which the narrator continually underscores 
as the impetus, purpose, and guiding force of all of their actions.  But what is interesting in these 
passages is how the idea of instinct is treated.  Near the end of the story, the narrator overtly 
states, in a somewhat diminishing way, that the animals’ lives are governed by instinct, that they 
are incapable of thought and understanding, at least as we tend to define them.  In these earlier 
passages, though, he attempts to capture the experience of instinct from a nonhuman perspective, 
how they perceive and react to the mysterious inner force that drives them on.  Moreover, this 
attempt is underscored as just that, an attempt.  Throughout the text there is a tension between 
internal and external points of view, culminating in the climax in sections four and five.  The 
narrator exhibits varying degrees of omniscience, at times describing the scene of the animals’ 
behavior from a completely external point of view, while at other times he seems to have full 
access to their feelings, sensations, and motivations.  At still other times, he presents these inner 
phenomena interpretively, as conclusions drawn from observable appearance and behavior.   
      The narrator begins the shift in point of view in section two in the passages mentioned above, 
and continues this in section three where he attempts to illustrate the difference in worldview 
more explicitly.  This section takes place in winter, when the climate is harsh and food is scarce.  
The narrator states:  
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Ночи были мучительны. [ . . . ] А блужающий свет луны тревожил, страшил, точно 
вся земля состоит из одного огромного волчьего глаза и поэтому светится так 
страшно. [ . . . ] Если бы птицы умели думать, они больше всего хотели бы утра.197   
The nights were agonizing. [ . . . ] And the wandering light of the moon tormented and 
terrified them, as if the whole world consisted of one huge wolf’s eye and that is why it 
shone so terribly. [ . . . ] If the birds had the ability to think, they would have most of all 
longed for morning. 
Similar to the description of the burden of instinct, the threatening environment is depicted from 
the birds’ point of view through an associative connection with their natural predators.  On the 
one hand, this passage reads as an attempt to portray the interiority of the birds by using the type 
of figurative association often seen in religious and mythological constructs, and thus it is again 
an attempt to imagine the subjective experience of the nonhuman.  On the other hand, this 
passage reinforces the narrative tension and highlights the question of access to what the bird 
sees and understands.  Using the conjunction “tochno” (“as if”), the narrator creates a simile 
which interprets rather than reproduces the birds’ experience of their environment.  This might 
seem too subtle a detail to command the reader’s attention, were it not for a couple of important 
points.  First, Pilnyak’s careful use of language is evident elsewhere; even here, for instance, he 
uses roots repeated throughout the text, specifically in many of the attempts at interiority, such as 
“muka” and “trevoga.”  Second, in the sentence a few lines down (“If they had the ability to 
think”), he uses a hypothetical construction to assert a border of difference between the birds’ 
subjectivity and human cognition, despite the fact that the assertion contradicts other parts of the 
story in which the narrator illustrates, or in some way refers to, the birds’ thoughts.  So, while 
helping to describe what life might be like from a nonhuman perspective, this tension serves to 
raise the question of representation and challenge the observer’s and the reader’s ability to 
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actually know how the animals see the world.  There is a limit to what we can know and 
represent.  What we have, then, is a sort of imagining of nonhuman experience presented in a 
human medium or mode of thought.  And while this is done in virtually any text dealing with 
nonhuman experience, Pilnyak’s story is important because it momentarily foregrounds the act 
of representation and its shortcomings with respect to human understanding and expression.              
      The most overt instance of this occurs in the climax, where the narrator includes a series of 
vocal communications.  In texts typically viewed as anthropomorphic, one will often see 
nonhuman animals communicating through human speech.  A classic example of this is 
Tolstoy’s “Kholstomer,” in which, over the course of several evenings, the old horse tells his 
stable-mates the story of his past.  In such a narrative, the reader must participate in the 
convention of representation, and see such moments as if they were translations of nonhuman 
communication in order to achieve a particular result.  The difference between Tolstoy’s story 
and this one is that Pilnyak seems to be deliberately addressing the idea of translation to 
highlight the question of access to the animal’s perspective. 
      There are two key points of “human speech” in the narrative, placed immediately one after 
another, in sections four and five, the point of both the organizational center of the text and the 
climax of the narrative arc mentioned above.  This is their second spring together, the time of the 
birds’ first reproduction.  At the end of section four, the male bird is drawn to his mate by a 
“great and beautiful passion” (bol’shaia, prekrasnaia strast’).  She, in turn, accepts his advances, 
and it is here that the narrator uses human speech, but the way he does so is quite careful.  Here 
is the exchange as it appears in the text: 
На своем языке, языке инстинкта, самка говорила самцу: 
      —Да.  Можно. 
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      И самец бросался к ней, изнемогая блаженством страсти.  И она отдавалась ему. 
 
                                                            V 
      Так было с неделю, с полторы. 
      Потом же, когда ночью приходил к ней самец, она говорила: 
      —Нет.  Довольно. 
      Говорила, инстинктом своим чувствуя, что довольно ибо пришла другая пора—
пора рождения детей.198 
 
 
In her language, the language of instinct, the female said to the male: 
      —Yes. You may. 
      And the male threw himself at her, exhausted with the bliss of passion.  And she 
yielded to him. 
                                                            V 
 
So it was for a week or a week and a half. 
Then at last, when the male came to her at night, she said: 
—No.  Enough. 
She spoke, feeling instinctively that it was enough, for another time had come—the time 
of the birth of children. 
 
This portion of the text calls attention to itself with the simple, parallel structure of the two 
utterances and how they are placed in such a way that they straddle the break between sections.   
While this structure can be read as emphasizing the thematic importance of reproduction, which 
of course it does, it can also be seen as engaging the anthropomorphic text.  Rather than simply 
presenting the speech and leaving implicit the interpretive nature of the speech, the narrator 
announces the fact that he is translating through the phrases he uses to qualify the utterances: “in 
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her language, the language of instinct,” and “feeling with her instinct.”  These function as a sort 
of explanatory note that the narrator is conveying the essence of the exchanges in a manner 
accessible to the reader. 
      The narrator’s translation of these exchanges is further emphasized through contrast with the 
male bird’s untranslated calls (hoots) that frame the “dialogue” quoted above.  There are three of 
these calls in the text, in sections two, three, and six.  In addition to providing contrast, if one 
compares the narrator’s presentation of these calls in turn, one notices that they too highlight the 
issue of interpretation.  In the first of these, the narrator simply presents the call as it would 
sound:  
Перед вечером самец, неизвестно почему ухал: 
—У-гу-у!—кричал он так, будто звук в горле его проходит через воду.199 
Toward evening, the male, for some unknown reason, called out: 
—Oo-hoo-oo! he cried, as if the sound in his throat were passing through water. 
An interesting detail here is that the narrator qualifies the call with an expression of ignorance.  
He writes that the male calls “for some unknown reason,” but he uses an impersonal type of 
adverb rather than a verbal adverb as he had in the expressions of ignorance seen in section two 
(“not knowing why”).  Using the impersonal adverb (neizvestno) creates a level of ambiguity 
regarding precisely to whom the reason for the call is unknown, whether to the bird or to the 
narrator.  With the second call, the narrator removes this ambiguity, but still resists trying to fully 
access the bird’s consciousness: 
Потом, снова сжимаясь в комок, втягивая голову, жмурясь, ухал. 
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—У-гу-гу-гу-у!—кричал он, пугая лесных жителей.200 
Then, he huddled up again, drew in his head and, squinting, called out. 
—Oo-hoo-hoo-hoo-oo!, he cried, frightening the forest creatures. 
While he goes a step further in his description, indicating how the call is perceived by other 
animals, and while he still does not interpret the call or its motivations, he does indicate that an 
invigorating alarm (trevoga) had entered him.  Additionally, this occurs just before the 
“translated” mating exchange quoted above.  However, while these details suggest a motivation, 
there are a few sentences between them and the call, a gap which gives the impression that a 
causal chain is likely but still uncertain.  In the third and final call, this uncertainty is removed, as 
the narrator goes still further along a continuum of interpretation: 
И он в полноте жизни, в ее красоте, грозно и жутко ухал, встряхивая эхо. 
—У-гу-гу-гу-у!—кричал он, пугая ночь.201 
And in the fullness of life, in its beauty, he called out fiercely and threateningly, stirring 
the echoes. 
—Oo-hoo-hoo-hoo-oo! he cried, frightening the night. 
In the second call, the focus is on the external depiction of the bird’s body and movements, but 
both these and the description of the call remain rather neutral.  In this third instance, he 
interprets both the motivation and the manner of the call in a way that distinctly contrasts with 
his earlier distance and objectivity. 
      In including these calls and imposing upon them varying degrees of what would be labeled 
“anthropomorphism,” and by juxtaposing them with expressly “translated” interactions, Pilnyak 
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is foregrounding the question of our experience of nonhuman communication.  We can see that 
animals communicate with one another.  We can even often see, with time and attention, what 
they are communicating about.  But we cannot penetrate this communication or their 
consciousness enough to quite grasp how these exchanges, in whatever form, are understood and 
processed, how they are felt.  It is not that animals do not understand and engage with the world 
in a meaningful way, but that this understanding is opaque to us and therefore creates an obstacle 
to our desire to know and talk about it.  We are limited to translation and interpretation.   
      Pilnyak’s narrator demonstrates the inherent difficulty in attempting to represent nonhuman 
life from within.  The narrator is shown to grapple with this problem in that we see, near the 
beginning, his attempt to access the animals’ perception or feeling of instinct and other natural 
forces, but then, as the narrative progresses, he employs increasingly more interpretation as his 
insight into the nonhuman cannot be sustained.  And while this grappling and inconsistency is 
evident throughout, the climax (“dialogue”) marks a point of transition from which we see his 
greater reliance on interpretation and his arrival at conclusions which reveal his difficulty.   
      As a possible consequence of this difficulty, we also see an increasing turn toward an 
anthropocentric view on the part of the narrator.  The uncertainly and speculation prevalent in the 
first half of the text gives way to more authoritative statements and conclusions, beginning in 
section six.  As mentioned earlier, following the wolf-eye/moon simile in section three, the 
narrator states, “If they were able to think” (Esli by ptitsy umeli dumat’).  In section six, we see 
the first of two pronouncements in which he uses similar language but in a more definitive way, 
drawing sharp distinction between thought and instinct.  He writes: 
Самец не умел думать и едва ли чувствовал, но чувствовалось в нем, что он горд, у 
своего прямого дела, которое вершит с великой радостью. 
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И вся жизнь его была заполнена инстинктом, переносящим всю волю его и 
жизнеощущение на птенцов.202 
 The male was not able to think and was barely able to feel, but within him was a sense of 
pride in his work, which he manages with great joy. 
His whole life was suffused with instinct, which directed his will and sense of life toward 
his fledglings. 
Similarly, in the next section he writes:  
Он не умел думать.  Он делал это потому, что так велел тот инстинкт, который 
правил им.203 
He was not able to think.  He did as he did because it was so ordered by the instinct 
which guided him. 
In these passages, the narrator is invoking the traditional instinct/intellect binary which has been 
used to mark a distinction between human and animal minds from Aristotle through Descartes up 
to modern ethology, an anthropocentric strain of thought which posits that only humans have 
rational agency while animals may appear to be active agents, but really act only in accordance 
with reflex or instinct.  However, leaving aside the problem of accessibility, though it applies to 
this as well, the narrative confronts this anthropocentrism in a couple of important ways.   
      One such confrontation is achieved through form.  As discussed above, the narrator states 
that the birds are incapable of thought, while elsewhere he describes their thoughts and feelings 
either as an omniscient statement or in a mode of speculative interpretation.  In these passages 
and their surrounding text, Pilnyak engages the question of agency though the use of narrative 
inconsistency, specifically through the use of verbs within the narrative.  In the line above, we 
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see that he immediately juxtaposes the active and passive forms of the same verb (chuvstvovat’ / 
chuvstvovat’sia – “to feel,” “to be felt”) in the context of the bird’s capacity to feel or to 
understand his sensations.  In discourse on instinct and agency, an animal is typically seen as a 
passive instrument through which the processes of instinct operate, a contrast illustrated in this 
juxtaposition.  Yet, in the long paragraph that follows this line, the narrator presents a series of 
actions each of which feature active verbs performed by the bird as the active nominative 
subject.  Moreover, several of these actions are qualified in ways that highlight his agency: he 
watches attentively (vnimatel’no) as the fledglings feed; he flies hurriedly and solicitously 
(pospeshno, zabotlivo) after a fledgling who has fallen from the nest, and he carries him back 
carefully (ostorozhno). 
      These inconsistencies continue to the end of the story, where we are given a vision of the 
male bird coming to terms with death.  The narrator writes that he has settled the account of his 
life, that he has lived to eat and reproduce, that what remains for him is only to die and that, “he 
probably sensed this instinctively, since for two days he sat quietly and still on the precipice, his 
head drawn into his neck” (verno, on chuvstvoval eto instinktom, ibo dva dnia sidel tikho i 
nedvizhno na obryve, vtianuv golovu v sheiu).
204
  Again, we see the narrator using the concept of 
instinct as a qualifier, as a means of explaining the bird’s behavior while maintaining a border of 
difference between human and animal subjectivity.  But that it is again somewhat inconsistent, 
and presented with the speculative “probably,” reminds the reader, at the end, that an important 
point of the text is the human perception and representation of the nonhuman world, in contrast 
to the nonhuman experience of the world.   
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      The other way the text challenges anthropocentrism is less concrete, and concerns the overall 
tone of the narrative and the conclusions reached at the end of the story.  While the narrator is 
seen to grapple with the problem of accessibility and in his struggle with representation he 
reveals certain anthropocentric tendencies, he does not devalue the birds’ lives.  Rather, his tone 
is consistently one of interest and respect, while at the same time continually reminding the 
reader of the difference between instinctual intuition and human reason.  Thus, in light of his 
emphasis on reason, an important distinction emerges, between living without understanding 
why, and living without the need to understand why.  The birds engage in behaviors necessary 
for their existence, yet the reader is consistently made aware that these behaviors spring from 
natural, unalterable sources, either environmental or instinctual, rather than from choices 
stemming from reason or an analytical awareness of life, of life cycles, of causality, etc.  But the 
juxtaposition of these distinctions invites the view that a nonhuman life is no less complete or 
meaningful in the absence of understanding as we tend to define it.   
      The text maintains a complex relationship both with the animals it seeks to portray as well as 
the humans for whom the portrayal exists.  This is one of the things that makes this particular 
story quite valuable—it is effective in decentering the human.  It suggests humanity’s 
estrangement from nature perhaps as a consequence of our forced exclusivity.  At the beginning 
of the story, the narrator states, in a short simple paragraph, “Man seldom came here” (Tut redko 
byval chelovek).  This is the only mention of humankind in the text.  We are thus given a glimpse 
of the world without human presence or influence.  And this world is presented through an 
omniscient narrator who struggles with his omniscience, with his ability to access this world and 
explain it to us.   
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      In her analysis, Galina Lobanova argues that the human-animal difference exhibited in the 
text is important insofar as it shows that humans are distinguished by their ability to have a 
greater sense of the whole, an awareness of cycles, instinct, etc.
205
  This may be a valid 
conclusion insofar as humans do seem to have a more holistic sense of existence, and seem 
demonstrably superior in terms of analytical ability.  However, it does not necessarily follow that 
because of such heightened analytical ability humans are qualitatively better, that for other 
animals, whose awareness of life in manner and degree is not equal to that of humans, life is for 
them any less whole.  The title of the story is compelling in this regard, and seems to be 
something to which Pilnyak gave considerable thought, having changed it to “Tselaia zhizn’” (A 
Complete Life) from the original “Nad ovragom” (Above the Ravine).  It is a story of a complete 
life as we may or may not understand it.  And it is in this that the variation in the story’s 
allegorical potential is most revealing.  The story can be read as relating to human experience, 
but in rather a different sense.  The similarity or difference between humans and the birds matter 
less than our attitudes toward these comparisons.  The story operates on two levels 
simultaneously.  On the one hand it is a sort of naturalist portrait of animals in nature.  On the 
other it is a query not so much into animals’ lives, but into the human reception of them, into our 
own abilities, ideas, and beliefs of self-importance.  The animals represented in the story live 
complete lives without us.  They understand life to the extent that they need to, and they do not 
need us to understand them. 
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II.  Because She is Beef: Valuing the Subject in Platonov’s “The Cow” (1938). 
      Where Pilnyak’s story gives us a glimpse of animal life without a human presence, Andrei 
Platonov’s “The Cow” presents the reader with a subject whose life, as a domesticated animal, is 
marked by human intervention.  As in “A Complete Life,” we have an omniscient narrator who 
employs interpretation to give the reader access into the animal’s interior life, and consequently 
raises questions concerning the cultural assumptions regarding the intrinsic value of that life.  
Where the story diverges is in its implications, arising mainly from the difference in context.  
The birds in Pilnyak’s story lead complete lives in accordance with their natural instincts; in 
Platonov’s story, the cow’s nature and instincts are frustrated because of her role and status in 
human society.  Because of the context, the story features a prominent and sustained tension 
between the cow’s subjectivity and her objectification as an agricultural resource, whose value is 
determined by what her body can provide or produce.  The narrator’s attempt to access her inner 
life and generate empathy with her suffering is framed in the text by reductive objectification.  
The cow begins and ends as a resource.  The tension created by these conflicting views provides 
a critical view of anthropocentrism, in terms of both the exploitation of living beings, and the 
devaluation of individual subjective lives by which such exploitation is justified. 
      The association or equation of animal and human life is prominent in Platonov’s work; the 
animality of humans and the “humanity” of animals serve as devices Platonov uses for various 
ends—satire, cultural criticism, philosophical speculation.  However, animals in Platonov’s 
fiction are typically more than just symbols or metaphors for humans or human circumstances.  
Often animals are represented as beings in their own right, or if they are stand-ins for something 
else, it is often the concept of “animal.”  As beings, in his works we see animals assuming the 
traditional roles imposed upon them—they are ridden, used as agricultural laborers, eaten, and 
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hunted.  However, there is typically not the same sense of the assumed value hierarchy we see in 
other authors.  Rather, we often encounter a degree of implicit, and sometimes explicit, criticism 
of such a hierarchy, either from the narrator, or through the sentiments of the characters with 
whom the narrator is in closest sympathy.  What becomes apparent, and what some scholars have 
noted, is that Platonov was rather consumed with the idea of a continuum of life, that all beings 
have, from a subjective standpoint, an equal stake in terrestrial existence.  What is remarkable is 
that he so often underscores the idea that this continuum exists beyond any type of value system.  
Konstantin Barsht notes that “In Platonov’s works there are no distinctions of value between 
living beings, nor between beings and things.”206  Similarly, Elena Tolstaya argues that in his 
work of the 1930’s, Platonov demonstrates an interest in finding a way out of this metaphysical 
hierarchy of being, in which “lower” forms of life serve as food for “higher.”207  This is a 
concept he explores in “The Cow,” using subjectivity and empathy as a possible way out. 
      The story is about a cow and the young boy, Vasya Rubtsov, who has grown attached to her, 
and who, through a series of events concerning the cow, must confront suffering, loss, death, and 
the prevailing notions of the adult world concerning the value of the cow’s life.   At the 
beginning of the story, we learn that the cow’s young calf has fallen ill.  Vasya’s father, a 
railway crossing keeper, takes him to the local veterinarian, and after having the calf treated, 
decides to sell him for slaughter, since he receives a good offer, and since his family has no 
practical use for a bull.  The mother cow, however, is shown to suffer deeply due to the loss of 
her son.  In her grief, she wanders onto the nearby railway tracks and is consequently hit and 
killed by a train.  Her body is then sold for meat.  The story ends with an excerpt from Vasya’s 
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classroom essay, responding to the question of how he “will live and work in order to be of 
service to our Motherland.”  In his response, he narrates the events concerning the cow and his 
gratitude for her sacrifice to him and his family and his promise to remember her.  
      Vasya is endowed with an independence of mind which the narrator repeatedly underscores 
as part of his resistance to loss, death, and the assimilation of the dominant worldview.  He is not 
afraid to reproach the adult characters for what he deems their irresponsibility and 
thoughtlessness, such as the train conductor for his not having brought enough sand for the 
wheels to grip the rails when going uphill, as well as his father when he returns from selling the 
calf, whom Vasya feels was too young to be separated from his mother. While one could argue 
that this is demonstrative of a youthful idealism or ignorance of practical, economic concerns, it 
also suggests that he is unwilling to compromise what is just or responsible for the sake of 
external concerns, and his emotional and intellectual independence position him in the narrative 
as a representation of an ideal.  The tragedy of the story rests in the fact that this ideal is at odds 
with the outside world, and Vasya risks losing this perspective in his passage into adulthood.  It 
thus echoes a prevalent existential theme in Platonov, discussed by Thomas Seifrid as the 
“progression from resistance to some larger order or force, to reluctant submission to it all the 
same.”208  For though at the end Vasya promises to remember the cow, some points made 
elsewhere in the narrative suggest that his memory of her will likely fade with time.   
      This idea is central to some of the critical work devoted to the text.   For instance, Galina 
Romanova reads the story as a coming-of-age tale in which Vasya encounters, and is forced to 
cope with, the challenge to his holistic and existentially unified worldview.
209
  The story is not so 
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much about the cow, as it is about Vasya.  A key element of the story, as she points out, is the 
narrative distinction between the adult characters and the child, and the differing ways they view 
the cow and her perceived value.  The adults adopt a more practical view, whereas Vasya 
perceives an inherent value in the cow, which she argues is due to the naiveté of youth which 
tends to anthropomorphize nonhuman life, a naiveté which he will lose in his passage to 
adulthood.
210
   
      Tatiana Fominykh also offers a reading which is centered on Vasya.
211
 However, in contrast 
to Romanova, she devotes much more space to detailing the philosophical underpinnings of 
Vasya’s resistance, focusing on the young hero’s story not so much as a coming-of-age tale than 
as a representation of certain philosophical strains in Platonov’s work.  She discusses, as many 
scholars have done with Platonov’s work in general, the palpable influence of Nikolai Fedorov, 
particularly the aim of universal brotherhood and the resistance to death.
212
  She argues that the 
central focus of the story is Vasya’s opposition to death, and that through his empathy and active 
agency, he represents a vital force in the manifestation of Platonov’s “idea of life” stemming 
from Fedorovian philosophy, which uses grief over death as a starting point in the striving 
toward an immortal ideal.
213 
 She explains that the thematic material of the story stems from two 
things: Platonov’s loss of his son, who was arrested in 1938; and the childhood memory of 
Vasilii Rozanov’s witnessing a cow being slaughtered, a memory which, for him, echoed the 
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pitiful lot of all living beings.
214
  In light of these influences, the cow in Platonov’s story 
becomes symbolic of both parental loss and a sort of destined fatality.  In terms of the latter, 
Fominykh argues, the important distinction in Platonov’s story is the fact that this fatality does 
not generate merely a passive despair, but an active resistance to injustice. 
      These readings certainly contribute to our understanding of the text, particularly Romanova’s 
analysis of setting, theme, and point of view, as well as Fominykh’s discussion of the larger 
philosophical and biographical context, and the symbolic value of Vasya’s resistance.  However, 
there has not yet been a detailed analysis of the cow’s interiority in terms of its relevance to the 
problem of humans’ attitudes to other animals.  Thus, I would like to extend the above points by 
taking a closer look at the way in which the cow is depicted, the specific language used, and the 
position of key points in the narrative—elements which raise questions about subjectivity and 
value as a critical counterpoint to anthropocentrism.  
      While Vasya is the main protagonist, the narrator keeps the cow in a central position.  This is 
done through the title
215, and through the narrator’s devoting significant space to describing her 
behavior and her subjective mental and emotional states.  The desire for access and 
understanding is first made overt in the initial train episode as the narrator describes Vasya’s 
personality.  On the day the calf is taken to town, the father has not returned in time to signal the 
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evening train and see it past, and so Vasya must do it.  In this scene, referring to the boy’s 
interest in physics and machinery, the narrator states that Vasya “could not bear to see any object 
or substance and not understand its workings and how it lived inside itself” (Ego muchilo, esli on 
videl kakoi-libo predmet ili veshchestvo i ne ponimal, otchego oni zhivut vnutri sebia i 
deistvuiut).
216
  The language used here is strange, particularly as the verb “to live” is used for 
inanimate nouns.  This is not uncommon in Platonov’s fiction, where we often see a blurring of 
the line between animate and inanimate as well as abstract and concrete.
217
  Here, though, this 
use of language is given additional significance by suggesting a curiosity for not only how a 
being functions or lives, but for an understanding of how it experiences that life, its unique 
subjective point of view.  The idea of subjectivity here is further emphasized by its place in the 
text.  It follows a description of this same curiosity applied to the people on passing trains.  The 
narrator explains:  
он всматривался в лица людей, глядящих из окон пассажирских поездов,—кто они 
такие и что они думают,—но поезда шли быстро, и люди проезжали в них не 
узнанными мальчиком на переезде.218 
he looked at the faces of the people who looked through the windows of the passenger 
trains,—who were they and what were they thinking,—but the trains went by quickly and 
the people in them passed by, still unknown to the boy at the crossing. 
The key clause here (who were they and what were they thinking) is set off by dashes, which 
formally distinguishes it and helps to connect it to the common theme of interiority.  The narrator 
then goes on to describe a particular incident involving one of these unknown passengers, a 
young, pensive (zadumchivyi) man whose train passed by slowly enough for him to notice the 
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boy at the crossing and briefly engage him in a silent exchange.  Vasya wonders who he is—a 
parachutist, an artist, a medal-winner—and “tells” him not to die, but to wait for him to grow up 
so they can meet again.   
      This passage deals with the subjectivity of other humans, but there are a couple of ways in 
which this is related to the subjectivity of the cow.  The first is thematic, as mentioned above; the 
second is linguistic.  Platonov uses repetition to establish a formal connection between this 
episode and the introductory episode in which we see Vasya interact with the cow.  In the 
opening section, the narrator states: 
Она всегда узнавала мальчика, он любил ее.  Ему нравилось все, что в ней было,—
добрые теплые глаза, обвденные темные кругами, словно корова была постоянно 
утомлена или задумчива…219 
She always recognized the boy, and he loved her.  He liked everything about the cow: her 
warm kind eyes, framed by dark circles—as if she were continually exhausted or lost in 
thought… 
In the descriptions of the cow and, a bit later, the young man on the train, the narrator repeats the 
word “zadumchivyi,” which both creates a formal link between these two passages, and endows 
both figures with a personal subjectivity, particularly one signifying a private depth of mental 
experience, albeit with the cautiously interpretive “as if” (slovno) when applied to the cow.  The 
second repetition here is found in the similarity between the phrase “uznavala mal’chika” (she 
recognized the boy) and the phrase “ne uznannymi mal’chikom” (unknown to the boy).  While 
the grammar between the two phrases is different, the word order is the same.  In the first we 
have an active, transitive verb with the cow as the subject and Vasya as the direct object; in the 
second we have a participle of the verb while Vasya is the logical subject in a passive 
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construction.  Thus, the grammatical differences between the two phrases lend additional 
significance insofar as they call attention to the interplay or reversal of subject and object, and 
active and passive agent, which enrich the text’s treatment of the theme of subjectivity. 
      In addition to highlighting the interplay of grammatical subjects, the sentence near the 
beginning (“she always recognized him, he loved her”) points to another question raised in the 
text: the significance and implications of the difference between species.  While the two clauses 
are very similar grammatically, the juxtaposition of two different verbs with the absence of a 
conjunction creates a noticeable distinction.  It is not that the cow is incapable of deep feeling—
the narrator elsewhere demonstrates that she is—but that the two characters see each other in 
different ways.  Later in the story this distinction becomes central to the specific way in which 
Platonov explores the issue of empathy.  The narrator makes it clear that due to the loss of her 
calf, the cow is very distraught, waiting for him, searching, and lowing mournfully.  Seeing this 
suffering, Vasya tries to console her but is unsuccessful.  In one instance, Vasya goes out to the 
yard and puts his arms around her neck “so she would understand that he understood and loved 
her,” but she jerks her neck, throwing him off, and, with a “strange guttural sound” (chuzhoi 
gorlovoi golos), runs away into the field.  In another instance, the narrator states that Vasya feeds 
and cleans her, “but the cow did not respond to his care, nothing anyone did made any difference 
to her.”220 The reason for this is made clear in the key section of the text where the narrator gives 
the reader further insight into the nature and intensity of her suffering.  Similar to these other 
instances, here we see Vasya trying to console the cow, while she remains motionless and 
indifferent because: 
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ей нужен был сейчас только один ее сын—теленок, и ничего не могло заменить 
его—ни человек, ни трава и ни солнце.  [ . . . ] корова уныло мычала, потому что 
она была полностью покорна жизни, природе и своей нужде в сыне, который еще 
не вырос, чтобы она могла оставить его, и ей сейчас было жарко и больно 
внутри.221 
she needed only one thing—her son, the calf—and nothing could replace him; neither a 
human being, nor grass, nor the sun. [ . . . ] the cow lowed despondently, because she was 
entirely obedient to life, to nature, to the need for her son, who was not yet big enough 
for her to be able to leave him, and she felt hot and aching inside. 
Like Pilnyak’s owls, the cow is identified with nature and instinct.  Here, though, we see the 
effects of having those instincts frustrated, and a partial glimpse into what this might feel like.  
The narrator is interpreting a mode of life that is comprehensible to humans but not fully 
accessible.  Her life means something different for her; we can understand her instincts, her 
impulses, drives, etc., but we cannot completely understand how she perceives or experiences 
them.  We do not know what it is like to be a cow. 
      This is not to suggest that humans are incapable of experiencing a deep sense of loss, sorrow, 
or frustration; rather, the narrative seeks to establish an appreciation of how the experience of life 
differs between species.  Nor does the articulation of these differences diminish the text’s 
emphasis on sympathy or empathy.  In fact, it strengthens it by raising a compelling point which 
challenges widely-held beliefs regarding how humans and nonhuman animals differ in their 
experience of suffering, beliefs which are centered on human rationality.  This point is raised in 
the same passage describing the cow’s obedience to life and nature.  The narrator states: 
тяжкое, трудное горе томилось в ней, которое было безысходным и могло только 
увеличиваться, потому что свое горе она не умела в себе утешить ни словом, ни 
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сознанием, ни другом, ни развлечением, как это может делать человек. [ . . . ]      
Корова не понимала, что можно одно счастье забыть, найти другое и жить опять, не 
мучаясь более. Ее смутный ум не в силах был помочь ей обмануться: что однажды 
вошло в сердце или в чувство ее, то не могло быть там подавлено или забыто.  
[ . . . ] она глядела во тьму большими налитыми глазами и не могла ими заплакать, 
чтобы обессилить себя и свое горе.222  
 
a heavy, difficult grief languished inside her, one that could have no end and could only 
grow because, unlike a human being, she was unable to allay this grief inside her with 
words, consciousness, a friend or any other distraction.  [ . . . ]  The cow did not 
understand that it is possible to forget one happiness, to find another and then live again, 
not suffering any longer.  Her dim mind did not have the strength to help her deceive 
herself; if something had once entered her heart or her feelings, then it could not be 
suppressed there or forgotten. [ . . . ] she was looking into the darkness with large, 
bloodshot eyes, and she was unable to cry with them, to weaken herself and her grief. 
Platonov is raising the point often made that since humans have ostensibly greater or more 
developed cognitive abilities that they necessarily have a greater capacity for suffering, that 
because of this increased cognition, they can more intensely anticipate pain, imagine 
possibilities, and speculate on possible or likely consequences.  And in many respects this is true; 
suffering fear or anxiety associated with a source of pain, real or imagined, can often be worse 
than the experience of the pain itself.  But the question raised in this passage is whether greater 
cognitive capacity or increased rationality necessarily correlates to the degree of suffering.  
Several researchers and theorists suggest that in many ways, and in many circumstances, the 
reverse might in fact be true.
223
  In contrast to humans, if other animals are less able to 
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rationalize or understand the source of fear or pain, or are unable to imagine an end to it, their 
experience of that pain or fear may actually be more distressing.
224
  Bernard Rollin offers a 
challenge to the belief that animals are less capable of suffering because of their limited intellect, 
and specifically, their lack of a concept or awareness of time, that they cannot remember or 
anticipate pain and so their experience of pain is both transitory and insignificant.  He argues that 
if one accepts the position that animals are thoroughly immersed in the present, then their 
experience of pain would be worse, specifically because they cannot remember its absence or 
look forward to its cessation. According to this logic, he writes, “If animals are in pain, their 
whole universe is pain; there is no horizon; they are their pain.  So if this argument is indeed 
correct, then animal pain is terrible to contemplate, for the dark universe of animals logically 
cannot tolerate any glimmer of hope within its borders.”225 
      In this passage, then, Platonov is asserting a difference between species, not as a way of 
excusing or justifying animal suffering, but as attempt to illustrate what that suffering might be 
like from an animal’s point of view, to try to access the subjective experience of that suffering.  
Of course, there is a limit to accessibility into the consciousness of another being, and so 
Platonov’s narrator offers a vision of her experience couched in imaginable, understandable 
concepts.  We cannot truly feel or understand her pain, but we can approach an appreciation of it, 
however limited our own faculties.  In doing so, he is attempting to give the reader an experience 
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of empathy as a way to challenge the valuation of an animal’s life and experience, a valuation 
based on criteria which invariably privilege the human. 
      To emphasize the message of empathy, and to heighten the contrast between opposing 
attitudes regarding nonhuman life, the passages concerning the cow’s subjectivity are framed in 
the narrative by passages referring to her objectification and the reduction of her life to a 
resource.  This reduction is first illustrated in the opening paragraph: 
Серая степная корова черкасской породы жила одна в сарае.  Этот сарай, 
сделанный из выкрашенных снаружи досок, стоял на маленьком дворе путевого 
железнодорожного сторожа.  В сарае, рядом с дворами, сеном, просяной соломой и 
отжившими свой век домашними вещами—сундуком без крышки, прогоревшей 
самоварной трубой, одежной ветошью, стулом без ножек,—было место для ночлега 
коровы и для ее жизни в долгие зимы.226 
The gray Cherkassian cow from the steppe lived alone in a shed; the shed made of boards 
and painted on the outside, stood in the small yard by the house of the level-crossing 
keeper.  In the shed, beside the firewood, the hay, the millet straw and the household 
things that had outlived their time—a trunk without a lid, a burnt-out samovar flue, some 
old rags, a chair without legs—there was space for the cow to lie down in at night, and 
for her to live in during the long winters. 
This paragraph sets the tone of the story with a few of important elements.  Firstly, we see the 
perceived “thingness” of the cow, as she is introduced among a catalogue of resources or used 
up, worthless objects.  Secondly, the nature of these objects is important as they are either of 
human production or natural materials gathered for human use (or secondary use, perhaps, in the 
case of the hay and straw as it is used as feed).  Even the mention of her Circassian breed 
(poroda) suggests human intervention and domination.  Thus, our first vision of the cow is one 
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of a being who finds herself firmly lodged in the human world, placed among inanimate objects 
in varying states of use and disuse.  In this way, her position in the world order is made clear: she 
is not a being, an end to herself, she is a resource.   
      Similar illustrations of reduction occur later in the text.  One such instance, relating to this 
aspect of “thingness” in particular, takes place in the train episode in which Vasya helps the 
conductor by spreading sand on the tracks to enable the train’s wheels to better grip the rails.  
The narrator reflects upon the contents of the train’s load: 
Мимо Васи пошли тяжелые четырехосные вагоны; их рессорные пружины были 
сжаты, и мальчик понимал, что в вагонах лежит тяжелый дорогой груз. Затем 
поехали открытые платформы: на них стояли автомобили, неизвестные машины, 
покрытые брезентом, был насыпан уголь, горой лежали кочаны капусты, после 
капусты были новые рельсы и опять начались закрытые вагоны, в которых везли 
живность. [ . . . ] Из одного вагона с живностью закричала чужая безвестная 
телушка, и тогда из сарая ей ответила протяжным, плачущим голосом корова, 
тоскующая о своем сыне. 227 
Some heavy four-axle wagons went past; their springs were compressed, and the boy 
could tell they were carrying a heavy and precious load.  Then came open wagons; on 
them were motorcars, machines of some kind covered with tarpaulins, mounds of coal, 
mountains of cabbages, and then new rails; after that came more closed wagons, carrying 
livestock. [ . . . ] From one of the livestock wagons came the low of an unknown calf, and 
his own cow, yearning for her son, answered from the shed with a long, plaintive cry. 
Similar to the opening paragraph, there is an inventory of resources, but here the reduction of 
living beings to commodity or resource is more overt, as we do not have a single, individual cow 
with whom the narrator or hero is in sympathy, but rather a group of unseen animals referred to 
by the collective “zhivnost’,” who are presumably being transported to a farm or to slaughter.  
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Exploitation often relies on abstraction and distance, both philosophical and spatial, and this is 
particularly true of animals.  In this story, the narrator continually resists or exposes this 
abstraction.  In this passage, this resistance is asserted through the juxtaposition of inanimate 
things and animate beings, the sentience of whom is underscored by the cry of the unknown 
female calf and the responding bellow of the Rubtsovs’ cow.   
      The abstraction indicated in this passage is further illustrated in the text through the signifiers 
with which the cow is identified; she does not have a name, and is simply referred to as “the 
cow.”  While arguably of little importance to the cow herself, this both preserves her dramatic 
otherness and allows for the minimization and trivialization of her life; she is not an individual, 
but rather merely a member of a given species.  Even Vasya, whose feelings for the cow are very 
strong, does not give her a name, but rather calls her “cow” as that is “what was written in his 
reading book” (kak bylo napisano v knige dlia chteniia).  His reference to her as “cow” as a 
matter of accepted cultural taxonomy calls attention to the system of defining and organizing the 
natural world and the value structures imposed upon it, as well as the way in which this system is 
reinforced through the education of the young:  “You are a cow!” he tells her (ty ved’ korova).   
      This statement of her identity becomes important in comparison to the way in which she is 
referred to after she is killed.  After she is hit by the train, Rubtsov and the other men pull her 
body from under it: “they dragged the mutilated carcass of the cow out from underneath the 
tender and heaved all the beef into a dry ditch beside the track” (oni vyvolokli izurodovannoe 
tulovishche korovy iz-pod tendera i svalili vsiu goviadinu naruzhu, v sukhuiu kanavu okolo 
puti).
228
  First reduced to a taxonomic classification (cow), she is then further reduced by a 
different signifier (beef).  This same identification is repeated in Vasya’s short essay written for a 
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classroom exercise at the end of the story.  In his essay he writes that she “died from a train” and 
was eaten too, as her son had been, “because she is beef” (ee tozhe c’’eli, potomu chto ona 
goviadina).
229
   In his sympathy for the cow, Vasya is forced to come to terms with the reduction 
of her life to the use-value for the humans to whom she is subjugated, and he is forced to engage 
the cultural signifiers by which the life and totality of the animal is reduced to her physical parts, 
to the word used for the flesh they consume, in a sort of semantic distancing.  She is not a 
sentient being—she is meat. 
      The repeated emphasis that the cow is a sentient being with a mental and emotional life 
distinct and important for her is indicative of a larger trend in Platonov’s work, in which animals 
are repeatedly seen as more than objects, more than simply means to human ends, however they 
might be used in a given situation.  More generally, though, Platonov was very interested in the 
idea of natural unity, an awareness of the fact that all beings (and Platonov does not even restrict 
this to sentient beings) are engaged in their own existential or evolutionary path, that nature 
exists independently of any anthropocentric or hierarchical worldview we might wish to impose 
upon it.  He wrote in his journal that life is “not a ladder of evolution, but a mixture of living 
beings, a general conglomeration.”230  Placing all beings on an equal existential plane, Platonov 
presents a challenge to ontological hierarchies by asserting a view that other animals are not 
lower forms of life, but only different forms, complete in and for themselves.  This idea is quite 
overtly stated in the novella Dzhan (Soul), written a few years earlier (1935) in which the 
narrator concludes that other beings have distinct qualities which signify the “great inner worth 
of their existence” (velikoe vnutrennee dostoinstvo ikh syshchestvovaniia).231   
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      In these stories, Platonov and Pilnyak raise the issue of intrinsic value of other animals, a 
value which has nothing really to do with how we see them, nor how we see ourselves in relation 
to them.  We often judge the value of animals based on faculties which more closely approach 
those we prize in ourselves—reason, abstract thought, ingenuity, etc.  Of course, we are 
immersed in our own particular way of seeing; just as we do not have access into another 
animal’s mode of consciousness, we do not have a way out of our own.  However, while the 
faculties which distinguish the human, in kind or degree, are important and valuable to us, there 
is not necessarily a reason to believe that they are universally so.  Barbara Noske examines this 
practice of valuation in connection with theories of communication.  She argues that in judging 
animal communication by human standards, in trying to determine whether animals have some 
degree of human-like language, the animals will always come out as “reduced humans.”  We 
claim to know, she states, “from within that [humans] themselves possess certain faculties and to 
know from without that animals do not.”232 
      It is difficult to put aside the human yardstick when considering the value of other animals, 
not only insofar as it is all we know or can know, but also because it raises uncomfortable 
questions.  These questions can threaten to destabilize our sense of self, the assumptions or 
beliefs we hold about the value of human existence; and they can force us to examine the ethics 
of our behavior.  If we accept nonhuman animals as subjects, intrinsically valuable and complete 
in themselves, the strategies we use to justify our exploitation of them are challenged.   
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Conclusion 
(Re)seeing the animal 
 
 
I see now what a horse means to a Cossack and a 
cavalryman. 
Unhorsed cavalrymen on the hot dusty roads, their 
saddles in their arms, they sleep like corpses on 
other men’s carts, horses are rotting all around, all 
that’s talked about is horses, the customs of barter, 
the excitement, horses are martyrs, horses are 
sufferers—their saga, I myself have been gripped by 
this feeling, every march is an agony for the horse. 
Isaac Babel, Diary, 18 August 1920. 
 
 
      In 1920, Babel was serving as a war correspondent in the Sixth Cavalry Division of the Red 
Army.  Being in a cavalry division, Babel was surrounded by horses, and their presence is felt 
throughout his diary and the Red Cavalry (Konarmiia) cycle based on his experiences and 
observations.  While such a presence would be true of most depictions of a cavalry, a 
distinguishing feature of Babel’s work is that, at times, he foregrounds the horse, not as a 
vehicle, resource, or property, but as a being made to serve human ends.  This is perhaps most 
apparent in the above passage in which he juxtaposes the value of the horse from the perspective 
of the Cossack and cavalryman, with the sensitive assertion of what this experience is like from 
the perspective of a horse.  He tries to really see the horse.  And while the diary entry above may 
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be a more overt example of this attempt than we see in the Red Cavalry cycle which developed 
from it, when we look at these later stories in light these entries, we see the animals in those 
stories in a different way; we become more sensitive to their presence, and, I would argue, to the 
ethical implications of their presence. 
      I began this dissertation with a comparison of two images, two modifications of the iconic 
image of St. George to show how the human/animal binary is overlain with a hierarchical 
concept which holds the human as fundamentally superior.  When we look at these images we 
immediately see the two principal figures, the knight and the serpent, and we perceive their 
ascribed value in a moral or ideological sense.  Indeed, this immediacy of perception is necessary 
for their effectiveness as propaganda.  However, there is a third figure in these images, one 
which, despite its centrality, we tend to overlook: the horse.  Unlike the serpent, the horse on 
which the knight is mounted is less noticeable because he is, in many ways, an extension of the 
knight; he is his vehicle, his property.  In relation to both animals in either image, the human is 
supreme, but the horse is not the focus because he has already been conquered.   
      Any representation of an animal carries with it, intentionally or otherwise, the baggage of our 
ideas, beliefs, and attitudes.  In his work on animal imagery, Steve Baker explores the possibility 
that attitudes to living animals are the result of the symbolic use of our concept of the animal in 
cultural representations.  He argues that “the representational, symbolic and rhetorical uses of the 
animal must be understood to carry as much conceptual weight as any idea we may have of the 
‘real’ animal, and must be taken just as seriously.”233  Animals have meaning for us; we use 
them for what they can physically provide, and we use them as symbols in various strategies of 
self-definition.   But an important feature of the texts explored here is that they point to an 
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understanding of animals as more than a set of symbols for us to explain ourselves to ourselves, 
more than objects for our use, conceptual or physical.  Returning to the idea of two intersecting 
lines of differentiation which Tim Ingold outlines, a horizontal line which differentiates between 
species of animal, and a vertical one which seeks to raise humans out of the animal world, if we 
remove the vertical mode of difference, if we suspend our notions of hierarchy, then we are left 
with a perhaps more objective view of life in which no one species is necessarily more valuable 
than any other.  And if we suspend the notion that only humans can be subjects, if we open up 
the notion of subject to a more general sense of “subject of a life” as opposed to defining it as a 
rational agent, we are forced to confront serious moral questions concerning our attitudes to “the 
animal,” to our view of our intrinsic animality, and most importantly, to other animals. 
      Although animals pervade human culture, as beings, resources, and ideas, too little critical 
attention is paid to their significance, to us and to themselves, to how we think about them and 
how we think through them, and to the way in which the moral concept of animality is related to 
our attitudes and treatment of actual animals, as victims of our curiosity and domination.  The 
question of the animal cuts through practically every aspect of human culture, but it is a question 
that has only relatively recently been posed.  There are, of course, many possible and likely 
interrelated reasons for this lack of critical attention, from the complexity and multiplicity of the 
problem, to the uncomfortable ethical questions which result from seriously addressing it, as so 
many aspects of human culture are related to our exploitation of other animals.  However, it is an 
important line of inquiry because of what it reveals about ourselves and our self concepts, as well 
as our vision of the world beyond ourselves.  When we begin to seriously consider these 
questions about the moral significance of nonhuman animals and the politics and poetics of the 
representation of animals, we see problems hitherto unrecognized or underexplored, and this 
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affects our perception of the cultural artifacts of the past.   Looking back at older literary works, 
for instance, with our attention focused on a given author’s use of animals and animal imagery, 
new levels of meaning and complexity are revealed, and we see details, or a deeper significance 
of details, previously unnoticed. 
      In the preceding analyses, I have directed attention to the authors’ use of animals in an 
attempt to show how these writers explore the difficult questions of identity, meaning, and value 
through the use of imagery that is, because of its inherent complexity, well-suited to revealing 
some of the intricacies and deeper implications of these questions.  They were produced in a 
period of profound transition, when questions were raised regarding the reduction and 
exploitation of life, the diminishing of intrinsic value, and the social and existential opposition 
between the individual and the collective, a particularly dominant theme in the literature of this 
period.  These texts were chosen, as I mentioned earlier, because of the way in which they use 
animal imagery to engage these questions, but also because they highlight some of the problems 
of the imagery itself, the ontological and ethical issues inseparable from any discussion of “the 
animal.”  It is because of this complexity that I have chosen the method of the close reading to 
better glean the significance of the animals in these works.  This type of reading is particularly 
relevant for the literature of this period due to the writers’ inclination toward formal 
experimentation and frequent use of poetic devices to create meaning and significance.  
Additionally, though, this methodology has been employed to offer a productive way to engage 
the animal question within literary works more generally.  Because of verbal art’s capacity for 
subtlety and multiplicity, it is a perfect vehicle for the complexity of the animal image and the 
animal question.   I have sought to show how these texts operate in terms of their use of animals 
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in a way that, I hope, will reveal similar uses in other texts by these and other writers, and thus 
see these works, or aspects of these works, in a new and appropriately sensitive way. 
      While I have attempted to provide a thorough analysis of the animals in these particular 
stories, there remain some issues which could be developed, as some sacrifices had to be made 
for the sake of organization, coherence, and depth.  In order to keep my discussion of the texts 
relevant to the chapter topics, there are a number of details I do not fully explore because they 
are more relevant to other chapters.  For instance, I do not analyze the question of the fox cub’s 
interiority in “Mother Earth,” the significance of the sparrow as an actual animal juxtaposed with 
the symbolic in “The Dragon,” or the way in which the meat of Platonov’s cow may be 
symbolically related to dehumanization in an oppressive or exploitative social structure.  That the 
animals or animal imagery in these stories are amenable to different organizational approaches 
demonstrates, once more, the richness and complexity of these works, as well as the fact that 
problems concerning animals and animality operate in multiple areas and on multiple levels 
simultaneously.  
      Furthermore, I have restricted my discussion to various works by Zamyatin, Pilnyak, and 
Platonov, but other writers, and indeed other works by these same writers, feature animals in 
ways that are equally compelling.  There have been a couple valuable studies of animals in 
Tolstoy and Turgenev, but few studies of the animals in Garshin or Chekhov, some of whose 
stories question the devaluation of nonhuman life.  Likewise for twentieth century literature, 
some scholars have discussed animals in the works of Bulgakov, yet few have addressed the 
subject in Remizov or Prishvin.  There has also been surprisingly little attention paid to animals 
in Khlebnikov, Babel, and Grossman, as these writers, like Platonov, engage rather directly with 
the ethics of animal exploitation.  As the field of (Critical) Animal Studies gains attention and 
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credibility, there is no doubt that progress will be made in these neglected areas, and these 
authors be recognized for not only addressing ethical problems which are just now gaining 
traction, but also for providing intriguing ways for seeing and discussing them. 
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